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AND REMEDIES IN SALES OF GOODS
DONALD F. CLIFFORD, JR.*
Although the Uniform Commercial Code is multifaceted
and comprehensive in many respects, Article 2 of the Code virtu-
ally ignores consumer sales problems. Once states began enact-
ing the Code there was great reluctance to tamper with the
original creation. The states were left to fend for themselves in
addressing sellers' warranty disclaimers and consumers' reme-
dies. In this Article, Professor Donald Clifford examines the
state and federal non-UCC attempts to fill in the gaps in Article
2 and protect consumers from warranty limitations and
disclaimers.
Professor Clifford notes that state treatment of this issue
falls generally into three categories: Those states whose statutes
are patterned after the National Consumer Act, which imposes a
total ban on the exclusion, modification, or limitation of implied
warranties and remedies for breach of those warranties; those
states that enacted statutes similar to California's Song-Beverly
Act, which deals also with disclaimer problems and requires war-
rantor to honor express warranty obligations; and those states
that merely have regulated the process and form of warranty dis-
claimers and have insisted on actual communication of limita-
tions to the consumer. Professor Clifford discusses the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in less detail, concluding that it
has impeded rather than fostered effective enforcement of the
state statutes.
In a separate section, this Article examines case law con-
struing these statutes, providing a judicial as well as legislative
look at this unsettled area of the law. Professor Clifford con-
cludes by evaluating the impact of the state statutes and examin-
ing the lessons to be learned from their treatment of Article 2
deficiencies. These lessons should prove useful to state reformers
as well as the committee that is currently at work on revising
Article 2.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In view of the comprehensive work done in recent years to amend
most articles of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and even to draft
entirely new ones,' it is not surprising that official attention now has
turned to Article 2. After all, Article 2 has survived virtually intact for
four decades. In 1988, a Study Group was appointed to "consider
whether Article 2 should be revised and, if so, to report on what revisions
might be required." 2 The Group issued a Preliminary Report in 1990
and an Executive Summary in 1991, recommending that Article 2 be
revised.3 The drafting committee was duly appointed and is now at
work.4 Among the numerous and complex issues facing the revisors is
the fundamental question of whether special provisions should be made
for consumers.
The preliminary report of the Article 2 study group originally rec-
ommended that the revised sales law be "neutral" as to consumer issues.5
Apparently in response to strong criticism of that view,6 the Final Report
indicated a much more open attitude. In addition to recommending that
1. For a brief description, see Frederick H. Miller et al., Introduction to Uniform Com-
mercial Code Annual Survey: The Centennial of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 46 Bus. LAW. 1449, 1449-54 (1991).
2. A.B.A. Task Group, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 988 (1991) [here-
inafter Preliminary Report].
3. PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 Bus.
LAW. 1869, 1869-81 (1991) [hereinafter Executive Summary].
4. Amelia H. Boss & Patricia B. Fry, Divergent or Parallel Tracks: International and
Domestic Codification of Commercial Law, 47 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1508 (1992).
5. The "conceptual and practical" reasons for this conclusion "include the notion that
Article 2 is, primarily, a commercial statute, the fact that the history of consumer protection
law reflects local, nonuniform development, and the belief that a more inclusive approach
would impair the changes for approval and ultimate adoption of any revised Article 2." Exec-
utive Summary, supra note 3, at 1876. The background of the appointment and work of the
group is reviewed in id at 1870-71.
6. The Executive Summary cited in particular the "critical comments of Professor David
Rice." Id. at 1876 n.15. My own preliminary views of why the revised Article 2 should in-
lude express consumer provisions appear in the ABA Task Force Report. In summary, they
are: (1) The Code, despite the absence of express consumer provisions, presently applies to
consumer transactions, successfully tempting courts to fashion rules which only uneasily fit
commercial cases; (2) "There is not available a viable package of non-U.C.C. law to resolve
consumer sales law problems"; (3) Although the federal Magnuson-Moss Act does not purport
to create national consumer sales law, it does preempt some UCC privity and disclaimer of
warranty provisions in transactions involving consumers with the result that Article 2 is no
longer an accurate statement of the law on those subjects; (4) Both markets and marketing
have changed materially since the enactment of the Code; and (5) The current Article 2 liter-
ally does not cover the most prevalent form of sales warranty-the manufacturer's warranty-
which passes through the distribution process directly to the consumer. Preliminary Report,
supra note 2, at 1002-09, 1103-05 (1991).
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the revision be consistent with the substantive and disclosure rules of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Magnuson-Moss) regarding implied
warranties,7 it urged "that a more systematic study of state and federal
consumer developments be undertaken. Such a study might yield solu-
tions which are transferable to non-consumer transactions or, perhaps,
identify specific provisions that should be incorporated into Article 2 for
consumer transactions."8 This Article is a partial response to one aspect
of that invitation.
One looking for statutory provisions protecting consumers from
abuses in consumer sales transactions might as well use a kaleidoscope as
a telescope or a microscope. The much mottled picture is a virtual Jack-
son Pollock product of drippings from a wide variety of federal and state
statutes, tinted with contrasting shades of judicial interpretations, and
washed in parts by some peculiar disclosure provisions of the Magnuson-
Moss Act. There is, of course, an appropriate place for abstract art. It is
not, however, in an area of the law that applies so many times to so many
people.
There are a number of reasons why there are not more recognizable
forms in the picture. The first, of course, is that the UCC took a hands-
off approach to consumer sales problems. This was exacerbated by
strong reluctance to tamper with that glorious creation after state enact-
ments had begun for fear of impairing the uniformity which our increas-
ingly national markets required. Thus, although the Permanent
Editorial Board, responding to nonuniform amendments adopted in
some states and other pressures to lower the privity barrier, set forth
three alternative versions of Section 2-318 in 1966,9 the Article 2 war-
ranty provisions have survived since original enactment relatively un-
7. Executive Summary, supra note 3, at 1879. One recommendation appears to go even
further. It is that "the implied warranty of merchantability should not be disclaimable under
§ 2-316(2) when the seller makes a written warranty that is subject to MMWA [Magnuson-
Moss]. This is the effect under federal law and there is no good reason why state law should
not be the same." Id. As a technical matter, § 108 of Magnuson-Moss prohibits disclaimer
only in the event of what is known as a "full" warranty under that Act. In the case of all other
("limited") warranties, merchantability may be limited to the duration of an express warranty
if conscionable and the duration of the express warranty is reasonable. It is clear, however,
that the Study Group's recommendation taken in full context did not contemplate the "full"
warranty absolute disclaimer ban approach since its next recommendation regarding disclo-
sure obligations refers to a written warranty "which disclaims or limits warranties." Id. In
short, the Group's recommendation is that the Article 2 revision should be consistent with the
Magnuson-Moss rules regarding disclosure and disclaimer of implied warranties.
8. Id. at 1878.
9. The original provision was designated as Alternative A. It is not always realized that
these alternatives were set forth after the Code had been enacted in a number of jurisdictions.
Consequently, it has been difficult to gauge the significance of how many states have adopted
one or another of the alternatives. In some states, a conscious choice was never made.
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scathed.1 At the outset, there was also hope that consumer interests
could be advanced by using the new disclaimer safeguards and the more
refined remedial provisions. Perhaps the new Code would work!
Other developments on two different fronts absorbed consumer ad-
vocacy resources during the early post-UCC period. The first was the
explosion of activity to deal with the brand new and rapidly expanding
universe of consumer credit. These developments came at both the fed-
eral and state levels. In 1968, Congress launched a decade of credit-re-
lated legislation beginning with the Truth-In-Lending Act.1 During the
same period, states' focus on consumer credit took the form of revital-
izing and updating retail installment sales acts. Attempts to achieve uni-
formity in these developments resulted in two versions of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (U3C) and the consumer advocate sponsored Na-
tional Consumer Act (NCA, whose revision took the name Model Con-
sumer Credit Act (MCAA)).12 None of the efforts to unify state laws
took firm hold, although each had considerable influence in a small
number of states and small influence in others.
13
The second development was the advent of state laws dealing with
unfair and deceptive acts and practices, which hereinafter are referred to
occasionally as UDAP. This movement was encouraged during the
1960s by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which collaborated with
the Council of State Governments to produce a Uniform Act 4 that con-
tained alternative approaches centering around the prohibition in Section
Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act against "unfair methods of
10. The original § 2-316 also was changed, but this occurred so early in the process of
state enactment that the original version had almost no impact. See infra note 86.
11. The additions were the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and, finally, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. They
all appear under the umbrella of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1693r (1988).
12. The history of these Acts is discussed briefly at infra note 20.
13. According to one consumer law casebook, the U3C has been adopted-although with
nonuniform variations-in Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyo-
ming. The National Consumer Act "provided much of the substance of the Wisconsin Con-
sumer Act and piecemeal amendments to other consumer laws. Perhaps more important,
Iowa, Maine, South Carolina and West Virginia each have enacted hybrid versions containing
some U3C, some MCCA, and some local variants." JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 1991).
14. This uniform act is the Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law of
1967 and its revision in 1970. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act promulgated in
1966 also qualifies generically as state legislation dealing with deceptive trade practices. How-
ever, that Act originally was intended as a remedy for business competitors and did not pro-
vide for a consumer cause of action or state agency enforcement. It was supplemented in most
of the 13 adopting states by a second statute that provided more comprehensive remedies. See
DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 3.02[2][b] (1991).
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competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices."15 State enactment
split among two of the options set out in the Uniform Act16 and a third
mode not based on it.1
7
Two important points may be made about the relevance to con-
sumer sales warranty law of these two significant and successful state
consumer law reform efforts. Neither touched directly on the failure of
Article 2 to confront consumer sales law problems, and both involved
unsuccessful attempts to achieve uniformity. The consumer sales law
warranty issues thus were not affected directly by these movements, and
those active in the efforts toward uniformity may well have concluded
that such activity on consumer issues was futile.18
Still another reason for state inactivity on the consumer sales war-
ranty front was the rumbling from Washington about new federal legisla-
tion. In 1967, warranty legislation was introduced in the Senate, and a
series of studies on consumer product warranties was begun, resulting in
1975 in the Magnuson-Moss Act. 19 During this time, those interested in
state law changes might well have thought it prudent to "wait and see."
In light of all of these factors, it is not surprising that there was no con-
certed activity at the state level to "consumerize" sales warranty law.
What is surprising is that some states undertook the task at all. More-
over, some of those efforts have persevered for several decades and influ-
15. The FTC considered state legislation desirable because there was no private cause of
action for violation of the federal Act, and the nature and number of the problems clearly was
beyond the enforcement capacity of the federal agency. See generally PRIDGEN, supra note 14,
§ 3.02 (explaining the origins of the state acts).
16. One authority noted that 20 states have adopted the "little FTC" model based on the
prohibition of the Federal Act and that 26 have adopted the "laundry list" alternative, which,
in addition, proscribes 13 described practices. Id. Jonathan Sheldon, in NATIONAL CON-
SUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 3.4.1.2.1 (3d ed. 1991),
has a slightly different breakdown and hence different numbers. Both works have comprehen-
sive and useful appendices containing the citations and a topical analysis of the statutes. Affix-
ing the numbers is also complicated by the fact that some states have incorporated elements of
more than one approach.
17. The statutes in this group are often called "consumer fraud acts." Although not based
on one of the Uniform Act alternatives, their approach is similar to the "little FTC" Acts,
absent any reference to unfair methods of competition. Pridgen and Sheldon agree that seven
states have taken this approach.
18. Those warriors in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
must have felt this rather deeply, given the fractious reception to the U3C noted above and the
virtual nonreception of the 1971 Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act. The latter was an
attempt to provide uniformity in approaching those matters covered by the little FTC acts. It
was adopted only in Kansas, Ohio, and Utah. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra
note 16, § 3.4.1.2.2; PRIDGEN, supra note 14, § 3.02[2][e].
19. For a useful capsule of the history of this Act, see BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER
SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 14.02 (1984).
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enced the shape of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the recent wave of state
motor vehicle lemon laws, and some mobile home statutes.
The statutes came in various sizes and shapes. Despite their variety,
they do show some consistent patterns of concern about the inadequacies
of the current Article 2. They also have served as very useful experi-
ments of ways to respond to those concerns. These statutes are occasion-
ally referred to in this Article collectively as "the special statutes."
This Article is subdivided to illustrate both the types of statutes
adopted and the underlying issues addressed. Categorizing the provi-
sions of individual states is fairly accurate on a generic basis, but there
are, of course, individual variations and exceptions.
Since case law construing statutes tends to be episodic and piece-
meal, I found it more valuable to discuss the statutes directly with only
brief reference to the case law. At the same time, thorough evaluation
requires access to the train of litigation within specific states. Therefore,
the case law is discussed in detail on a state-by-state basis in a separate
section.
As will be seen, some of the special statutes focused on discrete is-
sues; others covered a wide range. Various issues were treated in differ-
ent combinations. The changes were accomplished in some states by
amendments to Article 2. In others, they were incorporated into other
consumer legislation, occasionally as a separate chapter. Many of the
statutes fit loosely into two prototypes: The National Consumer Act
(NCA) and California's Song-Beverly model. Both came to fruition at
about the same time in the early 1970s. A smaller number of states
adopted provisions dealing solely with the form and process of disclaimer
of implied warranties. Each of these approaches is examined separately.
The most widely adopted features of the NCA are a total ban on the
exclusion, modification, or limitation of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for the particular purpose and any remedies
for breach of those warranties. Adoption began in Massachusetts in 1970
and followed in Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, Maryland, the District of
Columbia, West Virginia, Kansas, Mississippi, and, with respect to per-
sonal injuries only, Alabama. This Article, at various points, refers to
these as the "total ban" states.
The Song-Beverly Act, discussed in Section V, also dealt with dis-
claimer problems. More importantly, its point of departure was requir-
ing warrantors to honor their express warranty obligations by enlarging
on UCC remedy provisions and imposing new disclosure and remedial
duties. These were emphasized by the threat of both attorney fees in all
cases and treble (later lowered to double) damages for willful violations.
1993] 1019
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The California model appears to be the basis for provisions in Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Oregon, and Rhode Island, although none of those
states attempted to follow the entire Song-Beverly scheme, and some bor-
rowed only the conditions for disclaimer of the implied warranties. More
notably, some of the Act's features were carried over into the federal
Magnuson-Moss Act and the more recent automobile and manufactured
home lemon laws.
Statutes in a number of other jurisdictions are not rooted in either
model. Those considered below deal principally with the process and
form of disclaimers and insistence on conduct that will require actual
communication to consumers if reasonably expectable terms are not to be
in the contract. No effort is made to discuss special privity or product
liability statutes that have already been widely analyzed. Only brief con-
sideration is given to the UDAP Acts and lemon laws.
The federal Magnuson-Moss Act is not analyzed in great detail.
However, some of its elements are considered because of the ways they
intersect with state law. In addition, in several places the text will indi-
cate my strong suspicion that there would have been more successful
litigation under the special state legislation considered here if regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act had not prevented it.
My concern about this is addressed briefly in section VI.
The final section briefly evaluates some of the developments that
have obscured the pressing need for Article 2 reform on consumer mat-
ters and diminished the visibility of the special statutes. It then looks to
the special statutes individually and collectively for indications of com-
mon perceptions of problems in Article 2 as it applies to consumer trans-
actions. Some significant problems emerge. There also appear some
common grounds in these diverse statutes for some of the solutions. I
have not attempted to crystallize all the wisdom of the different ap-
proaches into a single ideal proposal. Rather, it seeks to identify some
general patterns of need and response. It should become clear that some
of these time-tested approaches are available as appropriate options for
those involved in the give and take of the drafting process.
II. THE TOTAL BAN APPROACH
The first approach to overcoming the failure of Article 2 to cope
with consumer warranty and remedy problems was simple and direct: It
banned limitations on warranties and remedies. A convenient reference
point for the statutes that took this approach is the sales article of the
National Consumer Act. The National Consumer Act was the 1969
product of a national conference of consumer advocates who sought sub-
[Vol. 711020
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stantial revision of the 1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C).2 °
Although the U3C did not deal with sales warranty issues, the NCA
drafters included a brief Article on Sales on the premise that "since many
credit transactions are in fact sales of goods, there is need. to afford the
consumer additional warranty protection."21 Despite their modest origin
as a by-product of dissatisfaction with the proposed consumer credit law,
the sales provisions were directly or indirectly influential in a number of
states.
The centerpiece of the National Consumer Act is its ban on war-
ranty and remedy limitations. It fits neatly into a single brief section:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, with respect
to goods which are the subject of or are intended to become the
subject of a consumer transaction, no merchant shall:
(1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any
warranty, express or implied, including the warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; or
(2) Exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy pro-
vided by law, including the measure of damages available, for a
breach of warranty, express or implied.22
A. Ban Against Limitations of Implied Warranties and Remedies for
Their Breach
The prohibition against limitations of implied warranties and reme-
dies for their breach has been the NCA's most widely followed provision.
It appears in the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont,
and West Virginia.23
20. The U3C originally was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws in 1968 in a form that alarmed proponents of consumer interests. They in
turn set forth their own vision of a model act in the National Consumer Act in 1969, the
product of a national conference co-sponsored by the then recently formed National Consumer
Law Center and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. The Center was asked to
do the actual drafting with the aid of other experts willing to assist. See NATIONAL CON-
SUMER AcT prefatory note (First Final Draft 1970); Vincent P. Cardi, The West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 401, 408-09 (1975). This provoked
some response in the 1974 revision of the U3C and a revision of the National Consumer Act
under the new title of the Model Consumer Credit Act. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE,
1974 Act, prefatory note, 74 U.L.A. 2-3 (1985).
21. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 3.201 cmt. 1 (1970). In the same vein, the drafters
proscribed a laundry list of unfair or deceptive sales practices, noting that "the draftsmen of
the Credit Code completely ignored the fact that these practices often accompany credit trans-
actions." Id.
22. Id. § 3.302.
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (West
Supp. 1992): MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316.A (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992). Other states have adopted
1021
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The total disclaimer ban makes a strong statement of public policy 24
and rules out the use of many commonly used clauses. The range of
possible applications is only suggested by the decided cases. Among the
contract provisions held invalid under total disclaimer bans are: "as is"
clauses,25 clauses providing that an express warranty is in lieu of all other
warranties both express and implied,26 provisions limiting the duration of
merchantability to that of the express warranty,27 "50-50" warranties in
which the buyer is to pay half the cost of any repairs during the war-
ranted period,28 and attempts to confine consumers to warranty claims
against distant component suppliers.29
One court has held also that the ban makes inapplicable the waiver
by inspection provisions of UCC Section 2-316(3)(b).30 The disclaimer
ban provisions also have been applied to a "two party equipment lease"
that was held to be the functional equivalent of a sale,3" and, in a state in
which the ban also applies to services, to a fire and burglar alarm sys-
tem.32 Another court found the public policy underlying the disclaimer
similar limitations with some variations. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-316(5), -2-719(4) (1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A-2-316 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(A) (1983);
MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1 (Supp. 1988).
24. This has been noted with particular vigor in Lectro Management, Inc. v. Freeman,
Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 216, 373 A.2d 544, 546 (1977), and State ex tel Tierney v. Ford
Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866, 872 (Me. 1981).
25. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-719 (1972); Maryland Indep. Auto Dealers v. Mo-
tor Vehicle Admin., 41 Md. App. 7, 10, 394 A.2d 820, 822 (1978); Gast v. Rogers-Dingus
Chevrolet, 585 So. 2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1991); Beck Enters. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 676 (Miss.
1987).
26. See, e.g., Stair v. Gaylord, 232 Kan. 765, 776, 659 P.2d 178, 187 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Patton v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1041,
1043 (D.C. Super. 1990); Fedders Corp. v. Boatright, 493 So. 2d 301, 303, 308 (Miss. 1986).
28. See, e.g., Maryland Indep. Auto Dealers, 41 Md. App. at 7, 394 A.2d at 822.
29. See, e.g., Stair, 232 Kan. at 771, 659 P.2d at 184. The same court cast doubt on
whether the holding would survive a new product liability act provision that excuses a seller
from liability for a product manufactured elsewhere if the seller had no knowledge of and
could not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care. Id. at 771, 659 P.2d at
184.
30. Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 136 Vt. 597, 599, 396 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1979).
31. Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Assocs., 502 So. 2d 619, 621-22 (Miss. 1986). Sev-
eral of the total ban statutes apply expressly to leases. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(c)
(1983); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAWv I § 2-314(4) (1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-109(a)
(1992).
32. Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 693-94, 732 P.2d 1260, 1270-71
(1987). In a later case, the court indicated that the holding may no longer apply. See infra
discussion accompanying notes 276-77. In another total ban state, a court found it unneces-
sary to decide whether the disclaimer ban applied to a burglar alarm protection system because
the transaction did not involve "consumer goods," inasmuch as plaintiff was a corporation
engaged in business. New England Watch Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 111 Mass. App. Ct. 948,
948, 416 N.E.2d 1010, 1011 (1981).
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ban persuasive in determining whether a mixed goods and services trans-
action was subject to UCC Article 2 warranties.33
Several cases illustrate the important point that since the implied
warranty of merchantability may not be disclaimed, it may extend be-
yond the duration of an express warranty.34 In a used car case invoking
that rule, the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that the warranty of
merchantability contemplates that a used car will not last as long as a
new one.
35
The ban in these states against remedy limitations has been invoked
in surprisingly few cases. It has been construed to invalidate copayment
provisions, 36 a clause limiting recovery to $250,37 and to raise some
doubt about the validity of a requirement for arbitration.38 The ban
against remedy limitations for breach of implied warranties does not
reach limitations in service contracts that provide "extra benefits in addi-
tion to the implied warranties. ' 39 On the other hand, a contractual limi-
tation on remedies for breach of express warranty cannot affect recovery
under an implied warranty theory. 4'
Several reasons may account for the scarcity of case law in this area.
The motor vehicle lemon laws that have so rapidly evolved in the last
decade may have absorbed some of the cases. Those laws, although
working within finite time lines, provide more specific and stronger reme-
dies than available under the special provisions or the UCC. Consumer
lemon cases litigated under the UCC also have evolved to provide conse-
quential damages even in the face of contractual provisions that bar
them. Thus, it is possible that those litigating over lemons have used the
format which has developed everywhere. 41 That is, however, a tortuous
path that runs from failure of the essential purpose of the standard lim-
ited remedy of repair and replacement clause to the consequent availabil-
ity of Code remedies. These remedies in the consumer cases often
33. Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 297, 455 A.2d 434, 440-41 (1983).
34. See, eg., Patton v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1041
(D.C. Super. 1990); Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 234 Kan. 840, 676 P.2d 744 (1984).
35. Dale, 234 Kan. at 844, 676 P.2d at 748.
36. Beck Enters. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 678 (Miss. 1987) (by implication).
37. Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 693-94, 732 P.2d 1260, 1271
(1987).
38. Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 824, 434 N.E.2d
611, 617-18 (1982) (raising question but not answering it definitively).
39. Farrell v. General Motors Corp., 249 Kan. 231, 240-41, 815 P.2d 538, 546 (1991).
40. See Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 202 n.5, 567 N.E.2d
1237, 1242 n.5, appeal denied, 409 Mass. 1105, 571 N.E.2d 28 (1991).
41. See Bostic v. Mallard Coach Co., 185 W. Va. 294, 296, 406 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1991);
Adams v. Nissan Motor Corp., 182 W. Va. 234, 239, 387 S.E.2d 288, 291-93 (1989).
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involve a routine award of consequential damages without bothering
about an inquiry, required in some commercial cases, whether the exclu-
sion of consequential damages is unconscionable.42 Clearly, the remedy
ban is a neater, cleaner, and easier means to that end. Circumventing the
undue complexity of the Code remedy process is also a feature of motor
vehicle and manufactured home legislation.
B. The Prohibition of Limitations on Express Warranties and
Remedies for Their Breach
The NCA disclaimer prohibition not only catches in its wake limita-
tions on implied warranties and remedies for their breach, but it also
removes impediments to proof of oral express warranties and proscribes
limitations on remedies for their breach.
1. Limitations on Disclaimer of Express Warranties
The express warranty disclaimer prohibition seems designed to end
the curse of the parol evidence rule, which may (but need not inevitably)
operate to keep evidence of oral warranties from the jury. It presumably
would block the operation of standard merger clauses that purport to
integrate an agreement with respect to written warranties so as to ex-
clude proof of any other warranties. Less clear is its application to
clauses that seek to limit the authority of agents to bind the principal and
declare oral agent representations off limits.
This NCA provision has survived unscathed only in West Vir-
ginia.43 Just why it was not adopted elsewhere is not clear. Perhaps it
was considered unnecessary in view of UCC Section 2-316(1), which ap-
pears to provide that limitation of an express warranty is "inoperative."'
Certainly, as a general proposition, "the concept of prohibiting any ex-
clusion, modification, or limitation of an express warranty does appear to
be a contradiction in terms."4 5 The objection of Kansas car dealers to
the provision that originally had been adopted in that state may also have
existed in other states: Concern that the language "might automatically
invalidate written express warranties that were limited in duration. ' 46
42. See Volkswagen of Am. v. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801, 803-04 (Miss. 1982). But see
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 814 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Utah 1991) (holding that the trial court
must determine whether the contractual limitation of consequential damages is unconscionable
and must support its determination with specific findings of fact).
43. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992).
44. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1989).
45. Barkley Clark & Michael J. Davis, Beefing up Product Warranties: A New Dimension
in Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REV. 567, 595 (1975).
46. Id. The provision was eliminated in 1974 "as creating a needless ambiguity." Id.
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Both objections seem unfounded. The UCC Section 2-316(1) provi-
sion is expressly subject to the parol evidence rule, which is sometimes
leveraged to exclude the admission of evidence of oral warranties. a7 The
NCA provision appears to be a neat and direct way to circumvent that
problem. The concern that the language would preclude express warran-
ties limited in duration seems purely formalistic. On the other hand, the
concern of the Kansas car dealers that the provision would also constrain
contractual limitation of remedies for breach of express warranties is
rooted in a correct interpretation of the Act. It clearly was designed to
reach that result. And, as indicated below, four jurisdictions chose to
proscribe limitation of remedies for breach of express warranties without
dealing with the disclaimer issue.48
2. Two Approaches Toward Circumscribing Limitations on Remedies
for Breach of Express Warranties
A total ban against limitation of remedies for breach of express war-
ranty has been part of the West Virginia package from the outset and was
incorporated by Mississippi in 1987. However, Maryland, in 1971, en-
acted a prohibition effective against those manufacturers who did not
provide "reasonable and expeditious means of performing the warranty
obligations. ' 49 The District of Columbia copied this provision in 1982.50
Massachusetts, which had in 1971 adopted the central features of the
NCA except for the ban on express warranty provisions, followed Mary-
land's lead in 1973 with the further condition that the manufacturer's
means of performing obligations be "within the commonwealth."'"
These small provisions stand in contrast to the very strong focus on
express warranties and repair obligations in the California-style jurisdic-
tions. The only case in these three states on the subject simply affirms
that the Massachusetts express remedy limitation ban applies only if fa-
cilities are not maintained in the state. In contrast, the court empha-
sized, the ban against remedy limitations for breach of implied
warranties is absolute.52
47. The placement of the cross-reference in § 2-316 is one of the subjects that the Article 2
study group recommended be given more consideration because of the difficulties it has caused.
48. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
49. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(3) (1992).
50. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1(4) (1991).
51. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
52. Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 202 n.5, 567 N.E.2d 1237,
1242 n.5, appeal denied, 409 Mass. 1105, 571 N.E.2d 28 (1991).
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C. To Whom the Disclaimer and Remedy Limitations Bans Apply
The statutes are not uniform regarding the parties against whom the
bans operate. Clearly some of the states sought to encompass both man-
ufacturers and sellers, recognizing that it was the manufacturer's war-
ranty usually at issue. There was also recognition of the privity
problems, more severe at that time, of suing the manufacturer directly
even on warranties directly issued by it and running directly to the con-
sumer. Indeed, some of the states, perhaps following the lead of NCA
Section 3.304,13 dispensed with privity obstacles as part of their package.
In three of the states, the bans apply by express language both to
sellers and manufacturers.14 The same result is reached in Kansas with
its very broad definition of "supplier," which brings in intermediaries as
well.5 West Virginia copied the NCA provision that applied the bans to
any civil "merchant" and was criticized for not defining the word out of
concern that it might be construed as not applicable to manufacturers.5 6
In the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Mississippi, the implied war-
ranty and remedy bans apply to "a seller of consumer goods and serv-
ices."57 Maryland has clarified the reach of the ban by a special
definition of "seller" which encompasses "the manufacturer, distributor,
dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer."58
Since the District of Columbia and Mississippi have not extended
the Article 2 definition of "seller," their disclaimer and remedy bans ap-
pear not to affect manufacturers. This result also seems to follow for two
53. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 3.304 (1970) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of law, no action by a consumer for breach of
warranty or for negligence with respect to goods subject to a consumer transaction
shall fail because of a lack of PRIVITY between the consumer and the defendant.
An action against any person for breach of warranty or for negligence with respect to
goods subject to a consumer transaction shall not of itself constitute a bar to the
bringing of an action against another person.
Id.
54. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch.
106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1992).
55. " 'Supplier' means a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, seller, lessor, assignor, or other
person who, in the ordinary course of business, solicits, engages in or enforces consumer trans-
actions, whether or not dealing directly with the consumer." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(i)
(Supp. 1991).
56. See Cardi, supra note 20, at 498; Gerard R. Stowers, Note, Products Liability-West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act-Definitional Inadequacies, 77 W. VA. L. REV.
328, 334 (1975).
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1(2) (1991); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(2)
(1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1(1) (Supp. 1988).
58. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-314(1)(a) (1992). The definition applies only to
the implied warranty, disclaimer, and privity provisions. Id. §§ 2-314 to 2-318. The same
provision also "abolish[es]" any "previous requirement of privity." Id. § 2-314(l)(b)
1026 [Vol. 71
CONSUMER PROTECTION
additional reasons: (1) the next subsection applies bans against remedy
limitations on express warranties only to manufacturers, using that word;
and (2) the provisions that give the seller indemnity from any manufac-
turer for damages resulting from breach of implied warranties suggest
that the implied warranty disclaimer ban applies only to sellers.59 How-
ever, as a practical matter, that conclusion seems of little moment. Mak-
ing the manufacturer liable to the seller for breach of implied warranties
surely is the functional equivalent of banning implied warranty disclaim-
ers by the manufacturer.'
D. How "Consumer" Is Defined
The NCA's definition of "consumer" is much broader than that
used in typical consumer legislation. "'Consumer' means a person other
than an organization who seeks or acquires business equipment for use in
his business, or real or personal property, services, money or credit for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes."61 Only Kansas
and West Virginia have enacted definitions this broad.62
Other enacting states generally use some variation of a consumer
purpose test. Several expressly refer to the UCC Article 9 definition of
"consumer goods," which turns on the use or purchase "primarily for
personal, family or household purposes." 63 Some others are functionally
similar. Vermont extends protection to purchases for use in connection
with operation of a farm even if it is conducted as a business.' The cases
illustrate routine applications of these definitions and are considered in
the text covering the individual states.65
59. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1 (Supp. 1988).
Maryland has the same provisions. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(2), .1(3) (1992).
Although the language makes the manufacturer liable to the seller for both the warranty of
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose, presumably it would be interpreted so
that the manufacturer's exposure as to a fitness warranty would be limited to circumstances in
which the manufacturer's conduct would give rise to that warranty. Merchantability may be
thought of as running with the product. Fitness for a particular purpose requires communica-
tion between the buyer and seller.
60. Perhaps this was viewed as a means of making the manufacturer liable without trying
to confront the privity barrier, an issue which at that time was considerably more formidable
than it is now. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-314(1) (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1988).
61. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 1.301(8) (1970).
62. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(b) (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(b) (1992).
63. U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1992).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451a(a) (Supp. 1992).
65. See infra notes 247-567 and accompanying text.
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E. Goods Covered
Most of the total ban statutes apply to both new and used goods
either because they are phrased in absolute terms without any reference
to new or used,66 or because, as in Maryland and Mississippi, there is an
exception for older motor vehicles, 67 thereby implying that everything
else is covered. The Connecticut and Vermont statutes, however, apply
only to new or unused goods.6 Three states otherwise in the total ban
group permit disclaimer of goods known to be defective if there is full,
conspicuous disclosure.6 9 All of these are discussed in more detail
below.70
Six of the jurisdictions expressly apply the bans to both goods and
services. 71 However, this statutory application to services has figured in
only a few cases. The most prominent of these is Corral v. Rollins Protec-
tive Services Co.,72 in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
remedy ban applied to non-UCC warranties, including a contract to in-
stall and service a fire and burglar alarm system.73 Thereafter, the stat-
ute was amended to restrict application to UCC warranties.74
Some of the statutes fall within the special exceptions or rules found
in a number of states regarding such widely diverse subjects as blood,
tissue, and livestock. This group of statutes is briefly considered below.
7
66. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (Supp. 1991);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107
(1992).
67. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1
(Supp. 1988).
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316(5) (West 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-
316(5) (Supp. 1992).
69. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316(5) (West
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (Supp. 1991).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (West
Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-
316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1992).
72. 240 Kan. 678, 732 P.2d 1260 (1987).
73. Id. at 690-94, 732 P.2d at 1269-72; see infra text accompanying notes 273-77. In
another total ban state, a court found it unnecessary to decide whether the disclaimer ban
applied to a burglar alarm protection system, because the transaction did not involve "con-
sumer goods" inasmuch as plaintiff was a corporation engaged in business. New England
Watch Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 948, 416 N.E.2d 1010, 1011 (1981).
The implications of the extension are not considered in this paper.
74. In Farrell v. General Motors Corp., 249 Kan. 231, 815 P.2d 538 (1991), the court
noted that the amendment to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(a)(1) (Supp. 1991) makes it "clear
that the only prohibition on limitation of warranties is of UCC warranties." Farrell, 249 Kan.
at 240, 815 P.2d at 545.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
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F. Applying the Prohibitions to Oral and Written Language
Seven of the total ban jurisdictions proscribe the use of either oral or
written language to limit implied warranties. The main thrust of the pro-
visions seems to be against contract provisions that reduce rights.
Hence, the usual object of these statutes is a written form contract. The
reference to "oral" language merely indicates that it is not confined to
that situation. Thus, the ban should apply both to completely oral con-
tracts and to contracts in which there is a combination of writings and
oral conduct.
The lack of reference in two of the total ban states76 to oral language
does not mean that a different result was intended. These states more
closely follow the National Consumer Act model, which says simply that
the warrantor shall not limit. The others followed Massachusetts's lead,
which in form proscribed the use of certain language." Oral limitations
are equally impermissible in all of the states.
G. Expansion of the Concept of Merchantability
The NCA definition of merchantability takes the concept beyond its
UCC Article 2 definition. It provides that merchantability means
in addition to the qualities prescribed in [Section 2-314 of the
UCC] that (a) the goods conform in all material respects to
applicable State and Federal statutes and regulations establish-
ing standards of quality and safety of goods and (b) in the case
of goods with mechanical, electrical or thermal components,
the goods are in good working order and will operate properly
in normal usage for a reasonable period of time.78
The drafter's comment to this section indicates that there is now to
be "compliance with statutes designed to set standards for products sold
or furnished to consumers. This could include the safety provisions for
automobiles under the Federal Act, standards of grading for meat and
food stuffs, useful life of products that are dated and the like."' 79 Since at
the time these provisions were drafted the common practice was for war-
rantor of consumer products to disclaim merchantability, the drafters
may have thought additional guidance was necessary because of the ab-
sence of consumer related case law. However, this definitional approach
was followed only in Kansas and West Virginia 0 and appears not to
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992).
77. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
78. NATiONAL CONSUMER Acr § 3.301(2) (1970).
79. Id. cmt.
80. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(e) (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(c) (1992).
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have had any impact in the sales case law.
H. Sanctions for Non-Compliance with the Bans
Violation of the NCA disclaimer and remedy bans invokes civil pen-
alty provisions giving the consumer ordinary damages plus twenty per-
cent of the total transaction or $200, whichever is greater, plus attorney
fees.81 Only Kansas directly followed this approach, with a civil penalty
of up to $2000.82 In Vermont a clause violating the bans is "unenforce-
able";83 in West Virginia, it is "void."" a Maine and Minnesota classify
such violations as unfair and deceptive trade practices,85 thus invoking
sanctions available under those acts. That result might follow in other
jurisdictions as a matter of judicial interpretation of a Little FTC Act.
III. STATUTES WHICH REQUIRE GREATER PARTICULARITY FOR
ALL DISCLAIMERS, LIMIT "As Is" DISCLAIMERS, EXCEPT
USED GOODS FROM DISCLAIMER BANS, AND
PROVIDE SPECIALLY FOR LIVESTOCK,
AND BLOOD AND TISSUE
There are several other kinds of variations from Section 2-316.
These include several different approaches to better communication of
the risk transfer that occurs when implied warranties are disclaimed,
such as narrowing the concept of "as is" and requiring additional specific
language-and sometimes a ritualistic formula-to disclaim. In a few
jurisdictions, there is also some focus on the process by which disclaimer
is achieved. Some statutes also except used goods from additional formal
constraints.
A. Requiring Greater Particularity for Disclaimers: South Carolina
and Washington
Both South Carolina and Washington have amended UCC Section
2-316 to require more of warrantors who wish to disclaim implied war-
ranties. The language in the South Carolina provision, taken from earlier
drafts of the UCC, is not limited to consumer transactions. The language
in the Washington provision has a broader common-law background but
has been codified only with respect to consumer transactions.
81. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr §§ 3.303, 5.303, 5.307 (1970).
82. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-636(a), 50-639(e) (Supp. 1991).
83. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316 (Supp. 1992).
84. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992).
85. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 325F.69, 325G.20 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993).
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The South Carolina provision simply requires that any language of
disclaimer be "specific," and if it "creates an ambiguity in the contract as
a whole it shall be resolved against the seller."86 The requirement of
specificity should invalidate an "as is" disclaimer which does not have
further description. In addition, the language creates a slightly different
tone. It has not, however, played a significant role in the cases, as is
discussed in greater detail below."
The Washington amendment requires that a disclaimer of implied
warranties in consumer transactions set forth "with particularity the
qualities and characteristics which are not being warranted."88 It thus
bears similarity to the provisions described below that severely limit the
operation of "as is" disclaimers.8 9 However, the Washington provision is
part of what began as a common-law inquiry which has probed deeply
into the process that may legitimately produce disclaimers and requires
that they be negotiated explicitly. The process inquiry has greater signifi-
cance than the particularity requirement and is discussed in. detail later.90
B. Confining Disclaimer to Restrictively Defined "As Is" Transactions
Three of the total ban jurisdictions have exceptions for what might
be regarded as true "as is" goods, that is, goods which are known to be
defective and accordingly are marked down in price. Connecticut thus
has a small exception for goods "clearly marked 'irregular, factory
seconds or damaged.' ",' The District of Columbia excepts goods with
"particular defects and limitations" if they are "noted conspicuously in
writing at the time of sale." 92 In Kansas, a supplier may limit implied
warranties "with respect to a defect or defects only if the supplier estab-
lishes that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects, which
became the basis of the bargain between the parties." 9- The Official
Comment to the Kansas provision states that "[t]his provision is in-
tended to cover sales of marked down or irregular goods which are sold
as is and where the consumer is aware of the defective condition; dis-
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The drafting history of UCC § 2-
316 is set forth in JOHN 0. HONNOLD & CURTIS R. REITZ, SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMES-
TIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-10 (1992). There is brief consideration of the meaning of
the version adopted in South Carolina in I NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 407-08 (1955).
87. See infra notes 384-94 accompanying text.
88. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316(4) (West Supp. 1993).
89. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 395-406.
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316 (vest 1990).
92. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1(3) (1991).
93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(c) (Supp. 1991).
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claimers in such sales will of course often be reflected in lower prices."94
C. Requiring Strong and Comprehensive Language for "As Is"
Disclaimers
One feature of California's Song-Beverly Act is a statutory formula
that spells out in exquisite detail what is required to accomplish an "as
is" disclaimer.95 Presumably, the requirements are designed to commu-
nicate the true meaning of "as is" to the consumer. Together, they as-
sume an almost ritualistic character. The statute provides:
(a) No sale of goods, governed by the provisions of this chap-
ter, on an "as is" or "with all faults" basis, shall be effective to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability or, where ap-
plicable, the implied warranty of fitness, unless a conspicuous
writing is attached to the goods which clearly informs the
buyer, prior to the sale, in simple and concise language of each
of the following:
(1) The goods are being sold on an "as is" or "with all
faults" basis.
(2) The entire risk as to the quality and performance of
the goods is with the buyer.
(3) Should the goods prove defective following their
purchase, the buyer and not the manufacturer, distrib-
utor, or retailer assumes the entire cost of all necessary
servicing or repair.96
This disclaimer ritual formula strongly influenced the provisions of
five states which require in almost identical language that there be (a) a
conspicuous writing (b) that clearly informs the buyer (c) prior to the
sale (d) in simple and concise language of the listed disclosures.9 7 The
most significant change made was the omission in Minnesota and Rhode
Island of the third disclosure requirement (that buyer assume all costs of
servicing), perhaps on the assumption that its contents were sufficiently
implied in the disclosure that all risk is on the buyer.98 The Song-Beverly
94. Id. § 50-639 cmt. 4 (1983)
95. The California statute defines "as is" and "with all faults" to encompass all sales in
which there has been a disclaimer of "all implied warranties that would otherwise attach to the
sale of consumer goods under the provisions of this chapter." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.3 (West
1985). The copycat statutes do not include any such definition.
96. Id. § 1792.4(a). Subsection (b) requires that a mail order catalog "contain the re-
quired writing as to each item so offered." Id. § 1792.4(b).
97. See IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-316(3)(e) (Burns 1992) (limited applicability-see infra
note 98); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.18 (West 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-
316(4) (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8050 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329(2)(b)
(1992).
98. Indiana acted likewise in IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-316(3)(e) (Burns 1992). Since the
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"prior to the sale" requirement was, of course, a precursor of the more
comprehensive Magnuson-Moss pre-sale availability requirements.99
Curiously, there has been no meaningful case law interpretation of
this explication of the "as is" disclaimer."t° Certainly, some interesting
issues lurk in the language. For example, do the requirements taken to-
gether require actual communication? The language does not require
merely that the writing be sufficiently conspicuous that it should come to
the attention of a reasonable consumer. The requirement is that it
"clearly inform" the buyer. 10' Perhaps the California requirement-fol-
lowed only in Oregon' 02-- that the writing be physically attached to the
goods gives slight support to the objective interpretation. New Hamp-
shire has added the requirement that the writing be signed by the
buyer. 103
D. Exceptions from Limitations for All or Some Categories of Used
Goods
Most of the total ban jurisdictions allow no exceptions, other than
those discrete provisions regarding livestock and blood and tissue, which
appear in almost all jurisdictions. However, the statutes in Connecticut
and Vermont apply only to new and "unused" goods."° Both Maryland
and Mississippi have exceptions for older motor vehicles.'0 5 As indicated
below, several of the statutes in the Song-Beverly-pattern jurisdictions
differentiate between new and used goods.1
0 6
E. Special Statutory Dispensations for Livestock, and Blood and Tissue
A number of jurisdictions have created exceptions for specific kinds
of goods or transactions. Presumably, all were considered to pose such
special problems that they should not be treated the same as other goods,
especially with respect to implied warranties. The statutes deal princi-
provision applies only to catalog sales of audio and video products, it is not discussed in the
text with statutes which apply across the board.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1992).
100. In East Side Prescription Ctr., Inc. v. E.P. Foumier Co., 585 A.2d 1176 (R.I. 1991),
the court noted that "the fact that a disclaimer is conspicuous and has been examined by the
purchaser is not sufficient to constitute a disclaimer." Id. at 1180.
101. See, ag., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1792.4(b) (West 1985).
102. OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8050(1) (1991).
103. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-316(4) (Supp. 1992).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316(5) (West 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-
316(5) (Supp. 1992).
105. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(4)(a) (1992); MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-
315.1(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
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pally with two widely diverse subjects: livestock, and blood and tissue.
The approaches taken in the statutes also differ widely.
With respect to blood and tissue, some provisions characterize them
as transactions of services, not sales, and hence not subject to UCC Arti-
cle 2. Others expressly exempt them from imposition of implied warran-
ties. The provisions also appear in a variety of places, sometimes in
variations of UCC Sections 2-314,107 2-315,108 and 2-316,109 and some-
times entirely apart from the UCC.110
Exceptions for livestock also center on implied warranties. They
likewise appear both outside the UCC and as amendments to UCC
provisions. I I
IV. MERCHANTABILITY OBLIGATIONS AND WARRANTY
DISCLAIMER LIMITATIONS IN CALIFORNIA AND COPYCAT
STATES
In considering the provisions of California's Song-Beverly Act and
its imitators regarding statutory bans against warranty limitations and
related matters, one must take into account that they were drafted before
the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, when the almost universal practice of
warrantor was to give a small express warranty and disclaim completely
107. ALA. CODE § 7-2-314 (1975).
108. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988).
109. ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-316 (Michie 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 11-2-316 (Michie 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316 (Law. Co-op
1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316 (1992); TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (West 1968 & Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 34.1-2-316 (1991).
110. See, eg., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481 (1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1603.5 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-
1-28 (Michie 1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 325-91 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (Supp. 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
373 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (Michie Supp.
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (West 1984);
OR. REv. STAT. § 97.300 (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. Civ. PPAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.003 (West Supp.
1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West
1992).
111. E.g., ALA. CODE § 2-15-4 (Supp. 1992); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 18501-18502
(West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554A.1 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(h)
(Supp. 1991); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-2-316(3)(d) (Vernon 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-
316 (Vernon Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29(c)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-316(3)(d) (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3160
(1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-315 (1992); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(0
(West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-316 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 62A.2-316(3)(d) (West Supp. 1993).
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all implied warranties. After the enactment of Magnuson,-Moss in 1975,
express warranties governing consumer products in all jurisdictions no
longer could disclaim the implied warranties totally. They could, how-
ever, limit the duration of the implied warranties to that of the express
warranty subject to disclosure obligations and some substantive limita-
tions.1 12 Song-Beverly, which appears to be the model for much of
Magnuson-Moss, accommodates reasonably well to this change in busi-
ness practices.' 13 As will be seen, however, provisions in imitator states
which adopted only bits and pieces of the California Act do not easily fit
the newer limitation of warranty duration.
A. Applying Implied Warranties and Disclaimer Limitations to
Manufacturers
Perhaps the greatest point of departure of Song-Beverly from the
UCC was its recognition of the role of the manufacturer in consumer
transactions. This is, of course, strongly emphasized in its then-revolu-
tionary provisions enhancing consumer remedies against manufacturers.
It also appears in various sections dealing with manufacturer warranty
issues. The Act provides that the warranty of merchantability attaches
to retailers and manufacturers' 14 and that the warranty of fitness for the
particular purpose attaches to manufacturers, retailers, and distributors
when the usual requirements of buyer's communication and reliance and
seller's knowledge have been satisfied.115 Despite a small glitch that oc-
curred in adapting Song-Beverly, the Oregon statute is in accord.
16
In the three other Song-Beverly states, there are no sections that
112. No duration limitation is permitted for "full" warranties. However, "limited" war-
ranties are most common. For limited warranties, implied warranty limitations must be "set
forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the war-
ranty." Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 108(b), 15
U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1988). It is also required that the duration of the written warranty be "rea-
sonable," a condition originally set forth in CAL. Civ. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1985), and that
the implied warranty limitation be "conscionable."
113. In 1982, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.1(a)(1) (West 1985) was amended to require that
warrantor conform to Magnuson-Moss standards for disclosure and conditions.
114. Id § 1792 (West 1985).
115. Id. §§ 1792.1-1792.2.
116. In adapting Song-Beverly to Oregon's needs, the drafters did not relate the obligation
of merchantability to retailers, see OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8030 (1991), although they applied the
implied warranty of fitness to retailers and distributors in addition to manufacturers. Id.
§ 72.8040. However, the general disclaimer provisions do not differentiate between
merchantability obligations at any level of distribution, id. § 72.8050, and § 72.8070(2)
prescribes a one-year duration for merchantability when "no express warranty is made." Id.
§ 72.8070(2). Thus, the implied warranty obligations seem to attach at all levels of distribu-
tion. There should, of course, be no question about the retailer's merchantability obligation.
At the very least, it is well founded in Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989).
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address the subject directly. The closest reference point is in their dis-
claimer provisions. In Minnesota and Rhode Island, it is provided sim-
ply that "every consumer sale" shall be subject to warranties of
merchantability and, where appropriate, fitness for purpose. 117 In New
Hampshire, the statute provides that disclaimers of the implied warran-
ties are not effective as against "merchant sellers" unless there is compli-
ance with the formula."1 ' None of these provisions gives any real
guidance regarding the application of merchantability obligations to per-
sons other than retail sellers. However, New Hampshire also has a pro-
vision removing privity as an obstacle to suit against a "manufacturer,
seller or supplier."'"I9 Since the anti-privity section applies to actions for
both express and implied warranty, this may imply that merchantability
and hence disclaimer requirements apply up the chain of distribution.
B. The Song-Beverly Ban Against Disclaimers, Limitations, and
Modifications When an Express Warranty Is Made
Curiously, the Song-Beverly Act, while not creating two classes of
warranties, provided the model for both the full warranty and the limited
warranty Magnuson-Moss Act provisions governing limitation of im-
plied warranties. The precursor of the full warranty disclaimer prohibi-
tion rules states that "a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer, in
transacting a sale in which express warranties are given, may not limit,
modify, or disclaim the implied warranties guaranteed by this chapter to
the sale of consumer goods."' 120 This not only banned the old total dis-
claimer practice, it also prohibited limitation or modification of the im-
plied warranties. It thus appears applicable to the post-Magnuson-Moss
common business practice of limiting the duration of the implied warran-
ties to that of the express.
Other provisions of the Act, however, diminish the total ban on lim-
itation of duration so that the provisions quoted above, which look like
the Magnuson-Moss full warranty disclaimer ban, become more closely
akin to the Magnuson-Moss limited warranty duration scheme. 2' This
comes about by virtue of provisions that establish the duration of
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.18(1) (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329(2)
(1992).
118. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-316(4) (Supp. 1992).
119. Id. § 382-A:2-318.
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793 (West 1985).
121. Compare Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1988) (prohibiting disclaimer or modification of implied warranty for
duration of any written warranty or service contract) with 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1988) (permit-
ting a time limit of implied warranties if equal to the time limit of the written warranty and if
the written warranty is reasonable, conscionable, clear, and "prominently displayed").
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merchantability (and fitness, if present) as "coextensive" with that of the
express warranty if "the duration of the express warranty is reasonable,"
but not less than sixty days nor more than one year after sale.1 22 Those
same fixed periods apply also to new goods sold without express war-
ranty unless there has been a disclaimer in compliance With the magic
formula discussed above.
123
In short, under Song-Beverly, an express warrantor is prohibited
from limiting the substance of the implied warranties in any way, but the
Act puts both a floor and a ceiling on the duration of those warranties.
Although the issue is disputed-and has not been resolved in the
courts-those floor and ceiling provisions apply only to the implied war-
ranties as defined in Song-Beverly and not to the usual UCC implied
warranties. One early article, for example, construed the Song-Beverly
provisions as limiting the UCC Article 2 merchantability warranty, and
therefore "a step backward."' 24  In contrast, another commentator,
speaking directly to the issue, concludes that:
Song-Beverly defines the duration only of those implied war-
ranties created by the Act and leaves the duration of UCC im-
plied warranties untouched. The result is that the purchaser
may have a Song-Beverly implied warranty of merchantability
equal in duration to the express warranty as well as a UCC
implied warranty of merchantability of uncertain duration on
the same product.
25
C. Problems in Copycat States Regarding Disclaimer Limitations
Because the copycat states did not incorporate all of the elements of
Song-Beverly, they have created serious interpretive problems which are
somewhat different in Minnesota and Rhode Island than in Oregon. The
principal source of difficulty in all three states was the failure to adopt
the basic Song-Beverly ban against limitation, modification, or disclaimer
when there is an express warranty. Minnesota and Rhode Island tried to
get by with a subsection that precluded only disclaimer of implied war-
ranties without mention of modification or limitation. 126 Also, there is
reference only to disclaimer in their sections controlling "as is" disclaim-
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1985). The periods are reduced to 30 days and
three months for used goods covered by express warranty. Id. § 1795.5(c) (West 1985).
123. See supra text accompanying note 97.
124. Clark & Davis, supra note 45, at 591.
125. Henry Weinstock, Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26 UCLA
L. REv. 583, 638-39 (1979).
126. MINN. STAT. § 325G.19(1) (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329(3)(a) (1991).
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ers. Their magic formula provisions were borrowed from California but
were altered in two important respects.
First, the disclaimer ban language applies not to the makers but to
the content of express warranties. Thus, they provide that "[n]o express
warranty... shall disclaim implied warranties of merchantability, or,
where applicable, of fitness." 127 One consequence, as noted above, is that
it is not clear whether the obligation attaches only to retail sellers or to
others in the chain of distribution. The second difference is the absence
of any reference to modification or limitation. The only ban is on "dis-
claimer." Given the pre-Magnuson-Moss business practice context, that
is not surprising. But how do the bans apply to the later developed con-
tract clauses which limit the duration of implied warranties to that of
express warranties? Does the ban against disclaimer apply to the lesser
acts of modifying and limiting?
Neither of the statutes defines "disclaimer," and the Article 2 provi-
sion12 which governs the subject does not use the word. In the context
of the California statute, "disclaimer" clearly means total exclusion; the
lesser acts of limitation and modification are identified separately., If
the word were construed similarly in the copycat states, a warrantor
would be free to limit or modify warranties. The currently ubiquitous
warranty that limits the duration of the implied warranties to that of the
express could pass muster.
Oregon's truncation of the California Act has produced considera-
ble confusion on this subject. In addition to sharing the deficiencies of
Minnesota and Rhode Island discussed above, the Oregon Act provides
that effective disclaimer of merchantability by a manufacturer, distribu-
tor, or retailer "making an express warranty" requires compliance with
the special "as is" disclosure provisions. 130 But if an express warranty is
made, there cannot be, by definition, an "as is" sale.131 Just what to do
with this erroneous byproduct of the Oregon pruning process is unclear.
Perhaps it should be construed, like the Minnesota and Rhode Island
provisions, as precluding total disclaimer by express warrantor of implied
warranties without affecting attempts to limit or modify them.
The only copycat state that says anything about the duration of the
implied warranties is Oregon. It provides that in sales of new goods, if
127. MINN. STAT. § 325G.19(1) (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 329(3)(a) (1991).
128. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793 (West 1985).
130. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8070(1) (1991).
131. Although there is no definition of "as is" in the Oregon Act, the California characteri-
zation should be applied even though the Oregon drafters in their streamlining attempt did not
copy the California definition.
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no express warranty is made or the duration of an express warranty is
not stated, the implied warranty of merchantability "endures" for one
year for ordinary goods or, for motor vehicles, for the lesser of one year
or 12,000 miles.13 2 The duration of implied warranties is coextensive
with express warranties subject to a floor of sixty days and a ceiling of
one year.
133
D. The Difficulty of Applying the Disclaimer Ban and "s Is" Sale
Requirements to "As Is" Sales by Dealers of Products
Covered by a Manufacturer's Warranty
At least two problems exist with the application of these statutes to
"as is" sales by a dealer of products covered by a manufacturer's
warranty. The first, whether the "as is" magic formula applies to such
transactions, is shared by all of the states. Prima facie, the special re-
quirements should apply. After all, they were imposed presumably be-
cause of dissatisfaction with the less onerous UCC Article 2
provisions."' But they simply do not work! The conspicuous writing
requirement is not a problem, although one wonders whether a consumer
would expect the disclaimer to be physically "attached" to a new auto-
mobile or mobile home. None of the three required disclosures fit the
situation, however. A dealer-disclaimer-but-manufacturer-warranty sale
(a) is not an "as is" sale; (b) does not place the entire risk with the buyer;
and (c) does not require the buyer to assume the entire'cost of servicing
or repair.
If the provisions cannot apply, does it follow that a dealer may not
sell on an "as is" basis when the product is covered by a manufacturer's
warranty? That is a possible reading of the Song-Beverly ban against "a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer, in transacting a sale in which ex-
press warranties are given," limiting, modifying, or disclaiming implied
warranties.13
5
Since the dealer under Song-Beverly would have a statutory right to
indemnity from the manufacturer for losses attributable to breach of the
implied warranty,'36 that would not be an unreasonable result. 137 How-
132. OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8070(2) (1991).
133. Id. § 72.8070(3).
134. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793 (West 1985). One case in a total ban jurisdiction did hold
that a dealer's attempt to confine consumers to warranty claims against distant component
suppliers fell within the disclaimer ban. Stair v. Gaylord, 232 Kan. 765, 776, 659 P.2d 178,
187 (1983).
136. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1792 (West 1985).
137. There is, however, a technical problem regarding the duration of the implied warranty
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ever, the language of the provision does not answer the question clearly.
The "transacting" language suggests that the ban applies to the party
who is conducting the immediate transaction. Under that view, the
dealer could disclaim because it had not given an express warranty. But
the language referring to the giving of the express warranties is not keyed
to a particular actor. The reference is to "a sale in which express warran-
ties are given." 13 Certainly, a consumer who gets a product covered by
a manufacturer's express warranty has been involved in a sale in which
express warranties have been given. That line of reasoning would lead to
the conclusion that the dealer could not disclaim the implied warranties
totally.
The closest any of the cases have come to discussing the issue is the
footnote observation in a manufacturer-warranty-dealer-disclaimer case
that "[p]laintiff did not question the effectiveness of the disclaimer by the
dealer and we make no judgment as to its effectiveness."
' 139
E. New or Used Goods?
The complexity of the California statute somewhat obscures its
reach. The implied warranties mandated by the Act apply in sales of
new goods whether or not covered by express warranty.14° If an express
warranty is given, the implied warranties also attach to used goods.
141
This pattern is followed in Minnesota and Rhode Island. 142 Oregon's
requirements apply only to new goods, whether or not covered by ex-
press warranty.143 Since New Hampshire does not include any analo-
gous controlling definitions, its limitations presumably apply to both new
and used goods, regardless of the existence of an express warranty.
of merchantability. If the dealer cannot disclaim and does not give an express warranty, it is
subject to a merchantability duration of one year. The manufacturer, on the other hand, may
limit duration to a shorter period. Id. § 1791.1(c); see supra text accompanying note 123.
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793 (West 1985).
139. Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 527 n.5, 612 P.2d 316, 319 n.5 (1980).
140. The warranty sections, eg., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1792 (West 1985), relate the warran-
ties to sales of consumer goods. The limitation to "new" goods comes from the definition in id.
§ 1791(a) (West Supp. 1983).
141. Id. § 1795.5 (West 1985).
142. MINN. STAT. § 325G.17(2) (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329(1)(a) (1991).
143. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8010(1) (1991).
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V. STATUTES WHICH IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON EXPRESS
WARRANTOR REGARDING SERVICE AND REPAIRS AND
PROVIDE NEW REMEDIAL OPTIONS FOR BREACH
OF THESE DUTIES
A. The Song-Beverly Act
As already indicated, the California Song-Beverly Act has impor-
tant provisions that affirm the implied warranty obligations of everyone
in the chain of distribution and regulate disclaimers.1" It has a much
more ambitious scheme, however. The total ban jurisdictions sought to
improve the position of the consumer by a shotgun blast of prohibiting
implied warranty disclaimers and, in some states, banning remedy limita-
tions. California took a rifle shot approach aimed at several discrete
targets.
The specific problems targeted by Song-Beverly presumably in-
cluded the difficulty of dealing with and obtaining repairs from distant
warrantors, long delays in getting response, run-arounds from persons in
the distributive chain, and the inadequacy of ordinary sales law reme-
dies-including the unavailability of attorney fees. The Act thus focused
on defining the express warrantor's obligation to remedy defects, enlist-
ing the aid of those in the chain of distribution, providing new remedies
more specific than those available under the UCC, and enhancing them
with attorney fees and, in egregious cases, multiple damages.
The obligations created by the Act routinely are addressed to manu-
facturers. However, the Act provides expressly that if express warranties
are made by anyone other than the manufacturer, obligations "shall be
the same as that imposed on the manufacturer under this chapter."
1 45
1. Elevating the Express Warrantor's Promise of Repair or
Replacement to a Statutory Duty
In many respects, the starting point of Song-Beverly is the express
warrantor's usual undertaking to repair or replace if there are defects.
The Act elevates that promise to a statutory obligation. As one early
incisive commentator put it, "the Act actually approves and adopts with
modifications the exclusive repair or replace limitation of remedy clause
prevalent in consumer warranties."1 46 In contrast to those total ban ju-
risdictions which apparently preclude the use of that standard clause, 47
144. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15, 120-23.
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795 (West 1985).
146. Weinstock, supra note 125, at 647.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
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Song-Beverly builds on it by specifying how the warrantor will comply
with it and sharpening the consumer's remedies when the warrantor is
unable or unwilling to do so. The statute, moreover, acknowledges the
reality of the modem chain of distribution and "establishes a chain of
responsibility for warranty service in which the express warrantor is al-
ways the final link."148
As a technical matter, these obligations apply only where there is an
"express warranty" that is defined in Song-Beverly more narrowly than
in either UCC Article 2 or the Magnuson-Moss Act. The central point
of reference is that it be a "written statement arising out of a sale to the
consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer, dis-
tributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or per-
formance of the consumer good or provide compensation if there is a
failure in utility or performance." '149 In addition, the use of the words
"warrant" or "guarantee" in a written statement creates a warranty
within the Act,15 as does an oral or written affirmation of conformity to
any sample or model.
151
This definition is broader than the UCC definition of express war-
ranty5 2 inasmuch as it makes no express or implied reference to reliance
or basis of the bargain, but it is narrower than the UCC definition in
several important respects. As is also true of the Magnuson-Moss defini-
tion, it does not apply to oral warranties, nor does it apply to written
statements of description, promise, or affirmation unless they include an
undertaking by the warrantor to preserve or maintain the "utility or per-
formance" of the goods or compensate if the undertaking fails.153 There
is even doubt whether the definition would reach a promise that the
goods would perform in the future if it were not accompanied by an un-
dertaking to maintain that performance or compensate,15 4 although such
a promise would satisfy the Magnuson-Moss definition. 15 Despite those
shortcomings, the definition clearly reaches the ubiquitous repair or re-
place undertaking, and the Act clamps firmly on it.
148. Weinstock, supra note 125, at 631.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.2(a)(1) (West 1985).
150. Id. § 1791.2(b).
151. Id. § 1791.2(a)(2).
152. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989).
153. This is illustrated in Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1985), where the court held that although statements of seaworthiness of a sailboat in litera-
ture may constitute an express warranty under Article 2, they do not satisfy the Song-Beverly
definition of express warranty. Id. at 19-22, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 395-97.
154. See Weinstock, supra note 125, at 628-29.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1988).
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2. Ensuring That Goods Covered by Express Warranty Will Be
Repaired in Timely Fashion
Every manufacturer who makes an express warranty covering goods
sold in the state must maintain "sufficient service and repair facilities
reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold" '156 or
contract with and adequately compensate independent service and repair
facilities to discharge those obligations.' 57 Additionally, service and re-
pair must be commenced within a reasonable time and ordinarily must be
completed within thirty days 5 ' after delivery of the nonconforming
goods by the buyer to the service facility. If the goods are bulky or in-
stalled, the buyer's delivery obligation is discharged by giving written
notice.159 New and enhanced remedies are available if the warrantor
does not live up to these obligations.
If the manufacturer does not maintain or contract for service and
repair facilities within the state, or does not provide its authorized service
and repair facilities with literature and replacement parts sufficient to
effect repair during the warranty period, the statute authorizes the con-
sumer to obtain repairs and even replacement or refund by a retailer at
the expense of the manufacturer."6° The buyer is given several options.
The first is to return the goods to the selling retailer who shall (a) service
or repair, or (b) direct the buyer to a close independent facility willing to
accept service or repair without charge to the buyer but with a statutory
claim against the manufacturer, or (c) replace the goods, or (d) refund
the purchase price.'
6 1
Alternatively, the buyer may return the goods to any retail seller of
such goods who may (but appears not to be obligated to) give the same
options to the buyer. If the buyer does not get relief by pursuing either of
the retailer options, she may obtain repairs from an independent facility
and the manufacturer will be liable for the cost of repairs. Under this
unusual provision, the buyer is not to be liable to the repair facility; the
facility may hold only the manufacturer liable. 62 Both retailers and in-
156. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993). Although these duties ex-
pressly apply to "manufacturers," it is clear that they also apply to anyone who makes express
warranties under the Act. Id. § 1795 (West 1985).
157. Id. § 1793.2(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
158. Id. § 1793.2(b).
159. Id. § 1793.2(c).
160. Id. § 1793.3.
161. Id. § 1793.3(a). The refund obligation is to take into account any use value before
discovery of the nonconformity. Id.
162. Id. § 1793.3(c). This provision applies only when the goods have a wholesale price to
the retailer of $50 or more. Id.
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dependent service facilities expressly are entitled to indemnity from the
manufacturer. 
163
3. The Statutory Remedy of Repair, Replacement, or Reimbursement
The modern motor vehicle lemon-aid laws that provide the remedies
of repair, replacement, or reimbursement are, in many respects, the end
result of evolution from Song-Beverly via the federal Magnuson-Moss
Act. The significance of that approach can best be appreciated against
the background of the UCC remedial pattern that applies when a war-
rantor has failed to meet its express warranty promise to repair or replace
defective goods.
The UCC permits a warrantor to limit the buyer's remedies for
breach of warranty to repair or replacement, so long as the limitation is
"expressly agreed to be exclusive,"' 164 and "circumstances" do not cause
the limited remedy to "fail of its essential purpose."' 165 If the limited
remedy of repair and replacement has failed its essential purpose, the
buyer may turn to the Article 2 remedy provisions.
Where the product has serious defects, the buyer ordinarily wants a
return of the purchase price. In UCC parlance, the buyer wants to re-
voke acceptance. This step is available upon the buyer's showing that the
defects "substantially impair[ ]" the value of the contract to the buyer,1
66
and there has not been "any substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects."' 167 In other cases, the buyer
may have damages.1
68
Thus, the consumer under Article 2 must satisfy the statutorily un-
defined requirements of two separate legal tests: failure of essential pur-
pose of the contractually limited remedy of repair and replacement, and
revocation of acceptance. Song-Beverly collapsed the two into a single
test. The original articulation of the new test was that the buyer would
be entitled to replacement or reimbursement if the manufacturer was un-
able to return the goods in merchantable condition within thirty days. In
addition to easing the buyer's burden, the provision also made the reme-
dies available directly against the manufacturer, thus leapfrogging tradi-
tional privity barriers.'
69
163. Id. §§ 1793.5-1793.6 (West 1985).
164. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1989).
165. Id. § 2-719(2).
166. Id. § 2-608(1).
167. Id. § 2-608(2).
168. Id. § 2-714.
169. Id. § 2-318.
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These innovations turned up in the federal Magnuson-Moss Act sev-
eral years later in more sophisticated form-but applicable only to "full"
warranties:
[I]f the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect
or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the
warrantor to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product,
such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a re-
fund for, or replacement without charge of, such product or
part (as the case may be). 170
The provision clearly bears the marks of Song-Beverly, but the insertion
of the "reasonable number of attempts" condition in effect reinstated the
Article 2 test for failure of essential purpose in more specific language
and in the context of the familiar repair and replacement clause. That
requirement in turn found its way back to California so that Song-Bev-
erly today contains the following test:
[I]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state does not
service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufac-
turer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an
amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that
amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the
discovery of the nonconformity.171
The final step in this evolution has been to refine further in the mo-
tor vehicle lemon laws the test for "reasonable number of attempts" by
establishing presumptions which prima facie satisfy the requirement.
172
Song-Beverly's adoption of a remedy more appropriate for consumers
than that provided by Article 2 has been widely followed in statutes gov-
erning motor vehicle sales and, to a lesser extent, sales of manufactured
homes. As indicated further below, it has not been emulated on a general
basis, having been followed in only one other state.
4. Enhancing UCC Article 2 Remedies
Song-Beverly enhances the UCC Article 2 remedy provisions in sev-
eral important respects. First, the measure of damages must include the
Song-Beverly rights of replacement or reimbursement in addition to the
usual damages available under Article 2.173 Secondly, a successful buyer
is entitled to costs and attorney fees. 74 Finally, if the buyer establishes
170. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1988).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
173. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(b) (West Supp. 1993).
174. Id. § 1794(d).
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that the warrantor's failure to comply with its warranty or Song-Beverly
obligations was willful, the judgment may also include a civil penalty up
to twice any actual damages, except in a class action or when the claim
was based solely on breach of implied warranty.17 5 The obligation of the
manufacturer to retailers and independent servicemen is emphasized by
the availability of treble damages and attorney fees in actions brought by
them for "willful or repeated violation of the provisions of this chapter"
by the manufacturer.
17 6
The warranty duration for both express and implied warranties is
tolled for the period of repair activity under the Act. Moreover, the war-
ranty period does not expire at all if the repairs were not made or if they
did not remedy the nonconformity, and the buyer so notified the manu-
facturer or seller within sixty days after completion of the repairs.1 77 The
manufacturer's liability to retailer sellers also is extended during such a
tolling period.
178
5. Special Motor Vehicle Provisions
California's motor vehicle lemon law provisions fit within the Song-
Beverly structure but with some special rules. As in other lemon laws,
there is a statutory presumption that a reasonable number of attempts
has been made to conform the vehicle to the express warranty if the same
nonconformity has been subject to repair four or more times by the man-
ufacturer or its agents or the vehicle was out of service for more than
thirty calendar days. 179 If the manufacturer does not replace a lemon or
refund the buyer's money, it is subject to a civil penalty of up to two
times the amount of damages in addition to usual damages and reason-
able attorney fees.180 In contrast to the general Song-Beverly civil pen-
alty provisions, the motor vehicle sanctions do not require a showing that
the violation was willful.181
175. Id. § 1794(c). Before 1983, the ceiling was treble damages. Id. § 1794(a) (West 1973).
176. Id. § 1794.1 (West 1985).
177. Id. § 1795.6 (West Supp. 1993). These provisions apply only to goods selling for $50
or more. Id.
178. Id. § 1795.7 (West 1985).
179. Id. § 1793.22(b) (West Supp. 1993).
180. Id. § 1794(e)(1).
181. The civil penalty is not available if (1) the manufacturer maintains a qualified third-
party dispute resolution process, id. § 1794(e)(2); or (2) the buyer has not given the manufac-
turer written notice requesting replacement or refund, id. § 1794(e)(3); or (3) the manufacturer
has responded to such a written notice within 30 days. Id. § 1794(e)(4). A civil penalty under
these motor vehicle provisions may not be tacked onto a civil penalty under the more general
Song-Beverly penalty provisions. Id. § 1794(e)(5).
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6. Application to Used Goods
Song-Beverly applies to used goods only if an express warranty is
given.1"2 In that circumstance, the obligations of the retailer or distribu-
tor who makes the express warranty are the same as those imposed on
manufacturers regarding new goods, except that the duration of implied
warranties is to be coextensive with that of the express warranty (pro-
vided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable), but not less
than thirty days nor more than three months. 3 It is clear that it is the
warranting retailer or distributor who is to maintain service facilities and
that the manufacturer has no liability to the retailer or distributor in
connection with such an express warranty.18
4
7. Other Special Provisions
The Act contains extensive special provisions for new and used
assistive devices 8 ' and a few twists for clothing, consumables, draper-
ies, 186 and electronic or appliance products. 187 It requires also that writ-
ten warranties be set forth in simple and readily understood language,
comply with the Magnuson-Moss disclosure requirements, 8' and be ac-
companied by a statement of the location of the warrantor's repair facili-
ties.189 Work orders and invoices for repairs must contain certain
information, including a disclosure of basic legal rights and remedies. 190
B. Adaptation of Song-Beverly Express Warrantor Service Obligations
and New Consumer Remedy Provisions in Other States
Of the states considered above that were influenced by the Song-
Beverly approach toward disclaimer of implied warranties, only Oregon,
Minnesota, and Rhode Island reflect any direct influence of the Act's
express warranty obligations.
182. Id. § 1795.5 (West 1985). This section specifically provides these special rules
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods
to mean 'new' goods." Id. § 1795.5.
183. Id. § 1795.5(c). These provisions apply only to those implied warranties that arise
under Song-Beverly. See supra text accompanying note 125. Moreover, the Act does not place
those time limits on implied warranties that have not been limited or modified pursuant to
U.C.C. § 2-316.
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795.5(a) (West 1985).
185. Id. §§ 1791(p), 1792.2(b), 1793.02 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
186. Id. § 1793.35 (West 1985).
187. Id. §§ 1791(r)-(s), 1793.03 (West Supp. 1993).
188. Id. § 1793.1(a) (West 1985). This presumably makes state remedies available for vio-
lation of the federal disclosure standards.
189. Id. § 1793.1(b).
190. Id. § 1793.1(a)(2).
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The Oregon statute follows more of the California provisions than
any other state, but it nevertheless only minimally mimics the Song-Bev-
erly approach to enforcing repair obligations of express warrantors and
does not attempt to enhance remedies other than by giving the buyer the
statutory right to repair, replacement, or refund (less use value). 191 Each
manufacturer who gives an express warranty must have "in this state
sufficient service and repair facility to carry out the terms of such a war-
ranty," and service or repair is to be "commenced as soon as possible."' 92
The buyer is to deliver the goods for service unless they are bulky or
installed, and if the manufacturer is "unable" to repair, it must replace or
reimburse (less reasonable use value).193 If the manufacturer does not
have service and repair facilities within the state, the retail seller is to
honor the manufacturer's express warranty. The retailer has the option
of replacement, servicing, or repair. If that is not done "in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the warranty," the retail seller is to
reimburse the consumer (less reasonable use value).1 94 The retailer is
then entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer plus reasonable han-
dling charges and, in the case of service and repair, "a reasonable
profit." 1
95
The Oregon statute does not contain any detail on some matters
covered at length in Song-Beverly, such as what constitutes a sufficient
service or repair facility,' 96 nor does it authorize warrantors to designate
independent repair or service facilities to perform their obligations.1
97
More importantly, it leaves remedies to implication other than the cur-
sory statement that they are "cumulative" and are not to be construed so
as to restrict any remedies available under UCC Article 2.'9'
The Minnesota statute, after barring express warrantors from dis-
claiming implied warranties, simply commands that express warrantors
"honor the terms" of their express warranty' 99 and that a manufacturer
who authorizes a retail seller to perform warranty service must pay the
191. OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8100, 72.8110 (1991).
192. Id. § 72.8100.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 72.8110.
195. Id. § 72.8130.
196. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2 (West Supp. 1993) (specifying that facilities be reason-
ably close to areas where the goods are sold).
197. See id. § 1793.2(a).
198. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8190 (1991).
199. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.19(2) (1981). The statute provides expressly that "the
manufacturer shall honor an express warranty made by the manufacturer; the distributor shall
honor an express warranty made by the distributor; and the retail seller shall honor an express
warranty made by the retail seller." Id.
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retailer for it.2" The statute is silent as to the nature of any remedy
available under these provisions, but it does say that a violation shall be
treated as a violation of the state's Consumer Fraud Act, thus triggering
claims for costs and attorney fees.201
The Rhode Island statute is a unique patch-work quilt using only a
few Song-Beverly patterns, namely that express warrantors should have
service facilities and honor their warranties.2 "2 The section contains
slightly different requirements for "makers" of express warranties and
"manufacturers" who give express warranties. All "makers" (including
manufacturers) must honor their own express warranties and designate a
representative in the United States to provide services or repairs.20 3 If,
however, there are "competent repair or service facilities" available in
Rhode Island, the maker must provide for service to be done within the
State.2°
Each manufacturer who makes an express warranty must designate
a representative in Rhode Island to provide service and make parts avail-
able to that representative within thirty days of an order.2"5 The manu-
facturer also is required to make adequate service information and
replacement parts available to both designated service facilities and to
independent service facilities for four years after the last sale of any given
model or type.
20 6
Although the section falls short of requiring that the manufacturer's
designated representative perform services, it does address the standard
for any services that are performed. The representative is to perform
services "in a manner fully consistent with that service or repair which
would be made if the consumer were not entitled to warranty protec-
tion. ' 20 7 Such service is to be completed within thirty days if the part is
in stock. If not, the representative must order the part within two days
and complete service within ten days after receiving the part.20 8 The
200. Id.
201. Section 325G.20 provides that violation of these provisions is to be treated as a viola-
tion of § 325F.69, the Consumer Fraud Act. Id. § 325G.20. Section 8.31(3a) provides for
costs and attorney fees in cases involving violations of § 325F.69. Id. § 8.31(3a) (West Supp.
1993).
202. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329 (1992).
203. Id. § 6A-2-329(3)(b).
204. Id. § 6A-2-329(4). The statute goes on to provide that "this shall not be construed to
exclude use of facilities outside the state of Rhode Island where acceptable to all parties." Id.
Just how this is to operate in the consumer context is unclear.
205. Id. § 6A-2-329(3)(c).
206. Id. § 6A-2-329(3)(c), (3)(e), (5).
207. Id. § 6A-2-329(3)(f).
208. Id.
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manufacturer must pay the representative for both parts and labor at the
same rate charged by the representative for like services to retail
consumers.
20 9
The statute does not appear to provide any private remedy for viola-
tion of these duties. The sole sanction identified is liability for a "fine of
twenty-five dollars ($25.00) a day for every day of non-compliance and/
or be liable to the consumer for replacement of the item to be re-
paired."21 Although the reference to liability to the consumer suggests a
private action remedy, the title of the subsection in which it appears is
"penalties," and the last sentence provides that "prosecution" under the
provision "shall be brought by the attorney general's department."
211
C. The Progression of Remedies and Sanctions into the Motor Vehicle
Lemon Laws and the Manufactured (Mobile) Home
Statutes
The explosion of motor vehicle lemon laws since 1982 has brought
to the fore the Song-Beverly emphasis on (1) enforcement of express war-
ranties, (2) the streamlined lemon-aid remedy of refund or replacement
when there has not been timely repair, (3) provision for the direct liabil-
ity of the manufacturer, (4) the availability of attorney fees for successful
consumers, and (5) in some states, sanctions for non-compliance. Manu-
factured home statutes in a lesser number of states and used car statutes
in a few states have gone one step beyond, mandating certain terms of an
express warranty that must be part of the sale. Occasionally the
mandatory approach is used for a specific kind of product. Thus, in New
York, a full warranty is required in a sale of solar thermal systems.
212
1. New Motor Vehicles
The typical motor vehicle lemon law2 13 is, in some respects, a codifi-
cation of basic Song-Beverly principles from which there have been ex-
cised all references to implied warranties and service facilities and to
which has been added an important refinement of the refund remedy.
209. Id. § 6A-2-329(3)(d).
210. Id. § 6A-2-329(6).
211. Id.
212. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 7830.5 (McKinney 1984).
213. Lemon laws have been adopted in some form in 46 states and the District of Colum-
bia. They are discussed and catalogued in NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CrR., SALES OF
GOODS AND SERVICES ch. 34 & app. I (2d ed. 1989), and in PRIDGEN, supra note 14, at ch. 15
& app. 15A & 15B. For a slightly dated but still comprehensive discussion, see Joan Vogel,
Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589 passim.
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The approach is simple and direct. No manufacturer is required to give
an express warranty, but if one is given, the warrantor assumes a statu-
tory duty to live up to it.214 If repair does not bring the vehicle into
conformity with the warranty after a reasonable number of attempts, the
consumer is entitled to replacement or refund.
The real innovation in these laws is the use of a statutory formula to
establish a presumption as to when a reasonable number of attempts has
been made to conform the vehicle to the express warranty and thus trig-
ger the replacement or refund remedy. Typically the presumption ap-
plies if repair has not been achieved after four unsuccessful attempts to
cure the same nonconformity or if the vehicle has been out of service for
more than thirty calendar days.215 In some states, "nonconformity" is
described in terms of either "defect" or "condition," 216 which presuma-
bly eases the burden of the consumer to establish exactly what is wrong
with the complex machinery. In some states, failure to replace or refund
may subject the manufacturer to multiple damages or a civil penalty of
up to two times the amount of damages and reasonable attorney fees.2 17
Warrantors are often authorized to require the consumer to submit
disputes to an informal dispute settlement mechanism before bringing
suit under the lemon law if very specific notice about the procedure is
given at the time of the sale, and the mechanism is qualified pursuant to
the statute. 2 18 In some states, dissatisfaction with contract-mandated ar-
bitration has prompted the formation of state agencies to perform the
function.219
Perhaps the outstanding feature of these statutes is their more finely
honed remedy provisions. As previously noted, the UCC Article 2 reme-
dial scheme for refunds necessitates resort to two rather generic legal
standards, the failure of the essential purpose doctrine in Section 2-719
214. Usually, the statutory duties are applicable only during a stated period, such as 12
months or 12,000 miles, even if the duration of the express warranty is longer. See, eg.,
IDAHO CODE § 48-905 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.842 (Baldwin 1986); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 1960 (1984).
215. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CmR., supra note 213, § 34.7.3; PRIDGEN, supra note 14,
§ 15.05.
216. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-351.3 (1992) (providing that "if the manufacturer is
unable, after a reasonable number of attempts, to conform the motor vehicle to any express
warranty by repairing or correcting, or arranging for the repair or correction of, any defect or
condition or series of defects or conditions").
217. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(e)(1) (1988).
218. Often the standard used to determine whether the mechanism is "qualified" is that
promulgated in 17 C.F.R. § 703 by the Federal Trade Commission for use under the federal
Magnuson-Moss Act. See PRIDGEN, supra note 14, § 15.06.
219. For a discussion of the "Lemon Law II" movement in this direction, see id.
§ 15.06[3].
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and revocation of acceptance in Section 2-608.220 The lemon law rules
have taken disputes down from the clouds of an Article 2 generic inquiry
to the specificity of four times or thirty days. And, although the laws
often include some requirement akin to the substantial impairment ingre-
dient of the revocation of acceptance standard of Article 2, they still pro-
vide a more bright-line approach. Indeed, the lemon laws appear to be
utilized even in those total ban jurisdictions which go so far as to prohibit
a limitation of remedies for express warranties.221 It seems very likely
that they have absorbed some of the litigation that would otherwise have
been brought under the other kinds of statutes considered in this Article.
2. New Mobile Homes
Legislation in approximately eighteen states and federal legislation
relating to loans for certain mobile home2 22 purchases goes one step be-
yond either Song-Beverly or the lemon laws. The statutes require an ex-
press warranty.
The state statutes generally require that there be a warranty-usu-
ally for one year-against defects in materials and workmanship. Some-
times this is stated in terms of a warranty against "substantial" defects,
and sometimes the remedy is keyed to the existence of substantial de-
fects.223 The statutes may apply the standard to specified key portions of
the unit. In some states, a differently stated warranty applies to each
participant in the distribution process, from manufacturer, supplier,
dealer, and set-up agent.224
The statutes differ on such issues as application of the warranties to
subsequent purchasers and remedies. Because the consumer has received
a written warranty, standard sales theory is available. Attorney fees and,
occasionally, punitive damages, may also be available. In some states,
the mobile home provisions are integrated with the motor vehicle lemon
laws or a larger consumer protection act like Song-Beverly.22 5 In still
others, there is a tie-in with state unfair and deceptive trade practices
220. See supra text accompanying notes 164-69.
221. See, eg., Adams v. Nissan Motor Corp., 182 W. Va. 234, 387 S.E.2d 288 (1989).
222. The term "manufactured home" usually appears in the legislation.
223. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-25-110 (Michie 1977); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.3
(1980); IDAHO CODE § 39-4010 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.994 (West 1974).
224. For extensive discussion of the issues and laws relating to mobile homes, see BUREAU
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, MOBILE HOME SALES AND SER-
VICE: FINAL STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE
REGULATION RULE (Aug. 1980); see also NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 213,
§ 35.6 (discussing state and federal warranties and safety requirements); PRIDGEN, supra note
14, at ch. 17 (addressing warranties, time limits, sites of repair, and remedies).





Federal involvement occurs at two levels. The more pervasive is the
National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act
of 1974,227 which establishes construction and safety standards for new
mobile homes. Although there is no private cause of action for consum-
ers for violation of the Act, there is federal enforcement of the standards,
and violation may be regarded as a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. In addition, the standards are incorporated into state
statutes and are involved in the second level of federal involvement:
The second federal presence is the requirement of a one-year manu-
facturer warranty as a condition to obtaining a loan insured under 12
U.S.C. § 1703.228 This warranty obligates the manufacturer to correct
any nonconformity with federal construction and safety standards as well
as "any defects in materials and workmanship which become evident
within one year after the date of delivery." '229 Again, there is no federal
cause of action available for consumers, but since the obligation is set
forth in a written warranty, ordinary sales or contract law is applicable
even if specific state mobile home statutes are not.
3. Used Motor Vehicles
The mandatory warranty approach also has been adopted in a hand-
ful of states with respect to used cars. The duration of the required war-
ranty varies according to the mileage on the vehicle. For example, in
New York the term is ninety days or 4000 miles for cars with less than
36,000 miles at the time of sale, and sixty days or 3000 miles if the car
has more than 36,000 but less than 80,000 miles.230 In some states, cars
costing less than $1500 are exempted.231 Statutory remedies are similar
to those found in lemon laws.232
226. See, eg., MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 140, §§ 32L, 32M (1973).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 5401 (1988).
228. 24 C.F.R. § 201.21(d)(1) (1992).
229. Id. § 201.21(d)(2).
230. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-b (McKinney 1984). Rhode Island has similar provi-
sions. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.4-2 (1982) (providing minimum 60 day, 3000 mile warranty
if 36,000 miles or less, and minimum 30 day, 1000 mile warranty if between 36,000 and
100,000 miles).
231. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-221 (1987).
232. See generally NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 213, § 34.12 (discussing
history and scope of lemon laws); PRIDGEN, supra note 14, § 16.03 (considering options of
states desiring more used car rules).
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VI. THE CORROSIVE IMPACT OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT ON
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NoN-UCC LIMITATIONS ON
DISCLAIMERS AND REMEDY LIMITATIONS
Ironically, the Magnuson-Moss Act, which was designed to expand
consumer rights, has, as a practical matter, undermined the total ban
statutes. This federal Act prohibits the total disclaimer of implied war-
ranties when an express warranty is given.23 3 However, it then permits
the "conscionable" limitation of the duration of the implied warranties to
that of an express warranty of reasonable duration if conspicuously dis-
closed.2 34 Finally, the Act expressly preempts state laws that permit
broader limitations, without affecting those that give the consumer
greater protection.
2 35
The provisions posed practical problems for warrantors. They not
only had to abandon their long-standing practice of total disclaimer of
implied warranties for consumer products, but they also had to learn
how to draft provisions that could apply both in jurisdictions which per-
mitted limitations on the duration of implied warranties and in those
which, like those under consideration here, did not. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) provided a way out which, it must be said in candor,
seems suspect under traditional standards of unfair and deceptive
practices.
The FTC originally proposed safeguarding the rights of consumers
from total ban jurisdictions by requiring that warrantors list by name
those jurisdictions in which modifications were unenforceable.2 3 6 How-
ever, after objection from national warrantors about the burden of moni-
toring state law changes, 237 the FTC withdrew and provided that
warrantors could comply with the Magnuson-Moss Act disclosure re-
quirements even if they set forth limitations unenforceable under state
law so long as they were followed by a boilerplate caveat which advised
that the limitation might not apply.238 Indeed, all consumers can now
expect to find this FTC sanctioned, laconic statement in a written war-
ranty: "Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied
warranty lasts, so the above limitation may not apply to you.
2 39
233. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1988).
234. Id. § 2308(b).
235. Id. § 2308(c).
236. Proposed Rules, Trade Regulation Rule; Sales of Used Motor Vehicles, 50 Fed. Reg.
21,269-01 (1985).
237. See CLARK & SMITH, supra note 19, f 17.02[3][c], at 17-10-11.
238. Rules & Regulations, Trade Regulation Rules; Sales of Used Motor Vehicles, 52 Fed.
Reg. 18,522-02 (1987).
239. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(7) (1992).
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The result of this curious compromise is that consumers in total ban
jurisdictions have no way of knowing from standard written warranties
that their implied warranty rights may extend beyond the stated duration
of a written warranty.240 In this circumstance, the consumer may also
have the mistaken impression that all of his rights expire with the end of
the express warranty.241 Even the total ban jurisdictions do not require
that warrantors disclose the unlimited character of implied warranties.
That, however, does not seem nearly as deceptive as a disclosure that
implied warranty rights are limited in duration when that is simply
untrue!
The Magnuson-Moss Act disclosure rules interfere equally with the
consumer's knowledge of remedy rights in jurisdictions that limit the
ways in which warrantors may restrict consumer rights. Again, the FTC
retreated, permitting warrantors to impose a remedy limitation even in
total ban states so long as it is followed by the incantation: "Some states
do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential
damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you." 242
Curiously, the same statement must also be made in states that permit
such limitations. All warranties are required to carry the dramatic clos-
ing statement: "This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you
may also have other rights which vary from state to state."243
An issue analogous to these Magnuson-Moss problems arose in
Kansas, a total ban state. There, suppliers routinely used form contracts
which contained prohibited disclaimer terms. They sought to achieve
compliance with the disclaimer ban while continuing to use the form
contracts by stamping on the front of the form a "NOTICE TO CER-
TAIN KANSAS LESSEES," which stated that these provisions did not
apply in Kansas. The federal district court held the language sufficient to
"eradicate" the unlawful disclaimers and resurrect the implied warran-
ties. 2" This holding seems especially suspect in a state with such strong
legislation.245 Surely a supplier who has gone to the trouble of preparing
a stamp to use on the forms could also prepare something to paste over
the prohibited terms.
Although many applaud the Magnuson-Moss rules because they ob-
240. The duration of an implied warranty, of course, depends on the nature of the product,
whether it is new or used, the price, and the usual factors that have a bearing on the concept.
241. This is, of course, also true in all jurisdictions where the warrantor does not purport to
limit the implied warranties at all.
242. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (1992).
243. Id. § 701.3(a)(9).
244. Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1212, 1219 (D. Kan. 1986).
245. See infra text accompanying notes 254-87.
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viate the need for manufacturers to prepare a "multiplicity" of written
forms, 4 6 it is remarkable how these disclosure rules may operate to mis-
lead consumers in substantial ways. This state of affairs surely suggests
that the appellate cases in these states cannot possibly provide an accu-
rate compass of the reach of these laws when warrantors remain free to
misrepresent or at least obscure them.
VI. THE CASE LAW
A. The Total Ban Jurisdictions
1. Connecticut
The Connecticut statute is identical to Vermont's except for a statu-
tory exception for "goods clearly marked as 'irregular,' 'factory seconds'
or 'damaged.' "247 No cases have turned on the statutory provisions.
2. District of Columbia
In 1982, a new UCC Section 2-316.1 was enacted for the District of
Columbia. It appears to have been modeled largely on Maryland's stat-
ute, except for the very limited exception available for "particular de-
fects" that are "noted conspicuously in writing at the time of sale.")2 48
In Patton v. Chrysler Motors,249 the court held that the statute's anti-
disclaimer provisions invalidated those typical provisions of the standard
automobile warranty that limit the duration of implied warranties to that
of the express warranties in the manner prescribed by the Magnuson-
Moss Act. 5 0 Such a limitation, the court stated, cannot stand in the face
of the total prohibition against disclaimers of merchantability in the D.C.
statute.2 51 Hence, a claim of breach of merchantability was asserted suc-
cessfully even though the period of the express warranty had expired.
This decision also is notable because the court applied the D.C. law
even though the consumer purchased the new automobile from a dealer-
ship located in Virginia. The dealer knew that the consumer would keep
246. Barkley Clark, Lemon Aid for Kansas Consumers, 46 J. KAN. BAR ASS'N 143, 147-48
(1977). The author, who wrote before the Meuli decision, stated: "As things now stand, the
interests of national manufacturers and Kansas consumers are nicely reconciled: the manufac-
turers can market their products in Kansas without changing the form to comply with the
Consumer Protection Act, while Kansas consumers are fully protected by that Act." Id. He
did cite one district court decision which awarded a civil penalty where the manufacturer's
form contained disclaimer language without the FTC proviso. Id. at 147 n.31.
247. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316(5) (1990).
248. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1(3) (1991).
249. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1041 (D.C. Super. 1990).
250. Id. at 1047-48.
251. Id. at 1047.
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the car in D.C. and arranged for registration of the vehicle there.252 The
court held that the strong public policy underlying the D.C. legislation
was paramount and should be enforced rather than the Virginia law,
which permitted such a limitation of duration.
253
3. Kansas
The Kansas provisions are part of a broad consumer protection act
and are quite comprehensive.25 4 Moreover, the definitions are unusually
broad, so that "consumer" is defined to include use for business and agri-
cultural purposes, and a "supplier" need not deal directly with the con-
sumer.2"' Disclaimer of the implied warranties is prohibited (with a
narrow exception discussed below), as is any limitation of remedies for
breach of those implied warranties, and violation of either prohibition
triggers civil penalty and attorney fee provisions and is by statute denom-
inated an "unconscionable act or practice."2 6 The old privity defense is
eliminated.
The basic application of the anti-disclaimer provisions and their
reach to distant suppliers is illustrated in Stair v. Gaylord.2 57 Buyer had
purchased an irrigation system through a local dealer of General Irriga-
tion, which was in the business of buying components, assembling them,
and selling the completed irrigation systems. 258 Both General Irrigation
and a component supplier separately gave an express warranty that the
product would be "free from defects in material and workmanship," and
further provided that the express warranty was in lieu of all other war-
ranties both express and implied.2 9 Both were held to have violated the
act by attempting to limit obligations to the express warranty. 26° Gen-
eral Irrigation also ran into trouble with a clause that provided: "Com-
ponents manufactured by others than General Irrigation Company have
no warranty except that given by the original manufacturer. '26 1 This
attempt to confine consumers to warranty claims against distant compo-
nent suppliers also fell within the disclaimer ban.262
252. Id. at 1042-43.
253. Id. at 1047.
254. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(a) (Supp. 1991).
255. Id. §§ 50-624(b), 50-624(i).
256. Id. § 50-627(b)(7).
257. 232 Kan. 765, 659 P.2d 178 (1983).
258. Id. at 768, 659 P.2d at 181.
259. Id. at 769-70, 659 P.2d at 183.
260. Id. at 770, 659 P.2d at 183-84.
261. Id. at 771, 659 P.2d at 184.
262. The court, however, did note that the "applicability" of the rule as regards distant
suppliers like General Irrigation "will be questionable in subsequent breach of warranty cases"
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The ban against remedy limitations, however, applies only to the
breach of the implied warranties. Thus, Gaylord was later distinguished
in a case in which the consumer's claim was founded on a General Mo-
tors Protection Plan service contract.263 The consumer had argued that
the limitation of consequential damages in that agreement violated the
statutory prohibition.26' The court held that, unlike the clause in Gay-
lord, the service contract did not affect the implied warranties. Rather, it
provided "something in addition" to them.265 Thus, it is permissible to
limit consequential damages "in an agreement that provides extra bene-
fits in addition to the implied warranties. 26 6 The court noted also that
breach of warranty itself does not violate the anti-disclaimer
provisions.267
A Kansas Attorney General opinion has confirmed the Consumer
Protection Act's broad definition of "supplier" by saying the Act applies
to sales of used cars by brokers who sell on consignment. Consequently,
implied warranties may not be disclaimed in such sales.268
The disclaimer ban clearly applies to used as well as new goods.
Thus, a used car dealer may not limit a consumer to a "30 day or 1000
mile Warranty 100% on Drive Line & Air Conditioner. ' 269 Accord-
ingly, the dealer may be liable when the motor totally fails fifty days after
the sale.270 The court emphasized, however, that a used car is not held to
the same standards as a new one:
[T]he implied warranty of merchantability varies with the par-
ticular car. A late model, low mileage car, sold at a premium
in light of the 1981 Products Liability Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3301 to -3320 (Supp.
1983), which now excuses a seller from liability for a defective product manufactured else-
where if he had no knowledge of the defect and could not have discovered the defect while
exercising reasonable care. See Gaylord, 232 Kan. at 771, 659 P.2d at 184.
263. Farrell v. General Motors Corp., 249 Kan. 231, 815 P.2d 538 (1991).
264. Id. at 236, 815 P.2d at 543.
265. Id. at 241, 815 P.2d at 546.
266. Id. It is slightly noteworthy that this was a case in which the court scarcely could
restrain its impatience with plaintiffs for refusing to accept an early offer of General Motors to
fix the van. The court was not impressed with plaintiffs' insistence that (1) payment should be
made pursuant to the General Motors Protection Plan and not by General Motors, and (2)
they wanted to know exactly what caused the fire. Id. at 237-38, 815 P.2d at 544. In the
court's view, this was a case that had gotten out of hand, and the court reversed a number of
rulings that had resulted in a verdict for more than $100,000 in actual and punitive damages
and civil penalties in a case in which there were no personal injuries. Id. at 238-47, 815 P.2d
at 544-50.
267. Id. at 241, 815 P.2d at 546.
268. Monopolies and Unfair Trade-Consumer Protection-Disclaimer or Limitation of
Warranties, 86 Op. Kan. Att'y Gen. No. 25 (Feb. 20, 1986).
269. Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 234 Kan. 840, 840, 676 P.2d 744, 746 (1984).
270. Id. at 844, 676 P.2d at 748.
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price, is expected to be in far better condition and to last longer
than an old, high mileage, "rough" car that is sold for little
above its scrap value. However, as noted above, there is no
contention in this case that the implied warranty of
merchantability had "expired."
271
The same point had been made shortly after adoption of the statutory
disclaimer ban by a commentator who observed that "the concept of
warranty is a relative one: a used car is not unmerchantable simply be-
cause it wears out faster than a new one."272
The disclaimer ban also was held to apply to warranties that might
arise in non-sales transactions. 273 The court held that a contract to in-
stall and service a fire and burglary alarm system may give rise to an
implied warranty even though it was not a sale and hence was not gov-
erned by either UCC Article 2 or the Magnuson-Moss Act.274 Thus, in
this case the statutory ban on the limitation of remedies for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability applied so as to invalidate contract
provisions which purported to limit plaintiff's recovery to $250.275 In a
more recent decision, 276 however, the Kansas court indicated that the
exact holding in the prior case has been undermined by an amendment to
the statute: "Since then, KSA 50-639(a)(1) has been amended to make it
expressly clear that the only prohibition on limitation of warranties is of
UCC warranties. '27 7 Nonetheless, the earlier case is still a reminder that
remedy limitations are within the purview of the Kansas Act.
The statutory exception to the general ban against implied warranty
disclaimers has not been satisfied in any of the decided cases. It permits
a supplier to limit the implied warranties only upon a showing that "the
consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects, which became the basis
of the bargain between the parties." 278 An early commentator suggested
the exception should be available only where the consumer is purchasing
"irregular" or "marked down" goods on an "as is" basis where the defect
271. Id.
272. Sen. Robert F. Bennett, The 1973 Legislative Session-A Legislative Review, 42 J.
KAN. BAR ASS'N 153, 192 (1973).
273. Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 694, 732 P.2d 1260, 1271-72
(1987).
274. The court described such a warranty as follows: "[A] person who contracts to per-
form work or to render service, without an express warranty, impliedly warrants to perform
the task in a workmanlike manner and to exercise reasonable care in doing the work." Id. at
688-89, 732 P.2d at 1268.
275. Id. at 690, 732 P.2d at 1271.
276. Farrell v. General Motors Corp., 249 Kan. 231, 815 P.2d 538 (1991).
277. Id. at 240, 815 P.2d at 545.
278. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(c) (Supp. 1991).
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is reflected in the cost of the product.279 A more recent opinion of the
Kansas Attorney General noted that the exception is "intended for sales
where the defects are the basis for discounting the price of the item. It is
not intended to be a license for 'as is' sales in all circumstances. In our
opinion, brokers may not sell vehicles 'as is' as a general practice."28 0
Some suppliers in Kansas apparently have continued to use stan-
dard forms in which implied warranties are disclaimed, without violating
the Kansas Act. As illustrated in two leasing cases decided in Kansas
federal district court, the suppliers stamped the following provision on
the front of the lease:
NOTICE TO CERTAIN KANSAS LESSEES-Notwith-
standing the terms hereof to the extent prohibited by Kansas
law, no exclusion, modification, or limitation herein of any im-
plied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose otherwise applicable to this transaction or any remedy
provided lessee by law, including the measure of damages, shall
apply to a lease made within the State of Kansas where lessee is
a natural person or sole proprietorship.281
The court held that this language was effective to "eradicate any unlaw-
ful disclaimers" and resurrect the implied warranties. 282 Thus, there
could be no violation of the obligation not to disclaim implied warranties.
The district court concluded, however, that finance lessors are not
"merchants," and therefore an implied warranty under UCC Section 2-
314 could not arise.283 The latter analysis falls far short of that employed
by the Kansas Supreme Court to determine whether a warranty arises in
a non-sales transaction,28 4 but arguably is consistent with the provision
that specifies that the disclaimer ban relates to implied warranties as de-
fined in UCC Sections 2-314 and 2-315.25 Presumably, the difficulties
involved in the lease cases will be resolved by Kansas's enactment of
UCC Article 2A,28 6 which deals expressly with problems of warranties in
finance leases.2 87
279. Bennett, supra note 272, at 192.
280. Monopolies and Unfair Trade--Consumer Protection-Disclaimer or Limitation of
Warranties, 86 Op. Kan. Att'y Gen. No. 25 (Feb. 20, 1986).
281. Wight v. Agristor Leasing, 652 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D. Kan. 1987); Agristor Leasing
v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (D. Kan. 1986).
282. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. at 1219.
283. Id. at 1220.
284. See Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 684-94, 732 P.2d 1260,
1265-72 (1987). It does, however, rest in part on the Kansas Court of Appeals decision in CIT
Financial Servs., Inc. v. Gott, 5 Kan. App. 2d 224, 228, 615 P.2d 774, 777-78 (1980).
285. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1989).
286. 1991 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 363 (effective Feb. 1, 1992).




In 1973, the legislature amended Section 2-316 of the Maine UCC to
add subsection five, which in substance was identical to that of Vermont
except for a specific tie-in of a violation of Sections 2-314, 2-315, or 2-316
to the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act.2"8 In 1975, it was amended to
apply to used as well as new goods.
The legislative history of the provision shows its strong public policy
foundations:
Maine consumers are customarily required to waive or
limit any and all warranty rights granted to them under the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In the purchase
of automobiles, mobile homes, appliances and a great many ne-
cessities, the Maine consumer is forced to release his warranty
rights under the U.C.C. and accept in their place warranties
which are oftentimes meaningless and unconscionable.
While the waiver or limitation of such warranty rights is
certainly a valid and reasonable commercial concept in a con-
tract bargaining session between two enterprises, it has been
grossly abused by the business community in its dealings with
Maine consumers who are forced to accept contract terms
which are dictated solely by the seller.289
Most of the few appellate cases involving the provisions are inconse-
quential. Not surprisingly, decisions have held the section not applicable
to the purchase of expensive electronic equipment for a motel290 or to
heavy industrial equipment. 291 The Maine court also has emphasized
that its analysis of disclaimers and express warranties in commercial
cases "does not apply to transactions in consumer goods, for which the
Legislature has made special provision.
292
The most far-reaching decision involves an interpretation of the pro-
visions that make violation of Sections 2-314, 2-315, and 2-316 per se
violations of the state's unfair trade practices act. In State ex rel Tierney
Legislatures Should Enact Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 KAN. L. REV. 95,
108 (1990).
288. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5)(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that "[a]
violation of sections 2-314, 2-315 or 2-316, arising from the retail sale of consumer goods and
services, shall constitute a violation of Title 5, chapter 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act").
289. State ex rel Tiemey v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866, 872 (Me. 1981) (quoting the
Statement of Fact accompanying the legislative document to subsection (5), L.D. 1042, 1973
Me. Laws 444).
290. Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. MUlligan, 395 A.2d 818, 820 n.3 (Me. 1978).
291. Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315, 320 n.5 (Me. 1982).
292. Id.
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v. Ford Motor Co.,293 the court held that although the open-ended lan-
guage of the provision made possible several interpretations, 294 the most
reasonable one was that a per se violation of the UDTPA occurs only
when there has been "an attempt to obtain a waiver or limitation at the
time of a sale" of the implied warranties in violation of Maine's Section
2-316(5).295
The decision was based in part on the fact that the UDTPA subsec-
tion was subsidiary to Section 2-316(5) and on concern about far-reach-
ing consequences, including the fact that among the grounds for
suspending or revoking an automobile dealer's license was violation of
the UDTPA.2 9 6 The result also comported with "the right of commer-
cial enterprises ... to contest whether a breach of warranty has, in fact,
occurred. ' 2 97 The decision as it related to breach of warranty as an un-
fair or deceptive trade practice was followed in a memorandum decision
in Porter v. Sangillo.98
5. Maryland
Maryland is a total ban jurisdiction as to disclaimer and limitation
of remedies for implied warranties.299 Unlike the Massachusetts statute,
however, the Maryland ban does not on its face apply to manufacturers,
but "seller" has been redefined in Maryland for purposes of UCC Sec-
tions 2-314 through 2-318 to include the manufacturer. 300 Hence, the
ban has been held to apply to a manufacturer. 0 1
In Maryland Independent Automobile Dealers v. Motor Vehicle Ad-
ministration,0 2 the court held that the statutory ban applies to "as is"
provisions and to a "50-50" warranty under which the buyer was to pay
half of the cost of any repairs during the statutory period.30 3 The court
293. 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981).
294. Among the court's citation of possibilities was breach of warranty, failure of a warran-
tor to honor warranties or remedy obligations, or an attempt to obtain a disclaimer in violation
of ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5)(a) (West Supp. 1992). Tierney, 436 A.2d at 869.
295. Tierney, 436 A.2d at 874.
296. Id. at 874.
297. Id.
298. 437 A.2d 855 (Me. 1981).
299. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1991).
300. Id. § 2-314(l)(a).
301. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 619, 440 A.2d 1085, 1088 (1982), aff'd,
295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
302. 41 Md. App. 7, 394 A.2d 820 (1978).
303. Id. at 12, 394 A.2d at 823. The automobile dealers' association brought suit, con-
testing a regulation promulgated by the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration that pro-
vided that "[a] warranty may not contain language which specifically disclaims any implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness" and gave as examples a provision that disclaimed those
1062 [Vol. 71
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held also that used cars are clearly subject to Section 2-316.1. Three
years later, the Maryland legislature limited Section 2-31.6.1 by adding
subsection (4), which carved out an exception for certain older used car
sales.3°
In Anthony Pools v. Sheehan,3 °5 the court held that the public policy
underlying Section 2-316.1 required an expansive interpretation of con-
sumer goods.3 °6 Plaintiff was injured when he fell from the side of the
diving board of his new, in-ground, backyard swimming pool. 3 7 His
breach of merchantability claim was countered by a sales contract provi-
sion that provided conspicuously that its express warranties were in lieu
of any other warranties express or implied. 8
Noting that the swimming pool package was a mixed goods-services
transaction, the court said that application of the predominant purpose
test would require the conclusion that the diving board was merely inci-
dental to what was predominantly a services transaction, and that conse-
quently an Article 2 warranty would not apply.3° Such a result would
be contrary, however, to the "legislative understanding" underlying
Maryland's Section 2-316.1 that UCC warranties apply to goods in con-
sumer transactions. Therefore, the "all or nothing" classification ap-
proach of the predominant purpose test should not be used.310 More
appropriate is the "gravamen" test, under which one should look to see
whether the cause of the problem was the goods or the services. 311 Here,
the cause was the goods. Therefore, Section 2-316.1 should apply, and
the merchantability claim cannot be barred by the contract disclaimer.312
6. Massachusetts
In 1970, Massachusetts was the first state to enact a total ban.313
warranties in specific language, an "as is" provision, and a "50-50" warranty. Id. at 9, 394
A.2d at 822. Violation of the provision was one of the grounds available for suspension and
revocation of dealer licenses. Id. The court upheld the regulation and based its decision in
part on MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 15-312 (1991), which prohibited dealers from will-
fully failing to comply with the terms of a warranty or guarantee. Maryland Indep. Auto.
Dealers, 41 Md. App. at 12, 394 A.2d at 823.
304. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(4) (Supp. 1991).
305. 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983) (Sheehan II).
306. Id. at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 440-41.
307. Id. at 286-87, 455 A.2d at 435.
308. Id. at 287, 455 A.2d at 436.
309. Id. at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 441.
310. Id. at 298, 455 A.2d at 441.
311. Id. (quoting the test from 1 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
121, § 2-102:04 (1982)).
312. Id. at 298, 455 A.2d at 441.
313. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1992).
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These provisions, rooted in the National Consumer Act, have by them-
selves not been the subject of much case law.314 Perhaps more important
has been the role the provisions, as later amended, have played in con-
junction with a series of amendments to the Massachusetts Uniform
Commercial Code in the evolution of products liability law in the
commonwealth.
These provisions, including the bans on disclaimers and remedies,
the elimination of privity requirements, the restriction of the defense of
failure to give notice to prejudice situations, the extension of warranties
to non-sales transactions, and special products liability statutes of limita-
tions, were used together to develop products liability law "to provide a
remedy as comprehensive as that provided by § 402A of the Restatement
[of Torts]. 3 15 Accordingly, in Back v. Wickes Corp.316 the court con-
cluded it need not adopt strict liability in tort but that the strict liability
cases of other jurisdictions would be "a useful supplement to our own
warranty case law."
'3 17
In New England Watch Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc.,318 the court said
that even if an agreement for burglar alarm protection came within UCC
Article 2 (an issue expressly not decided in the case), it did not involve
"consumer goods" in this case because plaintiff corporation was engaged
in business.3 19 Hence, the anti-disclaimer provisions of Section 2-316A
were not applicable, and the conspicuous disclaimer of implied warran-
ties was effective.32°
In Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc.,321 the court held that a war-
rantor's attempt to bar loss of use damages for breach of express war-
ranty could not prevent the recovery of loss of use damages for breach of
implied warranties.322 Moreover, the court, citing prior authority, ap-
proved a trial court instruction that breach of warranty constituted an
314. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
315. Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 629, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978),
316. 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978).
317. Id. at 640, 378 N.E.2d at 968.
318. 11 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 416 N.E.2d 1010 (1981).
319. Id. at 948, 416 N.E.2d at 1011.
320. Id. For another analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 273-77 (discussing Cor-
ral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 732 P.2d 1260 (1987)).
321. 30 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 567 N.E.2d 1237, rev. denied, 409 Mass. 1105, 571 N.E.2d 28
(1991).
322. Id. at 203, 567 N.E.2d at 1242 (holding that the ban on limitation of remedies for
breach of implied warranties is absolute; the ban on limitation of remedies for breach of ex-
press warranties applies unless manufacturer maintains facilities within the commonwealth to
provide reasonable and expeditious performance).
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unfair and deceptive practice under Massachusetts law.323
In 1975 Clark and Davis raised, in the context of discussion of the
then recently enacted Massachusetts statute, the issue of "whether con-
tinued use of written disclaimers invalidated by the statute constitutes a
deceptive trade practice insofar as consumers might not realize that such
disclaimers were legally unenforceable."324 The issue is certainly not
unique to any state and remains largely unresolved. One Massachusetts
decision, Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc.,32s comes close
to deciding the issue but is a little too muddled to decipher completely.
The contract in question was for the purchase and installation of an in-
ground swimming pool in plaintiff's back yard. The dispute was a typi-
cal dispute with a contractor over the cost of extras for excavation, de-
lays, defects, and stoppage because of disputes.326 The contract
contained a clause requiring the buyer to submit any dispute to arbitra-
tion before any lawsuit.
327
The buyer sued, alleging violations of the Massachusetts Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The contractor demanded arbitration.
Although the court originally stayed the buyer's action pending arbitra-
tion, and the arbitrator's award for the contractor was confirmed, the
lawsuit was later tried.328 The trial court entered findings and conclu-
sions that (a) the arbitrator's confirmed award required decision for the
contractor, and (b) the contractor did not commit any unfair or decep-
tive practices.329
The court upheld the lower court's conclusion that there was no
misrepresentation or breach of implied warranty330 and therefore no
claim for violation of the unfair and deceptive trade practices act on
323. Id. at 203, 567 N.E.2d at 1243. The court relied on Calimlim v. Foreign Car Ctr.,
Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 235-36, 467 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1984). The court's most recent comprehen-
sive consideration of breach of warranty as an UDAP violation is Maillet v. ATF-Davidson
Co., 407 Mass. 185, 193-94, 552 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1990). See Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 973 F.2d 988, 992-99 (1st. Cir. 1992) (holding that customers of a utility may not
recover under state deceptive practices statute purely economic damages related to breach of
warranty in contract between utility and manufacturer) and the helpful discussion in the dis-
trict court opinion, 756 F. Supp. 620, 622-31 (D. Mass. 1990).
324. Barkley Clark & Michael J. Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension
in Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567, 587 (1975).
325. 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (1982).
326. Id. at 819, 434 N.E.2d at 615.
327. Id. at 815, 434 N.E.2d at 614.
328. Id. at 815, 434 N.E.2d at 613.
329. Id. The court also made specific factual findings to avoid retrial in the event it was
wrong with respect to finding (a). Id.
330. Id. at 823-24, 434 N.E.2d at 617. The court held there was no breach of
merchantability because the defects did not affect the "operative essentials" of the pool and
could easily be repaired within one-half day-which the seller had offered to do long ago. Id.
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those claims. It had more difficulty with the claim that the inclusion of
the arbitration clause itself violated the Act. Relevant to that issue was
the Attorney General's regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act,
which provided: "It shall be an unfair and deceptive act or practice to
fail to perform or fulfill any promises or obligations arising under a war-
ranty. The utilization of a deceptive warranty is unlawful." '331
The court construed provisions of the Unfair and Deceptive Prac-
tices Act (UDAP) to preclude a stay of claims asserted pursuant to that
act, and thus concluded that the trial court's decision to stay the original
lawsuit was erroneous with respect to the buyer's UDAP claims.332 Ar-
bitration was appropriate, however, for those contract claims not gov-
erned by the Act.333 That left the buyer's claim that use of the clause
itself was an unfair or deceptive practice because it constituted a modifi-
cation of a consumer's remedies for breach of warranties, in violation of
the statute and the Attorney General's regulation.
The court was not responsive. Even assuming that the pool is en-
compassed within the phrase "consumer goods, services or both" as used
in Chapter 106, Section 2-316A of the Massachusetts General Laws An-
notated, and that the arbitration clause "exceeds, limits, or modifies a
consumer's remedies for breach of express or implied warranties, Section
2-316A merely declares unenforceable language which attempts to ex-
clude, limit, or modify such remedies. ' 334 Neither Section 2-316(A) nor
the Attorney General's regulation declares such a term to be illegal.
Therefore, the mere use of the clause was not a UDAP violation.33S
The court appears to have been affected strongly by the facts of the
case: the clause itself was not a disclaimer; this was the initial determina-
tion of the issue of whether arbitration should be stayed for a UDAP
claim; the court may have had some compunction whether Section 2-
316A should apply at all to what was essentially a contractor's dispute;
331. Regulation VII B, 20 Code Mass. Regs., Part 5 (1975) (current version at MASS.
REGs. CODE tit. 940, § 3.08(2) (1986)).
In Maillet v. AFT-Davidson Co., 407 Mass. 185, 552 N.E.2d 95 (1990), the court noted a
defendant's argument that the regulation was beyond the authority of the Attorney General to
promulgate because it automatically imposed liability for every breach of warranty but de-
clined to decide the issue because the facts of the case went beyond automatic liability. Id. at
190 n.7, 552 N.E.2d at 98 n.7.
332. Hannon, 385 Mass. at 825-27, 434 N.E.2d at 618-19.
333. The court thus reduced the attorney fees that had been awarded to the contractor
pursuant to contract terms to deny recovery for fees related to forcing arbitration and intro-
duction of evidence of arbitration in the trial. Id. at 828, 434 N.E.2d at 619-20.
334. Id. at 824, 434 N.E.2d at 617-18 (emphasis added).
335. Id. at 824-25, 434 N.E.2d at 618.
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and the facts showed the buyer was at fault.336
7. Mississippi
Mississippi has been a total ban state since 1987. Initially, the ap-
proach taken was simple: UCC Section 2-316 was not enacted. But this
created considerable uncertainty. Early commentators noted two possi-
ble meanings of the deletion: (1) disclaimers would still be allowed but
without the requirements of conspicuousness and the specific mention of
"merchantability," or (2) disclaimers would be totally prohibited.337
This debate was partly resolved in 1976 by adoption of a statute
outside the UCC that prohibited any "limitation of remedies or dis-
claimer of liability as to any implied warranty of merchantability or fit-
ness for a particular purpose" 33 and an amendment to UCC Section 2-
719(4) that prohibited "[a]ny limitation of remedies which would deprive
the buyer of a remedy to which he may be entitled for breach of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
'339
The courts construed these provisions broadly. In Massey-Ferguson
v. Evans,34° for example, the court held that the provisions negated an
"as is" disclaimer on used farm equipment.341 In Beck Enterprises v.
Hester,342 the court again noted that the provisions applied to used
goods.343 More recently, the court asserted, in another used car case,
that "the implied warranty of merchantability may not be waived or
disclaimed.
' '34
Another implication of the impact of the anti-disclaimer provisions
is suggested in Hester. The used car express warranty there required
some co-payment by the buyer.345 Inasmuch as the buyer was awarded
damages for repairs made to the vehicle, it seems reasonable to conclude
336. Id. at 814-20, 434 N.E.2d at 612-16.
337. Clark & Davis, supra note 324, at 584.
338. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-18 (Supp. 1988).
339. Id. § 75-2-719(4) (1972).
340. 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981).
341. Id. at 18-19.
342. 512 So. 2d 672 (Miss. 1987).
343. Id. at 675. The Court also noted that the standard of merchantability is
different for new and used goods of the same type. Used goods are reasonably ex-
pected to require more maintenance and repair and their quality should not be mea-
sured on the same scale as that of new goods. Used goods should be compared to
similar used goods. If they conform to the quality of other similar used goods, they
will normally be merchantable.
Id. at 676.
344. Gast v. Rogers-Dingus Chevrolet, 585 So. 2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1991).
345. 512 So. 2d at 674.
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that co-payment provisions cannot be applied as against an implied war-
ranty breach. The point, however, is not directly made in the opinion,
and recovery also was justified on grounds of fraud.346
In Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Associates, 47 a commercial
equipment lessee argued the anti-disclaimer provisions should invalidate
the disclaimer provisions in the lease.348 Concluding that the lease was
not the functional equivalent of a sale and that the lessor was really a
financer, the court said that the lessor was "not sufficiently like a seller so
as to impose Article 2 warranties. '349 The concurring opinion explained
that since no warranties arose between the financing lessor and the lessee
in the transaction, "there was no warranty for section 11-7-18 to
save." 350 In a subsequent case,351 however, the court found a "two party
equipment lease" the functional equivalent of a sale and held that provi-
sions of Article 2, therefore, should be applied by way of analogy.35 2 In
applying the Article 2 implied warranty provisions, the court noted:
[W]e confront immediately the language of the contract which
provides that there are no such implied warranties in this case.
That effort at private law-making in turn is met by Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-7-18 (Supp. 1985) which holds inoperative any such
disclaimer of warranties.353
346. Id. at 678.
347. 502 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1986).
348. Id. at 620-22. The court's statement of facts more colorfully noted that the lessee had
claimed that lessor had "conspired to avoid the availability to [lessee] Briscoe's of access to the
implied warranty provisions of" Article 2. Id. at 620. Regrettably, there was no direct discus-
sion of this theory in the opinion.
349. Id. at 622. The same result obtained in Capital Assocs. v. Sally Southland, Inc., 529
So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1988), in which there was a lease with nearly identical terms involving the
same equipment seller and lessor. Although the majority opinion did not cite Briscoe's, the
dissent contended that the majority "sub silentio" had relied on it. Id. at 648 (Lee, J., dissent-
ing). More importantly, the dissent argued that the distinctions between two- and three-party
leases did not work and that Article 2 provisions should be applied to three-party leases as
well. Id. (Lee, J., dissenting).
350. Briscoe's, 502 So. 2d at 623 (Robertson, J., concurring).
351. J.L. Teel Co., Inc. v. Houston United Sales, 491 So. 2d 851 (Miss. 1986). This case
was decided after Briscoe's even though its opinion appears eleven volumes earlier than the
later decision. Presumably the reason for delay was disposition of the motion to reconsider.
The Teel opinion refers to Briscoe's as a recently decided case not yet reported. Id. at 855.
352. The two-party terminology is contrasted with what the court referred to as the "three
party equipment lease [in Briscoe's] wherein the lessor did not supply the goods but was in
substance a financing agency." Id. at 855. The court's "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach to functional equivalency applies the kinds of factors usually applied in such cases. It
is notable, however, that the court did not require that the circumstances show what is called a
lease is actually a sale; it need only be functionally like a sale. Then, Article 2 applies by way
of analogy.
353. Id. at 859.
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The court also said: "For clarity, Section 11-7-18 creates no warranties.
It saves warranties otherwise existing."
354
In Fedders Corp. v. Boatright,355 the court held that the standard
provision purporting to limit the duration of the implied warranty of
merchantability to the one year express warranty was invalid. 56 It also
pointed out that Section 11-7-20 "abolished any requirement of privity to
maintain an action against the manufacturer for a defective product"
3 57
and that the manufacturer was within the UCC definition of "seller."
This followed, the court said, from Volkswagen of America v. Novak,
3 58
in which the court had held that the manufacturer, as well as the dealer,
was a "seller" under the UCC 9 because the sale and warranty "blended
into a single unit" and that such sales are usually made "not only upon
the make and model of the automobile, but also upon the assurance of
the manufacturer, through its warranty, that the vehicle will conform to
the standards of merchantability.
' '36°
The Boatright court also held the manufacturer liable for negligent
installation by the dealer, noting that "[ilt could even be said that the
proper installation of the machine was but a continuation of the manu-
facturing process, because until finally installed in place the unit had no
usefulness. ' 36 1 This approach was said to apply to a machine that re-
quires special skill to install when the manufacturer had authorized the
dealer to make such an installation.362 Finally, the court concluded that
this case fell "squarely" under attorney fee provisions of the Magnuson-
Moss Act, noting that it is "hard to imagine a case that better exemplifies
the type of litigation Congress had in mind when drafting this
provision.
' 363
In 1987, Mississippi adopted a new statute which appears to be
modeled on the total ban provisions of Maryland and the District of Co-
lumbia.364 The older provisions remain. It seems doubtful that the
354. Id.
355. 493 So. 2d 301 (Miss. 1986).
356. Id. at 303, 308-09. The court noted: "Significantly, the limited warranty also made
note that in some states the limitations on implied warranty as well as on consequential dam-
ages were not permitted." Id. at 303 n.1. The reference presumably is to the boilerplate per-
mitted by the Magnuson-Moss regulations.
357. aAi at 308.
358. 418 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1982).
359. Id. at 804; see Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-103(l)(d) (1972).
360. Volkswagen, 418 So. 2d at 804.
361. Boatright, 493 So. 2d at 307.
362. Id. at 307.
363. Id. at 312.
364. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1 (1987). It is broader than either Maryland's or the
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newer statute will change the results in any of the decided cases. It does,
however, clarify matters.
8. Vermont
Vermont adopted a total ban statute in 1972 identical to that in
Massachusetts, except that it is confined in application to new and un-
used goods. It rests on strongly stated judicial policy:
The law does not favor such disclaimers, very likely because
they so often play a part in fraudulent or unconscionable trans-
actions. With respect to consumer fraud, such provisions are
unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code, 9A
V.S.A. § 2-316.365
In 1985, the provisions were extended, by virtue of a broadened defi-
nition of "consumer," to apply to leases and also to persons who operate
a farm even if it is conducted as a business. 36 6 In Christie v. Dalmig,367
the court said that the total ban provisions would override the waiver by
inspection provisions of UCC Section 2-316(3)(b).368 Other cases dealing
with the provisions have revealed little about the application and scope of
the statute. Most of the cases have gone no farther than to determine
whether the sale involved a consumer transaction.369
District of Columbia's statute because it does not have their exemption from remedy limita-
tions for a manufacturer who maintains in-state repair facilities. Its older vehicle exemption
also tolerates more miles (75,000 compared to 60,000) on a used car before the statutory excep-
tion kicks in. Id.
365. Lectro Management, Inc. v. Freeman, Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 216, 373 A.2d 544,
546 (1977).
366. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451A(a) (Supp. 1992).
367. 136 Vt. 597, 396 A.2d 1385 (1979).
368. Id at 599, 396 A.2d at 1387. The court did not decide whether those provisions
would have applied to these facts. Plaintiffs had purchased a fiberglass tub and shower unit
from defendant. It was packaged in two cardboard boxes that were loaded in the back of
plaintiff's pickup truck. A dispute arose whether the goods were cracked on the ride home or
had been cracked at the time plaintiffs took delivery. Id. at 598, 396 A.2d at 1386-87. It seems
unlikely that subsection (3)(b) would apply here anyway.
369. See Corey v. Furgat Tractor & Equip., Inc., 147 Vt. 477, 477-79, 520 A.2d 600, 601
(1986) (holding that tractor purchased for logging business was not consumer good); Murray
v. J. & B. Int'l Trucks, Inc., 146 Vt. 458, 469-70, 508 A.2d 1351, 1358 (1986) (holding that
truck purchased for logging business was not a consumer good); Barrett v. Adirondack Bottled
Gas Corp., 145 Vt. 287, 293-94, 487 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (1984) (holding that absentee land-
lord buying propane tank for apartment complex was not a consumer); Lectro Management,
135 Vt. at 216-17, 373 A.2d at 546 (1977) (holding that complex office equipment was not
consumer goods). The court looked for help in construing the somewhat confusing definition
of "consumer" to § 9-109 and said that goods were to be classified "according to the use to
which they are put by the consumer." Barrett, 145 Vt. at 294, 487 A.2d at 1078.
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9. West Virginia
In 1974, West Virginia adopted a comprehensive Consumer Credit
and Protection Act based largely on the National Consumer Act.370 Its
sales provisions included abolishing privity, a total ban against disclaimer
and remedy limitations regarding implied warranties, and remedy limita-
tions regarding express warranties in consumer transactions.371
The privity provisions have been construed expansively in tandem
with UCC Section 2-318,372 despite some early concern by commentators
revolving around the definition of "consumer," which refers to one "to
whom a sale is made.137 3 The same commentators expressed concern
that the failure to define the word "merchant," which appears in the anti-
disclaimer provisions, might result in the conclusion that the provisions
would not apply to manufacturers.374
Language in one decision 37 1 could be read-but only by unreasona-
ble implication-to permit a limitation of the duration of implied war-
ranties. The court said that the warranty at issue "did not attempt to
exclude implied warranties"; rather, it limited them to the duration of
the express warranty. 376 The court then noted that the fire had occurred
during the twelve month period of the express warranty: "[T]hus, the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness apply. ' 377 Given the
facts of the case, this should probably be construed simply to mean that
the breach occurred during the stated period of the express and implied
warranties. It seems unlikely that the court meant to imply that the im-
plied warranty could be limited to the duration of the express warranty.
The statutory language would seem to bar such a result.373
370. There is an excellent description of the West Virginia statute and its background in
Cardi, supra note 20, at 411-15. Cardi also includes a very helpful discussion of the drafting of
the National Consumer Act. See id. at 408-09.
371. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-107 to -6-108 (1986) were borrowed respectively from NA-
TIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 3.302, 3.304 (1970).
372. Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 185 W. Va. 518, 520-21, 408 S.E.2d 270, 271-74 (1991);
Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 158 W. Va. 516, 519, 212 S.E.2d 82, 83-84 (1975); see Cardi, supra
note 20, at 497-501.
373. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(b) (1992).
374. See Cardi, supra note 20, at 497-501; Stowers, supra note 56, at 335-37.
375. Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 184 W. Va. 641, 403 S.E.2d 189 (1991).
376. Id. at 648, 403 S.E.2d at 196.
377. Id.
378. See Fedders Corp. v. Boatright, 493 So. 2d 301, 308 (Miss. 1986) (refusing to limit
term of implied warranty to that of express warranty); see supra notes 355-63 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Boatright).
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10. Alabama
The Alabama provision is the most specific of those considered. Its
unique addition to UCC Section 2-316371 was part of a package of
nonuniform provisions added upon initial adoption of the Code "to ex-
pand the right of the consumer in personal injury cases."' 3 0 As a pack-
age,311 these Alabama provisions have been influential in the adoption of
liberal approaches in personal injury cases to issues of products liability
generally, 3 2 statutes of limitations, privity, and requirements for giving
notice of breach,38 3 but they do not seem to have had any influence in
other kinds of cases.
B. Statutes Requiring Greater Particularity for Disclaimers Without
Other Provisions
1. South Carolina
The unique South Carolina Section 2-316(2) provides that the lan-
guage of disclaimers of implied warranties must be specific, and, if the
included language creates an ambiguity in the contract, it should be re-
solved against the seller.38 4 One case provides a clear illustration.3"5
Placing a disclaimer of implied warranties under the bold heading
"TERMS OF WARRANTY" "creates an ambiguity and is likely to fail
to alert the consumer that an exclusion of the warranty was intended." '386
The disclaimer therefore was held to be ineffective.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has indicated that a similar
result could obtain in a commercial case. However, although the court
indicated that a disclaimer was misleading because the heading simply
read "WARRANTY," and that the language, which appeared on page
seventeen of a twenty-two page agreement, was not conspicuous and did
379. ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(5) (1991). The subsection reads: "Nothing in subsection (2) or
subsection (3)(a) or in section 7-2-317 shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the seller's
liability for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods." Id.
380. Bishop v. Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340, 1345 (Ala. 1976).
381. The provisions are discussed in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134,
141-42 (Ala. 1976).
382. E.g., id.
383. Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979); Bishop, 336 So. 2d at
1345.
384. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
385. Hartman v. Jensen's, Inc., 277 S.C. 501, 289 S.E.2d 648 (1982).
386. Id. at 503, 289 S.E.2d at 649. The opinion did not contain the language of the at-
tempted disclaimer. The court cited two cases from other jurisdictions that reached a similar
result without the aid of such a statute. Id. (citing Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet
Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 108-09, 437 S.W.2d 459, 463 (1969); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v.
Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 391-92, 268 A.2d 345, 350 (1970)).
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not mention "merchantability," it nevertheless was effective because the
disclaimer language had been negotiated expressly. 387 During the
lengthy period of negotiations, the buyer had objected to the language
but agreed after the seller refused to contract without it.388 The court
said that these "circumstances surrounding the transaction are in them-
selves sufficient to call the buyer's attention to the fact that no implied
warranties are made" under South Carolina Code Section 2-316(3)(a),
and hence the language was effective.389 The court might also have con-
cluded that the language was conspicuous because it was part of a type-
written, fully negotiated contract.39°
The federal district court had much less trouble in another case in-
volving a disclaimer of implied warranties which appeared in a separate
paragraph written in all capital letters. The court found full compliance
with UCC disclaimer requirements.391 In addition, although these facts
were not tied explicitly into the conclusion of conspicuousness, the situa-
tion of the case was "one in which all prior negotiations, demonstrations,
the 'conditional' lease, and the experiments, culminated in two outright
sales whose terms were put into a final written expression.,
392
In another federal court decision, the court, without reference to the
special South Carolina amendments to Section 2-316, held that a dis-
claimer of non-distinct color and type buried in a lengthy paragraph of
an agreement seven pages long was not conspicuous. 39 3 Perhaps the dis-
position should not have been so summary. Since the agreement was
typed on legal size paper, it may have been negotiated. The opinion is
silent, however, as to the circumstances of negotiations other than to in-
dicate that the sale had been arranged by an intermediary who signed as
a witness. The disclaimer paragraph also excluded all consequential
damages and required that any lawsuit founded in express warranty be
brought within six months of execution of the contract.394
2. Washington
The Washington provision resulted from the pre-UCC decision of
387. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, 283 S.C. 182, 189, 322 S.E.2d
453, 456 (S.C. App. 1984).
388. Id. at 189, 322 S.E.2d at 457.
389. Id. at 187, 322 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-316(3)(a) cmt. 6 (Law. Co-
op. 1976)).
390. See id. at 186, 322 S.E.2d at 456.
391. Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974).
392. Id. at 44.
393. Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D.S.C. 1974).
394. Id. at 1117.
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Berg v. Stromme,3 95 which was rooted in very strongly worded public
policy. In Stromme the court noted:
The record shows that the parties reached an agreement as to
the size, style, color, power and model of the automobile; they
agreed, item by item, on the kinds of extra equipment to be
added to and made a part of the new car and the price the
buyer would pay for each one. The record does not show that
they ever discussed, contemplated or agreed that the buyer in-
tended to waive his right to delivery of a new car of merchanta-
ble quality, nor that the seller, aside from the printed
statements, intended to exact such a waiver.... Such waiver,
even though printed, should not be allowed to arise from the
fine print to haunt the buyer of a new car unless he has agreed
to be bound by it with the same degree of explicitness that he
bound himself to the other vital conditions of the contract of
purchase.3 96
Accordingly, a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is
ineffective unless: (1) it was negotiated explicitly between the buyer and
seller, and (2) it sets forth with particularly the qualities and characteris-
tics that are not warranted.39 7 Later cases have made it clear that the
burden of proof is on the seller to establish the validity of any
disclaimer.39
It is important to note that although the Stromme rule arose from a
consumer context, its language was not so confined, and the courts, until
recently, regularly applied it to commercial transactions. This, of course,
obviated any need to draw definitional lines around consumer transac-
tions. The commercial application continued even after the second re-
quirement-requiring disclosure with particularity of qualities and
characteristics not warranted-was codified in 1974 by an amendment to
Section 62A.2-316(4) for consumer purchase transactions.399 Moreover,
395. 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971). The case was decided after adoption of the
Code, but it involved a purchase made before adoption. The decision made no reference to the
Code.
396. Id. at 193-94, 484 P.2d at 385.
397. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 293, 753 P.2d 530, 535 (1988) (citing Thomas
v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, 43 Wash. App. 208, 213, 716 P.2d 911, 914 (1986)); see Stromme, 79
Wash. 2d at 196, 484 P.2d at 386.
398. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 293, 753 P.2d at 534 (relying on DeCoria v. Red's Trailer
Mart, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971)).
399. Act of May 5, 1974, ch. 180, 1974 Wash. Laws 642 (1st Ex. Sess.). Earlier in the same
session, the requirements also had been applied to leases and to purchases for commercial or
business uses. Act of Feb. 16, 1974, ch. 78, 1974 Wash. Laws 167 (1st Ex. Sess.). Two months
later, however, those broad applications were deleted and the requirements confined to con-
sumer purchase transactions. Act of May 5, 1974, ch. 180, 1974 Wash. Laws 642 (lst Ex.
Sess.). None of the cases have referred to this brief but interesting history. Several cases have
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the cases acknowledge that the first requirement-that a. disclaimer be
negotiated explicitly-has continued as a matter of common law.' The
statutory provision as such, therefore, was of little importance, and there
is a strong aspect of common-law evolution in the decisions.
The cases have given some content to the Stromme requirements.
The explicit negotiation component has been explained in several differ-
ent ways. Thus, a disclaimer is ineffective if it "was never brought to the
plaintiff's attention," 1 or if "[tihere were no discussions, no bargaining,
no negotiations, and no agreements" as to the clause.' 2 It follows, a
fortiori, as held in another case, that "[a] disclaimer made after a sale is
completed cannot be effective because it was not a part of the bargain
between the parties."'4 3 This is so even if the clause is in a writing sent
to buyer and signed by him after an oral contract had been made.'
Even "actual knowledge of the disclaimer is insufficient to give it ef-
fect.""4  Further, the required agreement cannot be provided by the ap-
plication of Section 2-207, which in other contexts as a matter of law
may make terms in a written confirmation a part of a contract." 6
It is clear, at least in a consumer case, that the explicit negotiation
must relate to the disclaimer clause. Thus, in one case the court empha-
sized that there was no evidence of any negotiations regarding a dis-
claimer. 4° 7 Moreover, the fact that the contract had been drafted by an
attorney mutually chosen by the parties did not change the situation. 
4
0
applied sales law rules to lease transactions. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d
198, 201, 484 P.2d 405, 407 (1971) (holding that one cannot properly distinguish between sale
and rental of chattel).
400. The court in Hartwig Farms Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App.
539, 625 P.2d 171 (1981), noted: "In response to Berg v. Stromme, ... RCW 62A.2-316 was
amended in 1974 to require particularity in consumer, i.e., noncommercial, transactions.
There was no change, however, in the requirement that a disclaimer must be negotiated in
order to be effective." Id. at 242-43 n.5, 625 P.2d at 173 n.5 (citation omitted); see also
Thomas, 43 Wash. App. at 213-14, 716 P.2d at 915 (stating that the disclaimer still must be
negotiated).
401. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 46, 554 P.2d 349, 355
(1976).
402. Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 104, 666 P.2d 899, 903 (1983).
403. Hartwig Farms, 28 Wash. App. at 543, 625 P.2d at 173 (holding that disclaimer on
wholesaler's invoice sent after oral contract and a written confirmation that did not contain the
disclaimer is not effective).
404. Rottinghaus, 35 Wash. App. at 106-07, 666 P.2d at 905.
405. Id.; Hartwig Farms, 28 Wash. App. at 545, 625 P.2d at 175; see also Miller v. Badgley,
51 Wash. App. 285, 294, 753 P.2d 530, 535 (1988) (stating that knowledge of a disclaimer is
ineffective "absent negotiation and agreement").
406. Rottinghaus, 35 Wash. App. at 105-06, 666 P.2d at 904-05; Hartwig Farms, 28 Wash.
App. at 543-44, 625 P.2d at 174.
407. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 293, 753 P.2d at 535.
408. Id. at 294, 753 P.2d at 535.
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In several cases, the explicit negotiation requirement has been used in
tandem with the requirement that any qualities or characteristics being
disclaimed be set forth with particularity. This is particularly evident in
a consumer case involving a used Corvette." 9 The salesman pointed out
the following statement in the purchase order and requested that the con-
sumer initial it: "I understand you don't provide any warranties whatso-
ever, and the auto is sold as is and with all defects."41 He then
"explained that this provision would protect Lease-Sales [seller] from
complaints of engine problems from buyers who would punishingly drive
a high-performance sports car like the Corvette. No other specifics were
discussed. Thomas (consumer) then initialed the disclaimer." 4 The
court held the evidence fully supported the finding that the seller had
"neither negotiated the disclaimer of warranty nor informed Thomas
[buyer] correctly as to the qualities and characteristics intended to be
excluded by the disclaimer. On the contrary, he was told that the dis-
claimer referred only to engine wear that might occur through his misuse
of the vehicle.
412
"In its present condition" is a litigious clause in many jurisdictions,
there being a split of authority whether it is sufficiently similar to "as is"
to constitute a disclaimer of implied warranties.413 It clearly is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the Washington particularity requirement.414 It is likely,
in fact, that the classic "as is" clause itself fails the test because it is too
generic to set forth the required particulars.4 15 That is also true of a
clause that explicitly attempts to disclaim all express and implied
warranties.416
The particularity requirement also has been used in circumstances
409. Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, 43 Wash. App. 208, 213, 716 P.2d 911, 914 (1986).
410. Id at 210, 716 P.2d at 912-13.
411. Id. at 210, 716 P.2d at 913.
412. Id. at 214, 716 P.2d at 915.
413. See the brief discussion in Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 292-93, 753 P.2d
530, 534 (1988).
414. Id. at 294, 753 P.2d at 535.
415. This seems to be a reasonable reading of Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 43
Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911 (1986). The case does not squarely present the issue, however,
because the salesman's "explanation" misrepresented the provision. Id. at 210, 716 P.2d at
913.
416. Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 104, 666 P.2d 899, 903 (1983). The dis-
claimer in this case provided in part:
LIMITATION OF WARRANTY AND REMEDY
Since the use, crop, yields or quality of certified seed potatoes is beyond the
control of the producer, the seller, the inspector, or the Montana Potato Improve-
ment Association, after loading for shipment, no warranty of any kind, express or
implied, including merchantability, which extends beyond the description on the face
of this tag is made concerning the performance or quality of these seed potatoes.
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that would have required proof of fraud or misrepresentation in other
jurisdictions. Thus, one of the reasons given for the invalidity of a dis-
claimer in a used car case was the seller's failure to disclose that the car
previously had been used for racing.417
The most pronounced change in the Stromme rule over the years
has been in its application to commercial transactions. In some of the
earlier cases, the application in the commercial context was explicit.
Thus, in 1975 the Washington Supreme Courta18 said that the Stromme
disclaimer rule is not limited to consumer cases, noting that it had been
applied to a commercial transaction in a 1971 court of appeals deci-
sion.419 Moreover, the court went further to apply the Stromme policy to
clauses excluding consequential damages even when both parties are
business people.420 In that limitation of damages context, the Stromme
disclaimer criteria were not determinative as to the validity of such a
clause but were relevant in applying the unconscionability test of Section
2-719(3).
A year later, the court of appeals in a consumer case suggested that
the rule would be applied differently to negotiated commercial con-
tracts.4 21 In two later cases, however, the rule was applied in a commer-
Id. at 102 n.2, 666 P.2d at 902 n.2. The disclaimer was also ineffective because of lack of
negotiation. Id. at 104, 666 P.2d at 903.
417. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 44, 554 P.2d 349, 354
(1976). The disclaimer also was ineffective because it had not been negotiated explicitly. Id. at
46, 554 P.2d at 355. In some jurisdictions, it is an unlawful trade practice not to disclose "any
known material defect or material nonconformity." See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608(1)(t)
(1991). Thus, failure to disclose that a car had been in an accident and repaired may be such a
practice even where the sale has been made on an "as is-no warranty" basis. Hinds v. Paul's
Auto Werkstatt, Inc., 107 Or. App. 63, 65-66, 810 P.2d 874, 874 (1991) (applying OR. REV.
STAT. § 646.608(l)(t) (1991)).
418. Schroeder v. Faegol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
419. Id. at 261, 544 P.2d at 24 (citing Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App.
194, 200, 491 P.2d 1346, 1349 (1971)) (involving liability of herbicide dealer to farmer and
manufacturer to dealer; comments made in latter context).
420. Id. at 261, 544 P.2d at 24. The court noted that the public policy underlying Stromme
previously had been extended to exclusionary clauses in a case involving an injured consumer,
Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971), which was handed down the
same day as Stromme. Schroeder, 86 Wash. 2d at 261, 544 P.2d at 24. In Baker, the court
held that one cannot properly distinguish between the sale and rental of a chattel. Baker, 79
Wash. 2d at 201, 484 P.2d at 407. Hence, the policy underlying the disclaimer and exclusion
of consequential damages rules of Article 2 should apply to lease transactions. Noting that the
disclaimer for the lease of a golf cart was "contained in the middle of the agreement and was
not conspicuous," the court overruled a prior case and held it would b- unconscionable to
permit the clause to exclude recovery for personal injuries suffered by the lessee. Id. at 202,
484 P.2d at 407.
421. "Although a general disclaimer clause may negate implied warranties if there is a
negotiated contract between a commercial seller and a commercial buyer, it is not appropriate
to a consumer sale." Testo, 16 Wash. App. at 349, 554 P.2d at 355.
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cial context with no hint of different treatment.422 Indeed, the
commercial context was underscored by the holding in both cases that
the written confirmation provisions of Section 2-207 cannot be used to
supply the negotiated agreement necessary for an effective disclaimer
under the rule, even, as in one of the decisions, where the confirmation
was signed by the affected party.4 23 In Rottinghaus, the court also clearly
applied that part of the rule which requires that qualities and characteris-
tics being disclaimed must be set forth with particularity.424 Several
cases since then, however, have set a different tone that eventually might
affect the approach in consumer cases.
The first case in which the supreme court backed off from a literal
application of Stromme in a commercial context involved not a sale of
goods but rather the sale of an apartment complex.425 As the court em-
phasized, the buyer had sought the deal for tax reasons from a seller who
was building the complex for its own use and management and not for
purposes of resale.426 Moreover, the buyer was fully represented by
counsel.427 The court found Stromme inapplicable:
[In Stromme] we held that the communicated particular needs
of the buyer of an automobile would not be overcome by a
boiler-plate exclusion of all warranties, express or implied.
That case is quite different from this where the buyers sought
no promises, the sellers made none, and the buyers with their
lawyer, faced a clause which said the sellers not only made no
covenant about the condition of the buildings, but expressly
disclaimed any such covenant.428
In a later decision, the court characterized this case as holding that "ex-
plicit negotiation is not required to give effect to a disclaimer in a con-
tract for the commercial sale of an apartment complex., 429 It then
declined to "extend" the Stromme rules to an auction sale of a race
horse.43 It found a strong contrast on these facts to both the nature of
422. Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 666 P.2d 899 (1983); Hartwig Farms v.
Pacific Gamble Robinson, 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P.2d 171 (1981).
423. Rottinghaus, 35 Wash. App. at 106-07, 666 P.2d at 904, 905; see Hartwig Farms, 28
Wash. App. at 543-44, 625 P.2d at 174.
424. Rottinghaus, 35 Wash. App. at 103, 666 P.2d at 903.
425. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 715, 725 P.2d 422, 423 (1986).
426. Id. These facts were also the basis for the holding that the implied warranty of habita-
bility did not arise in the transaction.
427. Id. at 715, 725 P.2d at 423.
428. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d at 426.
429. Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, Inc., 111 Wash. 2d 396, 402, 759 P.2d
418, 421 (1988).
430. Id at 403, 759 P.2d at 422. The court noted that the amendment to WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-316, which provides that there are no implied warranties that livestock are free
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the bargaining and the format of the contract in Stromme.431
The court highlighted the fact that the front side of the order form
in Stromme contained handwritten notations of explicitly negotiated
components of the sale, while the language of disclaimer was buried on
the back in a printed mass. 432 In contrast, in a horse auction sale there is
only negotiation over price, and the trade custom is that conditions an-
nounced at the auction are binding even if the bidder has no knowledge
of them. Moreover, the disclaimer disclosures were "visible, readable,
and contained in the sale booklet, 43 3 and the bill of sale "was on a single
page, easy to read, and understandable.
'434
Largely on the basis of these decisions, a federal district court more
recently concluded that neither of the components of Stromme apply to a
commercial transaction. 35 This conclusion seems overly broad and fac-
ile. The Washington Supreme Court decisions on which the district
court relied did not reach such a generic conclusion.436 Rather, they
turned on the nature of the relationship between buyer and seller, the
character of the sale and the seller, the form of the contract, and, in one
of the cases, the fact that the buyer was represented by counsel.437 It
seems likely that this factual analysis approach will continue, possibly
creeping into the consumer cases. It is, however, abundantly clear that
those cases almost certainly will continue what is in effect a presumption
against the validity of a disclaimer in consumer transactions.
from sickness or disease, did not apply to the case because it was adopted after the case arose.
Travis, 11 Wash. 2d at 405, 759 P.2d at 423.
431. Travis, 111 Wash. 2d at 402-03, 759 P.2d at 421.
432. Id at 402-04, 759 P.2d at 421-22.
433. Id. at 404, 759 P.2d at 422.
434. Id. at 403, 759 P.2d at 421.
435. United Van Lines v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, 710 F. Supp. 283, 286 (W.D. Wash.
1989).
436. See, eg., Travis, 111 Wash. 2d 396, 759 P.2d 418 (1988); Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters.,
Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986). The court also relied on Hartwig Farms for the
proposition that an exclusion of warranty need not be explicitly negotiated. Hartwig Farms,
Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 28 Wash. App. 539, 541-42, 625 P.2d 171, 175 (1981). But
the Hartwig Farms court said that "[w]ithout negotiation and agreement, no disclaimer, in-
cluding the present one, can be effective." Id. at 545, 625 P.2d at 175. United Van Lines also
cited Hartwig Farms for the proposition that the requirement of particularity for disclaimer
does not apply to commercial transactions because the Hartwig Farms court did not discuss it
in finding the disclaimer ineffective. United Van Lines, 710 F. Supp. at 286. There was in
Hartwig Farms, however, no need to discuss particularity because the disclaimer was otherwise
ineffective.
437. See Travis, 111 Wash. 2d at 402-04, 759 P.2d at 421-22; Frickel, 106 Wash. 2d at 715-
21, 725 P.2d at 423-26.
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C. The Song-Beverly and Copycat States
1. Minnesota
Litigation in Minnesota regarding consumer goods has not involved
a construction of the statute other than the attorney fee provisions.438
These provisions are the product of a sequence of statutory sections that
make violation of the Act a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act" 9 for
which, in a separate chapter, attorney fees are permitted." 0 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court squarely affirmed that sequence, holding that "[a]s a
matter of law, the breach of the express warranty so found constitutes a
violation of the consumer protection act for which attorney's fees are
recoverable."" 1 This appeared to make the award of attorney fees rou-
tine 2 in consumer warranty cases involving statutory violations." 3
A more recent court of appeals decision involving a consumer fraud
act violation for misrepresentation in the sale of real estate,' 4 and an
unpublished decision by the same judge in a consumer warranties case,44
have given greater emphasis than the earlier cases to the permissive char-
acter of an attorney fee award and set forth criteria which, if continued,
could result in constricting attorney fees in warranty cases. The opinions
438. The facts in an unpublished opinion, Goodlow v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., No. CX-89-
1300, 1989 WL 151871 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1989), raise the issue of the application of
disclaimer restrictions to manufacturers, but the court did not discuss the issue. Although the
dealer had disclaimed all warranties in the purchase agreement, the court simply concluded
that the disclaimer complied with UCC § 2-316 and made no reference to the disclaimer provi-
sions in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.18 (West 1946). Goodlow, 1989 WL 151871, at *3. The
court's inattention to the question may have been influenced by the fact that the plaintiffs had
already reached a settlement with the manufacturer of the goods. Perhaps counsel did not deal
with the question. It is discussed in the context of similarly worded statutes. See supra text
accompanying notes 99-102.
439. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.20 (West 1981) provides that a violation of the provisions
restricting disclaimers and imposing obligations on express warrantor to honor their express
warranties is a violation of § 325F.69.
440. Id. § 8.31(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993) provides for attorney fees for violations of
§ 325F.69.
441. Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago S., 310 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Minn. 1981).
442. See, eg., Metag v. K-Mart Corp., 385 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("A
violation of the consumer warranties act is treated as a violation of the prevention of consumer
fraud act."); see also Yost v. Milhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing
the Minnesota statute which authorizes recovery of attorneys fees for violations of the Con-
sumer Fraud Statute).
443. See supra note 442. A breach of an implied warranty may not be a violation of the
Consumer Warranties Act. The focus of the Act is on controlling implied warranty disclaim-
ers and enforcing express warranty obligations.
444. Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The opinion does
not set forth any specific facts about the case.
445. McGill v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., No. C7-88-2776, 1989 WL 3541, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 24, 1989).
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refer to cases that encompass a range of issues that have arisen in con-
struing the attorney fee provisions of the civil rights statutes. These in-
cluded a case in which a party sought fees on the theory that a city's
condemnation of property violated the federal civil rights acts," 6 and
another that involved the question of how to apply attorney fee rules
when counsel is a legal services organization.' 7 Literal application of
the cited criteria, such as the requirement of a policy analysis of "the
degree to which the public interest is advanced by the suit,"" could
adversely affect the award of attorney fees in these essentially private
actions.
The civil rights cases do not involve analogous issues. Moreover,
the cross references in the consumer warranties and deceptive fraud acts
provide a clear basis for the award of attorney fees. In a very real sense,
the statutory pattern itself establishes the "public interest." Additional
inquiry seems out of place. So far, none of the cases construing the Con-
sumer Warranties Act have involved the problems concerning award of
attorney fees to a legal services organization. 449
2. New Hampshire
New Hampshire's statute provides that disclaimers are ineffective
unless there has been compliance with a rather elaborate statutory
formula.450 It also largely dispenses with privity requiremetits in war-
ranty actions45 and imposes some obligations on manufacturers with re-
spect to honoring warranty obligations.45 2 There are no notable
appellate cases construing these provisions.
3. Rhode Island
The Rhode Island statute453 provides that disclaimers of implied
warranties are not effective unless there has been compliance with a stat-
utory formula. Although this version does not include one of the ele-
446. Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496, 502 (S.D. 1982).
447. Page v. Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399, 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
448. Liess, 354 N.W.2d at 558.
449. In Wexler v. Brothers Entertainment Group, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990), the court held that the fact that the plaintiff, a licensed attorney, acted as his own
attorney did not preclude a claim for attorney fees in an action under the Consumer Fraud
Act. The court also reiterated, but did not apply, the public interest policy factor of Liess, but
the case did not involve the consumer warranties act. Id. at 222-23.
450. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-316(4) (Supp. 1992).
451. Id. § 382-A:2-318.
452. Id. § 382-A:2-329.
453. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329 (1992).
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ments of the California ritual,454 it is functionally similar. It also follows
the California prohibition against disclaimer of implied warranties when
there is an express warranty, but, unlike California, it has not included
floor and ceiling limits on the duration of merchantability. There are
also less extensive provisions dealing with an express warrantor's obliga-
tions to honor express warranties.455
In the one case construing the statute, the court implicitly gave a
broad reading to "consumer."456 The anti-disclaimer provisions in Sec-
tion 6A-2-329(2)(b) appear to require goods purchased primarily for con-
sumer and not for business purposes.45 7 Without discussion, the court
applied the statute where the owner of a corporation purchased a station
wagon "to deliver prescriptions, as well as for general transportation.
'" 458
Since the named plaintiff was the corporation, it seems likely that title
had been taken in the name of the corporation. There was no discussion
of how much personal use had been made of the vehicle.
The more substantive aspect of the case was the court's interpreta-
tion of the disclosure requirements of the statute that must be satisfied to
make an effective disclaimer of implied warranties. The dealer's dis-
claimer provided:
All warranties, if any, by a manufacturer or supplier other than
dealer are theirs, not dealer's, and only such manufacturer or
other supplier shall be liable for performance under such war-
ranties. Unless dealer furnishes buyer with a separate written
warranty or service contract made by dealer on its own behalf,
dealer hereby disclaims all warranties, express or implied, in-
cluding any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for
a particular purpose:
(a) On all goods and services sold by dealer, and (b) on all used
vehicles which are hereby sold "as is - not expressly warranted
or guaranteed.
45 9
The court found the language ambiguous on several counts460 and there-
454. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1792.4(a) (West 1985).
455. See id. § 1793.3.
456. East Side Prescription Ctr., Inc. v. E.P. Fournier Co., 585 A.2d 1176 (R.I. 1991).
457. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329(2)(a) (1992) refers to a "consumer sale." "Consumer
sale" is defined as "a sale of new goods, or as regards an express warranty, any goods,
purchased primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and not for agricultural or
business purposes." Id. § 6A-2-329(1)(a).
458. East Side Prescription Ctr., 585 A.2d at 1177.
459. Id. at 1180.
460. The court found the first two sentences "inconsistent in that one refers to existing
warranties and the other disclaims those existing warranties but provides for alternative war-
ranties." Id. The remainder was considered "ambiguous on its face in that it disclaims all
warranties on 'all goods and services' sold by Fournier and then it employs restrictive language
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fore ineffective to disclaim merchantability. It would appear that the
court might also have found the language lacking because of its failure to
inform the buyer clearly that he bore the entire risk as to quality.461 The
court did, however, note expressly that "the fact that a disclaimer is con-
spicuous and has been examined by the purchaser is not sufficient to con-
stitute a disclaimer. 4 62 Among the cautions one should draw from the
decision is that it is dangerous to use a multi-purpose disclaimer clause
which purports to leave to the consumer the decision as to which limita-
tion applies to her purchase.
4. California
The statutory provisions are discussed extensively in the text of this
Article and are not considered separately here. Given the very compre-
hensive nature of the Song-Beverly Act, it is surprising how few issues
have been considered in the appellate courts. The cases decided to date
do not disclose any real problems with the definition of "consumer"
under the Act. An unpublished Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
holds that an action may not be maintained under Song-Beverly by a
corporation; the definitional provisions limit standing to an
"individual.
,4 63
One case illustrates the point that the Song-Beverly concept of ex-
press warranty is not as expansive as that in the UCC.4 " Although
statements of seaworthiness of a sailboat in literature may constitute an
express warranty under Article 2, they do not satisfy the Song-Beverly
definition of express warranty that requires a "written statement arising
out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain
the utility or performance of the consumer good or provide compensa-
tion if there is a failure in utility or performance. '465 An implied war-
ranty of fitness may arise under the Consumer Warranty Act, but it did
limiting the disclaimer to 'all used vehicles which are hereby sold "as is-not expressly war-
ranted or guaranteed."' " Id
461. See R.I. GEN. LAvs § 6A-2-329(2)(b)(ii) (1992).
462. East Side Prescription Ctr., 585 A.2d at 1180.
463. Blair v. Mercedes-Benz of N.A., Inc., 914 F.2d 261 (table, text in WESTLAW), un-
published disposition (9th Cir. (Cal.), Sept. 6, 1990) (No. 89-55486) (applying California law).
Song-Beverly grants standing to "[a]ny buyer of consumer goods" who is damaged in a certain
way, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(a) (West Supp. 1993), and defines "buyer" as any "individual
who buys consumer goods from a person engaged in the business of manufacturing, distribut-
ing, or selling such goods at retail." Id. § 1791(b).
464. Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 19-20, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394-95 (1985).
465. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.2(a)(1) (West 1985).
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not in this case because there was no showing of reliance.466
Several cases involving civil penalty questions contained facts that
invite some kind of penalty or punitive damages. In one, the plaintiff had
a steady stream of problems with her car that kept it in the shop for a
total of fifty-five days.4 67 She finally had had enough when, while preg-
nant, she endured the harrowing experience of having the car die on the
railroad tracks. Considering the car unsafe, she asked for a refund.468
When it was refused, she used all her savings to buy another car and then
sued and asked for a civil penalty.4 69 The Act provides that a judgment
may include civil penalties up to twice the actual damages "if the buyer
can establish that the failure to comply was willful. '470 The trial court
had instructed the jury that "willful" connotates knowing or reckless dis-
regard of the consumer's rights.471 This was held to require too much.
The instructions should have explained that "a civil penalty could be
awarded to plaintiff if the jury determined that Ford knew of its obliga-
tions but intentionally declined to fulfill them.""47 The court endorsed
the following quotation from another case: "It amounts to nothing more
than this: That the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he
is doing, and is a free agent."473 The court also held that the instructions
should have made clear that a civil penalty can be awarded for failure to
comply either with the obligations of Song-Beverly or of an express or
implied warranty.4 74
Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. 4 75 had facts that strongly
invited punitive damages. Plaintiff was an eighty-two year old widow
who developed headaches and eye, nose, and throat irritation from the
formaldehyde fumes exuded from her new mobile home.47 6 The retailer
representative who responded to her complaints developed "headaches
and nausea" after twenty to thirty minutes in the mobile home.477 Both
466. Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 25-26, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
467. Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Cal. App. 3d 878, 883, 263 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66 (1989).
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(c) (West Supp. 1993). The provisions of CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1794(e)(1), which do not require a showing of willfulness in an automobile case to obtain a
civil penalty, were adopted in 1987, to be effective in 1988, and were not applicable to this case.
Ibrahim, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 884 n.5, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 67 n.5.
471. Ibrahim, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 893-94, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
472. Id. at 895, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
473. Id. at 894, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (quoting May v. New York Motion Picture Corp., 45
Cal. App. 396, 404, 187 P. 785, 788 (1920)).
474. Id.
475. 175 Cal. App. 3d 218, 220 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1985).




plaintiff and the retail representative notified the manufacturer, which
did not reply but instead hired an engineering firm that tested and found
high formaldehyde concentrations.478 However, the manufacturer not
only did not disclose the report or its results, but it performed only mini-
mal repairs that it knew would not remedy the problem.47 9 The jury
awarded $90,000 in compensatory damages, $55,000 in punitive dam-
ages, and a $90,000 Song-Beverly civil penalty. The trial court added
attorney fees and costs.
480
The mobile home warranty complied with the express warranty re-
quired by statute4 8x that it be free from substantial defects in material or
workmanship.48 2 The statutory obligation of the manufacturer is to cor-
rect any defects that become apparent within one year from the date of
delivery to the buyer.483 A manufacturer's "willful" failure to do so trig-
gers the civil penalty provisions of Song-Beverly.484 The appellate court
agreed that the trial court's finding that the manufacturer's concealment
of the chemical levels and its failure to cure the problem constituted "op-
pression, fraud, or malice" in "disregard to plaintiff's rights" justified an
award of punitive damages.485 Likewise, the refusal to correct the prob-
lem and the concealment of the defective condition constituted "willful"
conduct within the meaning of the civil penalty provisions.486 However,
the court concluded that plaintiff could not have both forms of damages.
In the view of the majority, both are punitive damage awards, and if the
legislature had intended to permit recovery of both, it would have said
so. 487 Moreover, the majority concluded, a plaintiff who seeks a civil
penalty and attorney fees and expenses under Song-Beverly has "elected
to waive punitive damages under section 3294.
"
,488
The dissent disagreed sharply. The punitive damages award "was
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 221, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
481. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1797-1797.5 (West 1985).
482. The full text of the warranty is not set forth in the opinion. The court did say, how-
ever, that "[t]he purchase was attended by Silvercrest's express warranty that it was 'free from
any substantial defects in materials or workmanship' as required by Civil Code 1797.3."
Troensegaard, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
483. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.3(b) (West 1985). The buyer must give written notice to the
manufacturer within one year and ten days after receiving delivery. Repairs are to be made at
the buyer's site. Id.
484. Id. § 1794(c). The buyer may recover as much as twice the actual damages in addi-
tion to the compensatory damages. Id.
485. Troensegaard, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
486. Id. at 226, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
487. Id. at 226, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
488. Id.
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based not on the same conduct.., but on the separate and distinct the-
ory of fraudulent concealment of the unfavorable EAL report; and the
jury so specially found." '489 Each award "rests on a separate factual basis
and legal theory."4 90 Moreover, Section 1790.4 provides that remedies
under Song-Beverly "'are cumulative... [to] any remedy that is other-
wise available.' "491 Finally, the dissent argued that there is no basis to
warrant a determination of waiver: "Indeed, waiver of any of the provi-
sions of the Act dealing with consumer and mobile home warranties is
expressly prohibited as a matter of public policy."492
Another decision, Gomez v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,4 93 consid-
ered the relation between the civil penalty provisions and a tort action for
breach of good faith and fair dealing. The court first affirmed that
wrongful refusal to fulfill statutory repair and replacement obligations is
a willful violation triggering multiple damages.494 It then held that the
statutory civil penalty provided an adequate remedy and therefore de-
clined to extend the tort remedy for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to such conduct.495
Several cases have involved questions regarding awards of attorney
fees. In one case,49 6 plaintiff was awarded the purchase price of the car
plus a $5000 civil penalty for defendant's willful failure to repair or re-
place.497 Plaintiff claimed attorney fees of $137,000.498 The court held
that although the language of the act mandates the recovery of costs,
including attorney fees,49 9 it "requires payment only of those costs and
489. Id at 230, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Racanelli, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
490. Id. (Racanelli, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
491. Id. (Racanelli, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1790.4 (West 1985)).
492. Id. at 231, Cal. Rptr. at 720 (Racanelli, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790.1 & 1797.4 (West 1985)).
493. 169 Cal. App. 3d 921, 215 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1985).
494. Id. at 925, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The breached obligation was that set forth in CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1793.2(b) (West 1985), which requires that repairs be commenced within a rea-
sonable time and ordinarily completed within 30 days.
495. Gomez, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 929, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
496. Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 4 Cal. App. 4th 807, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770
(1992).
497. Id. at 810, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
498. Id
499. Prior to 1987, the attorney fee provisions in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d) (West 1985)
were functionally identical to those in the Magnuson-Moss-Warranty Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act § 1 10(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(d)(2) (1988), that provide for costs and
attorney fees to a prevailing consumer "unless the court in its discretion shall determine that
such an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate." CAL. CIm. CODE § 1794(d) (NWest
1985). The language of discretion was removed from § 1794(d) in 1987 so that it is, as applied
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fees 'determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the
buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution' of the un-
derlying action. '""co Moreover, the facts of the case did not qualify for
the more generous computation formula available under the "private at-
torney general" theory because the action did not enforce an important
right affecting the public interest.5 0 1 Accordingly, the trial court prop-
erly restricted the amount of attorney fees by application of criteria de-
veloped in cases not involving Song-Beverly.
5 0 2
Song-Beverly does not have its own statute of limitations. In Krie-
ger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc.,503 the court of appeals concluded
that the UCC Article 2 statute should apply."° Reasoning that the legis-
lature intended that Song-Beverly supplement the UCC and that UCC
Section 2-725 governs actions for breach of warranty of sales contracts,
the court preferred the UCC provision over the general provisions of the
California Code applicable to liabilities created by statute.5 °5
The court then considered some usual Section 2-725 issues to which
it applied a small dollop of Song-Beverly. Ordinarily, the sales cause of
action accrues on tender of delivery, but there is an exception when a
warranty extends explicitly to future performance." 6 When does the ex-
ception apply? The warranty at issue was BMW's undertaking to repair
the vehicle within thirty-six months of its purchase or during the first
36,000 miles of its use, whichever occurred first.5 0 7 BVW contended
that this
was merely an agreement by the manufacturer to repair the ve-
hicle, free of charge, during this period. It was not a warranty
of future performance.... The warranty is given so as to allow
in this case, mandatory. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d) (West Supp. 1993). The court did not
discuss the provisions of § 1794(e)(1), which provide that a buyer who establishes a violation
of a warrantor's repair or replace obligation under the motor vehicle lemon law provisions in
§ 1793.2(d)(2) is entitled to "recover damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs" as well a
civil penalty. The same result would presumably obtain despite the somewhat different lan-
guage because there is still a requirement of reasonableness, a standard which the court also
emphasized by quoting from CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1033.5 (West 1985). Levy, 4 Cal. App.
4th at 813, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
500. Levy, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 813, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 (quoting CAL. CIV CODE
§ 1794(d) (West 1985)).
501. Id. at 814, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773.
502. Id. at 814-15, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773-74. The trial court had found the claim for
$137,000 in attorney fees not only "grossly exaggerated," but also, in a case in which damages
totaled $22,619.52, unconscionable. Id. at 812 n.l, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 n.l.
503. 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1991).
504. Id. at 211, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
505. Id. at 212-13, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
506. Id. at 214, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 722-23.
507. The exact language of the warranty was not set forth in the opinion.
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the manufacturer to repair any problems with the vehicle with-
out charge to the buyer. It is not provided for the purpose of
allowing a buyer to extend the time he has to bring an action
against the manufacturer, or an innocent retailer.
508
As capsulized by the court, this amounts to a "position that [BMW]
did not promise that its automobiles would perform satisfactorily during
the warranty period. Instead, [BMW] claims that it only promised to
repair any defects which occurred."50 9 This argument, which has pre-
vailed in some jurisdictions, 510 received only short shrift from the Cali-
fornia court. In its view, a promise to repair defects that occur during a
future period "is the very definition of express warranty of future per-
formance" both under the UCC and Song-Beverly.51' In support of this
conclusion the court quoted the Song-Beverly definition of express war-
ranty, which includes a "written statement... [in] which the manufac-
turer, distributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain the
utility or performance of the consumer good or provide compensation if
there is a failure in the utility or performance."
512
Because the warranty extends to future performance, the statute
does not begin to run until discovery of the defect. On the facts of this
case, it was appropriate to conclude that the cause of action accrued on
the last date plaintiff had taken her car to the dealer and "determined
that respondent has been unable to repair" it.5" 3 The court found this
result consistent with the Song-Beverly policy that requires buyers to
give the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to repair.514 Moreover, us-
ing the date of the sale would undermine the legislative purpose that par-
ties attempt to resolve problems before resorting to the remedies
provided under the act.515
Only one case has dealt with the specific automobile lemon law pro-
visions that are an integral part of Song-Beverly. There the court noted
that the general lemon rule of the Act516 "establishes a substantive rule
of general application-the manufacturer is obligated either to replace or
508. Krieger, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 217, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
509. Id.
510. See, eg., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648, 545 P.2d 371, 375 (1976)
(holding automobile warranty against defects in material and workmanship to be warranty to
repair or replace defective parts, not promise that vehicle would never malfunction).
511. Krieger, 234 Cal. App. at 217, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (referring to U.C.C. § 2-313 and
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1790.4 (West 1985)).
512. Id. at 217, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.2 (West 1985)).
513. Id. at 218, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
514. Id. (referring to CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993)).
515. Id. at 218, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
516. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West Supp. 1993).
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to reimburse the buyer if 'the manufacturer or its representative in this
state [are] unable to service or repair the goods to conform to the applica-
ble express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.' "517 The
later-added automobile provisions provide "a pair of standards" applica-
ble to new motor vehicles-w"the vehicle is out of service for more than 30
calendar days, or the same problem has been the subject of at least four
attempts at repair by 'the manufacturer or its agents.' "" They are,
however, only "presumptive standards of what is 'reasonable.' "519 They
do not constitute a "per se, valid-in-all-circumstances, money-back guar-
antee" upon a showing of either factual circumstance.5 20 Replacement
or reimbursement is still dependent upon a showing that there had been
"a reasonable number of attempts" to conform the vehicle to the war-
ranty.521 On the other hand, "[u]nreasonableness may still be found even
if a new vehicle has been out of service for less than 30 days or if there
have been fewer than four attempts to repair the same problem.
5 22
In determining whether the four-or-more repair standard has been
satisfied, the manufacturer and its representatives in the state are treated
"as a single entity, the repair efforts of both being aggregated for the
purpose of calculating whether 'the same nonconformity has been subject
to repair four or more times.' ",523 Therefore, Ford, the defendant in the
case, was not entitled to an additional opportunity to fix the vehicle. The
court also found on the facts that Ford's owner's manual failed to give
appropriate notice of Song-Beverly rights and obligations.524 Conse-
quently, the consumer was excused from the requirement of giving direct
notice to the manufacturer.525
The case includes a somewhat confusing discussion of the concept of
nonconformity. One of plaintiff's contentions about jury instructions
was that the word "defect" had been used instead of "nonconformity," a
difference plaintiff considered prejudicial because the word invokes prod-
uct liability notions that the product was unsafe in design or manufac-
517. Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Cal. App. 3d 878, 886, 263 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (1989)
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West Supp. 1993).





523. Id. at 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
524. Id. at 890, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 71. The obligation in question was that set forth in CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(l)-(West 1985), which requires the buyer to give notice of breach to the
manufacturer. This, however, is dependent on clear and conspicuous disclosure by the manu-
facturer of that obligation, which was not done in this case.
525. Ibrahim, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
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ture.5 26 Although conceding that it would have been better practice to
use the statutory language "nonconformity," the court concluded that
there was no harm in this case. 27 In reaching this conclusion, the court
found the Song-Beverly definition of "nonconformity" to be of "scant
assistance: '"nonconformity" means a nonconformity which substan-
tially impairs the use, value, or safety of the new motor vehicle.'... This
definition is nothing more than a means of describing what the average
person would understand to be a defect. The two words ["defect" and
"nonconformity"] are in effect synonyms. "528
The court's analysis is susceptible to misinterpretation. First of all,
it did not explain that the nonconformity definition to which it referred
applies only to the motor vehicle lemon law subsection of the Act. Sec-
ondly, the court's conclusion that there is no difference between a "de-
fect" and a "nonconformity which substantially impairs the use, value or
safety of the new motor vehicle" cannot be taken out of the context of the
case. The court, without further explanation, noted briefly that another
jury instruction provided the definition of "nonconformity" and in a
footnote intimated that counsel for both sides in closing arguments had
satisfactorily and consistently included the substantial impairment con-
cept in conjunction with a discussion of defect.5 29 It would have been far
clearer if the court had emphasized those matters more strongly. By not
doing so, it left undiscussed the significance of the motor vehicle
definition.
As indicated above in the discussion of the Song-Beverly Act, 30 one
of the purposes for enacting the repair, replace, or reimburse remedy was
to overcome the cumbersome analysis under UCC Article 2, which re-
quires, in a refund case, separate consideration of the doctrines of failure
of essential purpose of a limited remedy and revocation of acceptance.
The definition of "nonconformity" in the motor vehicle provisions goes a
long way toward bringing back into the statute (for motor vehicles only)
doctrine relating to revocation of acceptance in which substantial impair-
ment of value is a statutory feature. 3 1 Clearly, then, where motor vehi-
cles are concerned under Song-Beverly, there is considerable difference
between "defect" and "nonconformity." For other products there may
not be such a difference, although it seems likely that the drafters chose
not to use the word "defect" in order to emphasize that express warran-
526. Id. at 887, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
527. Id.
528. Id. (citation omitted).
529. Id. at 887 n.7, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 68 n.7.
530. See supra text accompanying note 169.
531. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1989).
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ties as defined in the Act are covered even though they may be carefully
drafted to avoid use of that word.
In a case532 treated as involving strict liability in tort, although other
theories also had been submitted, the court spoke rather loosely about
Song-Beverly in a way that might be interpreted erroneously to mean
that the Act applies only to contracts involving express warranties.533 A
close reading, however, shows that the court was addressing only the
provisions of the statutory section 534 that govern the obligations of retail-
ers and distributors of used goods. The court concluded correctly that
that section applies only when an express warranty is given.535 The
court's conclusion that Song-Beverly does not affect an action in strict
liability in tort is unexceptionable.
An unpublished federal district court opinion5 36 dismissed plaintiff's
Song-Beverly claim in a case for failure to comply with the thirty day
time period set forth in the section of the Act537 that deals with the spe-
cific problems of a consumer's return or claim for reimbursement for
clothing and "consumables" covered by an express warranty. The
court's conclusion is questionable. First of all, there is no indication in
the decision that an express warranty was involved. Secondly, the return
provisions neither foreclose in any way an action for damages for breach
of express warranty nor make unavailable a claim for breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability that arises under Section 1792 of the
California Civil Code. Thus, the consumer should have been able to pur-
sue a damage claim under Section 1794 based either on express or im-
plied warranty. It is true, however, that the civil penalty provisions of
the Act are not available for claims grounded only in implied war-
532. Williams v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1244, 226 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1986) (state reporter title: Williams v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft).
533. The court stated:
Nor does the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, section 1795.5 serve to impair
Williams's remedies under strict liability/implied warranty theory. The section sim-
ply does not apply. It is clear on its face that the application is limited to sale con-
tracts in general and only those involving express warranties in particular. Each
paragraph is carefully written in terms of such limitation.
Id. at 1269, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
534. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795.5 (West 1985).
535. Supra note 533. The Act defines "consumer goods" to be new goods. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1795.5 in effect provides some limited exceptions when used goods are sold with an
express warranty. Clearly the anti-disclaimer provisions of the Act are not confined to sales in
which there are express warranties.
536. Thompson v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. C-80-3711 EFL, 1982 WL *114 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 8, 1982) (applying California law).
537. Id. at *3 (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.35 (West 1985)).
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ranty,538 although attorney fees would be available under Section
1794(d). Clearly, though, the Act is not keyed to personal injury cases.
5. Oregon
Although the Oregon act is more comprehensive than those of the
other copycat states, it is still a much stripped down version of Song-
Beverly."' Several Oregon cases illustrate shortcomings in the statute.
In two of the cases, the dealer sold the consumer a product covered by
the manufacturer's limited warranty and completely disclaimed any war-
ranties of its own. In each case, the existence of the disclaimer was
noted, almost in passing, with no discussion of whether it was subject to
the statute's disclaimer provisions. Thus, in Clark v. Ford Motor Co.,
the court simply observed that the consumer had signed a "Disclaimer
Form" that identified the product and stated:
Any warranties on the vehicle sold hereby are those made by
the manufacturer. The seller, Beaty Ford Merc, hereby ex-
pressly disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, in-
cluding all implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for
the particular purpose, and Beaty Ford Merc neither assumes
nor authorizes any other person to assume for it any liability in
connection with the sale of the vehicle described hereon.
5 4 1
In the second case,5 42 the court noted that "[p]laintiff also received
and signed two documents by which Signer [Motors, Inc., the dealer]
disclaimed all express and implied warranties. ' 543 There was no other
reference in the opinion either to the language or the circumstances of
the disclaimer. In neither case did the court examine whether the dis-
claimers complied with the statutory requirements or whether, indeed,
only a disclaimer of dealer warranties is contemplated by the statute.
This problem is discussed in detail in Part II.
The same two cases also illustrate problems with the remedial-and
lack of remedial-provisions in the Act. The Oregon statute follows the
California pattern governing the warrantor's repair, replace, or refund
obligations and the preservation of implied warranties, 5" but it does not
set forth a cause of action for violation of those obligations. The statute
538. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(c) (West 1985).
539. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33 and 191-98 for a discussion of some of the
problems created by paring down the California act to "Oregon size."
540. 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980).
541. Id. at 524, 612 P.2d at 317.
542. Hanson v. Singer Motors, 105 Or. App. 74, 803 P.2d 1207 (1990).
543. Id. at 76, 803 P.2d at 1208.
544. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West Supp. 1993).
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says merely that the remedies "provided" by the Act are "cumulative"
and are not to be construed as restricting any other remedies, expressly
including those available under UCC Article 2.111 That leaves a number
of questions unanswered.
In Clark, the consumer asked for rescission and return of his down
payment and monthly payments for an intractably rusty Bronco, on the
UCC theory of revocation of acceptance and under the Oregon Con-
sumer Warranty statutes. 546 The court held that revocation was not
available against the dealer because it had disclaimed all warranties, nor
against the manufacturer because it did not sell the product to the con-
sumer and "[a] buyer may revoke acceptance only as to his seller."547
Regarding the second claim, the court observed that although the
Consumer Warranty Act provides "additional protection, '5 48 the con-
sumer is entitled to look to the retailer "only if the manufacturer fails to
maintain adequate service facilities in the state. '5 49 Because there was no
showing that Ford did not have such a facility, there was no statutory
claim against the dealer.5 50 Since Ford was unwilling or unable to re-
solve the rust problem, it was in violation of its statutory obligation.551
Ford, however, resisted recovery, arguing it had the option to replace or
refund and that it had offered to replace.5 52 The court said that, "As-
suming, without deciding, that Ford has that option, the record shows
that no offer to replace was ever made."55 3 Ford then argued that the
consumer could not satisfy his statutory obligations to (a) return the ve-
hicle to Ford because it had been repossessed and sold by the dealer, or
(b) return it free of liens and encumbrances because it had been subject to
the selling dealer's security interest. 4
The court properly treated the arguments as literalistic and
"mechanical." It observed that Ford could have resolved the security
interest problem by making payment to the dealer so the lien could be
545. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8190 (1973).
546. Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 525, 612 P.2d 316, 318 (1980). The court
said also that "[p]laintiff also relies upon the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. section
2304 et seq., but we find that statute to be inapplicable to these facts." Id. at 525 n.2, 612 P.2d
at 318 n.2. This is an inexplicable explanation.
547. Id. at 526, 612 P.2d at 319.
548. Id. at 527, 612 P.2d at 319.
549. Id. at 528, 612 P.2d at 319 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8110 (1973)).
550. Id.
551. OR. Rav. STAT. § 72.8100(4) (1973).
552. Clark, 46 Or. App. at 528, 612 P.2d at 320.
553. Id. at 528, 612 P.2d at 320.
554. Id.
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removed.115 It also treated the consumer's return of the vehicle to the
dealer as a return to Ford because Ford had instructed the consumer to
take it to the dealer for repairs.55 6 Finally, the court held that the burden
of proof was on Ford to establish the value of the "beneficial use" deduc-
tion to which a warrantor is entitled when paying a refund."5 7
These holdings that (1) UCC revocation is not available against a
disclaiming seller, (2) nor against a manufacturer (because not a
seller), 5 ' and (3) that a consumer could not proceed against a dealer
under the Consumer Warranty Act because the manufacturer had ade-
quate repair facilities in the state, were all confirmed in Hanson v. Singer
Motors.5" 9 In addition, the Hanson court held that the dealer could not
be regarded as having given an express warranty under the Act simply
for handing over the manufacturer's warranty. s The most significant-
and misleading-holding in the case is that the consumer had no Con-
sumer Warranty Act claim against the manufacturer "because plaintiff
did not prove 'substantial impairment in value.' ",561 This, of course,
sounds as if the elements of a UCC claim for revocation of acceptance
must be satisfied in an action under the Consumer Warranty Act. It is
essential, however, to emphasize the court's footnote observation that
"[b]oth parties argue the case under that standard. We are not asked to
decide whether a showing of substantial impairment is necessary for re-
covery under the act, and we express no opinion on that issue."5 62 There
appears no basis whatsoever in the Act for such a requirement. Indeed,
the statute flatly provides for replacement or reimbursement "if the man-
ufacturer is unable to service or repair the good in compliance with each
applicable warranty."563 Those strong remedies are not even conditioned
on permitting the warrantor a "reasonable number of attempts," as in
555. Id. at 529-30, 612 P.2d at 320.
556. Id. at 529, 612 P.2d at 320.
557. Id. at 530, 612 P.2d at 320; see OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8100(4) (1973).
558. In Hanson v. Signer Motors, 105 Or. App. 74, 803 P.2d 1207 (1990), the court side-
stepped the consumer's argument that the no-revocation rule should be changed in light of the
Magnuson-Moss Act's conferral of a cause of action on a "supplier" by saying that consumer
would lose even if revocation were available because he had not shown substantial impairment
of value. Id. at 79, 803 P.2d at 1210. In Gaha v. Taylor-Johnson Dodge, Inc., 53 Or. App.
471, 632 P.2d 483 (1981), the court found that a conclusion that a dealer was sufficiently an
agent of the manufacturer, so that revocation was available against the manufacturer, was
supported by a showing of some direct dealings with the manufacturer prior to sale and deliv-
ery by the manufacturer of the motor home to the dealer, with the expectation that the dealer
would make the necessary modifications. Id. at 477, 632 P.2d at 486.
559. 105 Or. App. 74, 803 P.2d 1207 (1990).
560. Id at 78, 803 P.2d at 1209.
561. Id. at 79, 803 P.2d at 1209.
562. Id. at 79 n.1l, 803 P.2d at 1210 n.11.
563. OR. REv. STAT. § 72.8100(b)(4) (1973).
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California."' It should be noted that Oregon's motor vehicle lemon law
does employ a substantial impairment test. 6 ' But the Hanson court did
not cite that statute, and it is not clear how that statute and the Con-
sumer Warranty Act interact.
Even if a showing of "substantial impairment" were a condition of
the strong remedy of refund or replacement, it surely should not be a
complete bar to recovery of some damages under the Act. In this case,
the camper-trailer was in various repair stations for a total of sixty-five
days during the first six months of ownership. 66 Apparently, the finding
of no substantial impairment of value was rooted in the fact that most
(but not all) of the defects had been fixed. But surely a consumer statute
can be construed to provide some recovery on such facts.
Obviously, much of the blame in this case must rest on counsel for
not framing a better argument. But the statute is also at fault for its
complete silence regarding remedies. Also, although the statute requires
that repairs be "commenced as soon as possible," 67 there is no require-
ment, as there is in California,5 68 that they be completed within any par-
ticular time. Moreover, the California remedy provisions give teeth to
the requirement by providing a cause of action not only for breach of any
warranty but also of "any obligation under this chapter." 569
VIII. AN EVALUATION AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that the special statutes illuminate some significant defi-
ciencies in Article 2 provisiois relating to disclaimers, remedies, and the
obligations of distant warrantors, at least as they apply to consumer ac-
tions, and that they provide some tested models for overcoming them. It
is also true that other developments-some of them originating in the
special statutes-have both diluted their direct impact and obscured the
need for Article 2 reforms in these areas. Evaluation, therefore, must
address both the special statutes and at least some of the other
developments.
A. The Context for Evaluation: The Impact of Other Statutes
Context is crucial to evaluation of these statutes. 570 The statutes
564. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West 1985).
565. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.335 (1991).
566. Hanson, 105 Or. App. at 77, 803 P.2d at 1209.
567. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8100(2) (1991).
568. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(b) (West Supp. 1993) (within 30 days).
569. Id. § 1794(a).
570. For a much broader context than that considered here, see the insightful analysis in
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themselves simply do not tell the full story. During the early UCC years
in which states were considering enactment, there was strong reluctance
to make amendments out of concern that to do so would impair the goal
of uniformity. Consumer advocates concentrated on trying to make the
UCC work while waiting to see what would happen at the federal level.
In the same time frame, substantial consumer advocacy resources gravi-
tated to the newly exploding area of consumer credit and later to the
drafting and implementation of state laws dealing with unfair and decep-
tive acts and practices (UDAP). And, after the Code had been in place
for a number of years, the mindset for dealing with consumer sales law
problems no longer contemplated the gargantuan task of amending Arti-
cle 2. In addition, the evolution of federal and state legislation enacted
after Article 2 obscured the pressing need for reform of sales law to deal
with consumer issues.
The later legislation had several effects on the statutes considered
here. The Magnuson-Moss Act borrowed from the state acts a few con-
cepts5 71 that helped alleviate some problems on a national basis and to
that extent it helped to ward off some of the pressures that might other-
wise have made the nonuniform state revisions more popular. But the
Act and its regulations have a curious duality (some might say duplicity).
On the one hand, the Act elevated implied warranty protection for con-
sumers in many states by banning total disclaimers of the implied war-
ranties (although permitting limitation to the duration of express
warranties). On the other, the FTC made that standard the lowest com-
mon denominator for its rules regulating the disclosure of the contents of
warranties 2 and permitted warrantor to leave consumers (and lawyers)
uninformed-or misinformed-about the warranty and remedy rights
available in states that afforded greater protection. Moreover, consumers
in all states are left to ponder ambiguous boilerplate language that surely
engenders more cynicism than comprehension. All of this may well have
resulted in less use of the more protective statutes and thus further en-
larged the circle of ignorance about them.
The state UDAP statutes and the newer motor vehicle lemon laws
also have diverted attention from the kinds of problems these statutes
have addressed. Both of these bodies of law have attracted-principally
because of their superior remedies-litigation that otherwise would have
David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. REv. 1
(1985).
571. In particular, Magnuson-Moss borrowed the provisions which (1) prohibit total dis-
claimer of warranties if there is a written warranty and (2) authorize an award of attorney fees
in breach of warranty cases.
572. See discussion supra part VI.
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proceeded under the special legislation in these states and under Article 2
in the others. The laws thus have led to less use of the special statutes
and helped obscure pressures for reform of general sales law.
The impact of the relatively recent lemon laws can be clearly identi-
fied. Consumers with motor vehicle and, to a lesser extent, mobile home
problems have turned to this legislation because it provides much more
specific rules and neater, cleaner, and easier roads to recovery with a
much greater prospect for recovery of attorney fees and, in some states,
multiple damages. It seems a fair guess that automobile and mobile
home problems have accounted for a substantial percentage of consumer
sales law cases litigated under Article 2. As a consequence of the lemon
laws now in force in all of the states, and the mobile home laws in about
one-third of them, those disputes most worth litigating-those involving
problems during the first year of ownership of a consumer's most costly
purchase-increasingly are moving out of the Article 2 pipeline. Indeed,
the same pattern appears to be occurring in states with the special provi-
sions considered here. This diversion of cases from general sales law also
diverts attention from the need for Article 2 reform. Consumers' sales
law problems, however, are not limited to first year ownership of
automobiles and mobile homes!
Evaluation of the attempts to squeeze consumer sales warranty
problems into formats suitable for litigation under UDAF acts is more
complex and difficult. The temptation to use the legislation is clear.
There is the hope of bypassing some of the sluggishness of sales law.
Probably more compelling is the remedy pay-off. In some states, there
are either mandatory or discretionary multipliers of damages. And, in
some states, attorney fees are mandatory, while in others the standards
for determining the availability of fees is more liberal to consumers than
under the Magnuson-Moss Act. No clear patterns have appeared, how-
ever, and it is unlikely they will.
The world of UDAP acts is more diverse than that of lemon laws,
both in terms of kinds of legislation and also in interpretation. As ap-
plied to sales law problems, that diversity ranges from total exclusion of
routine sales disputes from coverage under a UDAP act to a statutory
tie-in of breach of warranty. This rapidly evolving law is marked by un-
certainty about scope and substance.573 The uncertainty exists not only
because of the grapplings to give content to "unfair" and "deceptive,"
573. Less than a decade ago, Professor Stewart Macauley speculated about the possibility
that the UDAP statutes might in time be a "Bambi" which, by inference, stood no chance
against the Godzilla of classic contract law. Stewart Macauley, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflec-
tions on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REv. 575, 576 (1989). At the very least, if those
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but also because of the problems of translating the standard administered
by a federal administrative agency to one suitable for use in a private
cause of action in the state courts. That is a large leap!
While the potential for application of the UDAP acts to sales law
problems is uncertain, it is also great. As Professor Macauley has ob-
served, "[s]ome of these statutes have overturned much of contracts' con-
ventional wisdom."574 A strong example pertinent to consumer sales law
is the interpretation that the parol evidence rule, although perhaps an
impediment to establishing an express warranty, is irrelevant to a UDAP
action rooted in oral misrepresentations.-7 5 In the same vein are the
cases that sidestep the UCC statute of limitations,576 merger clauses,
577
and even disclaimers that comply with the formal requirements of Arti-
cle 2.17' However, a general approach toward treating breach of contract
as an unfair or deceptive trade practice has been very troublesome.
5 79
This has been achieved in a few states by an express statutory tie-in.
580
In many others, there appears a strong reluctance to transform a breach
of contract into a UDAP violation. No doubt there is greater concern in
those states in which the acts apply to commercial as well as consumer
transactions.
Given these problems, it is not surprising that there is a sharp differ-
ence in the cases as to whether simple breach of warranty or a warran-
tor's failure to repair is "unfair" or "deceptive," or whether some sort of
obdurate or unusual behavior is required."' Some courts clearly are
concerned about the unbridled expansion of such actions under the in-
creasingly large UDAP umbrella. In short, there is not only a very une-
ven application nationally of such laws to consumer sales law problems,
but also there is a possibility of an eventual backlash that could under-
mine some of their beneficent features. Thus, they cannot seriously be
acts could ever be regarded as a Bambi, they must now be seen as a Bambi who has considera-
bly bulked up-still smaller than Godzilla, but able to do a lot of damage.
574. Id. at 582-83.
575. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CmR., supra note 16, § 4.2.15; PRIDGEN, supra note
14, § 3.04[5] n.30.5.
576. State v. Bob Chambers Ford, 522 A.2d 362, 364 (Me. 1987).
577. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 16, § 4.2.15.
578. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W. Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604,
606-07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
579. See PRIDGEN, supra note 14, §§ 3.04[5], 9.07[2]; Macauley, supra note 573, at 576.
580. E.g., MASS. REG. CODE tit. 940, § 3.01 (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A,
§ 2(a) (West 1992)); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (West 1987).




regarded as providing very helpful answers on a national basis to con-
sumer sales law problems.
B. The Nature of the Article 2 Deficiencies Disclosed by the Statutes
It is significant that the special statutes both have contributed to the
evolution of these other bodies of law and also have survived them. If for
no other reason, they deserve consideration because they have been in
effect for more than two decades, and the case law construing them has
not shown they have caused any significant problems. In the traditional
American way, these states have experimented. The record shows that
what might at first blush appear radical has not been so. Analysis of the
provisions also shows pervasive state legislative concern about the ade-
quacy of Article 2 to deal with important problems.
Some of the special statutory provisions operate on the premise that
what is wrong with Article 2 for consumers is not its basic protection
scheme but rather the authorization to depart from it. The disclaimer
ban and some of the anti-remedy limitation rules fall into this category.
Other provisions--especially those dealing with remedies-rest on con-
clusions that the Article 2 rules do not work well for consumers. Most of
the special statutes reflect the view that the Article 2 remedy rules are too
general to be useful in many consumer disputes and are, as a practical
matter, unavailable because of the attorney fee problem.
Less uniformly addressed, but clearly evident in these statutes, is the
attempt to do something about the failure of Article 2 to address the
issues relating to the relationship between a distant warrantor and the
buyer. Many make some provision for the direct liability of the warran-
tor to the consumer, as does the Magnuson-Moss Act.58 2 A lesser
number attempt to apply the ultimate liability concept to others in the
chain of distribution by providing for indemnity to retailers and
distributors.
Policing of the usual express warranty undertaking to repair or re-
place is another approach taken in some of the statutes, one that has
caught fire in the motor vehicle and mobile home lemon laws. Several
states also have required that manufacturers have substance behind their
warranties by maintaining adequate service and repair facilities and by
making information and parts available to independents.
582. Magnuson-Moss does not do the complete job, however, because it does not apply to
oral express warranties, and the courts are split as to whether it confers standing to assert
claims against distant warrantor for breach of implied warranty when such standing is not
available under state law. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 213, § 33.7.4.
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C. Some Specifics
1. Disclaimers
Taken as a whole, the disclaimer provisions in the special statutes
speak strongly to reforming the disclaimer provisions of Article 2, at
least for consumer transactions. The case law does not show any unto-
ward results from the various rules, even those that make
merchantability inviolate. Analysis does show that much care will be
required for approaches that utilize less than a total ban. More impor-
tantly, these special statutes teach us that revision must also address both
breadth and depth-policy, process, and format. Currently, Article 2 is
strong only on format.
The legislation dealing with disclaimers differs from Article 2 in pol-
icy, process, and form. There are several different approaches. The most
striking aspect of the Article 2 disclaimer provisions is that they have not
stated the law accurately as it applies to consumer transactions since
1975 when the Magnuson-Moss Act became law. That Act, which was
undoubtedly influenced by some of the special statutes, serves as a useful
baseline for measuring them. It (1) prohibits complete disclaimer of
merchantability where there is an express warranty, but (2) permits limi-
tation of the duration of merchantability to that of the express warranty
if conscionable and the duration of the express warranty is reasonable,
and (3) permits states to provide additional protection.
Clearly, the strongest policy position on this issue in the special stat-
utes is the complete prohibition against disclaimer of the implied warran-
ties in the nine total ban states. This approach, although first enacted
prior to Magnuson-Moss, survives the federal law as a form of additional
protection permitted to the states. However, as indicated elsewhere, the
Magnuson-Moss disclosure regulations probably have undercut the util-
ity of the total ban by authorizing warrantor to obscure the existence of
those rights.58 3 An additional problem is that the special statutes are not
consistent in their application to manufacturers as well as retailers.
584
The Song-Beverly states are influenced by the total ban approach,
but, although providing more protection than Magnuson-Moss, they are
qualified in important and uncertain ways. The disclaimer of implied
warranties is governed by three principles: (1) if either new or used goods
583. See discussion infra Part VIII (D).
584. The difference in approach seems not so much a matter of conscious decision as over-




are covered by an express warranty,"'5 the implied warranties may not be
disclaimed; (2) the implied warranties may not be disclaimed in any sale
of new goods not covered by express warranty unless there is compliance
with an elaborate statutory formula which requires far more detailed
communication to the consumer than Article 2; (3) the implied warranty
of merchantability has a duration for purposes of the Act of no less than
sixty days nor more than one year,586 and express warrantors may limit
the duration of that implied warranty within those parameters.
These provisions differ from the Magnuson-Moss disclaimer rules in
three ways. First, the Magnuson-Moss disclaimer ban does not apply to
sales not covered by express warranties, while Song-Beverly does.5 87 Sec-
ondly, Magnuson-Moss goes further in the case of "full" warranties than
Song-Beverly by prohibiting any limitation on the duration of
merchantability.588 Finally, Song-Beverly puts numbers on the range of
permissible limitation of duration of merchantability in an express war-
ranty rather than leaving it to determination under the standard of
conscionability 89
One of the strong points of Song-Beverly is that it clearly applies to
manufacturers and others in the distribution process. Unfortunately, the
abbreviated adoptions in some of the imitator states are rather vague
about their reach.591 Some aspects of Song-Beverly are troublesome. Its
unique approach of effectively prohibiting disclaimer of merchantability
but compassing it with minimum and maximum limits is perhaps best
explained by returning to the warranty situation that existed at the time
it was drafted. At that time, the common practice of warrantors of con-
sumer goods was to give express warranties and totally disclaim all im-
plied warranties. One consequence was that there was little or no law
determining how long the implied warranty of merchantability persisted.
Undoubtedly, when consideration was being given to prohibiting dis-
claimers of merchantability, warrantors were concerned about how the
merchantability concept that they previously had avoided would apply.
The selection of finite numbers thus served the goal of providing minimal
consumer quality protection without exposing warrantors to the risk that
the concept of merchantability would be stretched beyond what the war-
rantor may consider an unreasonably long period of time. Moreover, the
585. "Express Warranty" is defined in the Act more narrowly than under Magnuson-Moss
or the UCC. See supra text accompanying note 149.
586. In the case of used goods, the periods are reduced to 30 days and three months.
587. See supra text accompanying note 120.
588. See supra text accompanying note 125.
589. See supra text accompanying note 122.
590. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
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selection of specific numbers kept uncertainty within defined limits.
There are, however, countervailing problems that outweigh those
benefits.
From a consumer perspective, the strongest objection is that both
the minimum and maximum time periods are too short for many-per-
haps most--consumer products. There are several lawyer problems.
The interrelationship with Magnuson-Moss is probably the most puz-
zling. For example, assume a two-year express warranty. Under
Magnuson-Moss, the minimum duration of merchantability is two years.
Under Song-Beverly, the maximum duration is one year. Assume an ex-
press warranty of thirty days. Under Magnuson-Moss, the duration of
merchantability would be thirty days if such a limited duration were con-
scionable, and if the duration of the express warranty were reasonable.
Under Song-Beverly, the duration of merchantability would be sixty
days. To further complicate matters, it is conceivable that a limitation of
duration effective under Song-Beverly (within the statutory time parame-
ters) would not be effective under Article 2 to limit the UCC implied
warranty of merchantability. As if all of this were not complicated
enough, the Magnuson-Moss disclosure rules permit the warrantor to
communicate in Magnuson-Moss terms and ignore the specifics of Song-
Beverly. The benefits are blurred by the burdens. 91 From any perspec-
tive, Song-Beverly is another example of strong dissatisfaction with the
disclaimer provisions of Article 2.
Concern about disclaimers is expressed in other states in ways that
affect both process and format. The Washington statute focuses on the
process leading up to disclaimer, requiring that it be "explicitly negoti-
ated. ''5 92 South Carolina, hearkening back to the 1944 proposed Revised
Uniform Sales Act and the early versions of the UCC,5 93 requires speci-
ficity. 94 Several others confine "as is" disclaimers essentially to use with
defective goods.5 95 All five states in the Song-Beverly group condition
disclaimer of the implied warranties on compliance with a ritualistic
formula, going far beyond Section 2-316, to convey a strong message of
transfer of risk.5 96 It is also notable that West Virginia, in banning dis-
claimers of both implied and express warranties, may have overcome,
591. The other states did not address the issue of limitation when adopting shorter ver-
sions, with the consequence that some may be construed to preclude it. There is no helpful
case law on the issue.
592. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
593. The drafting history is briefly set forth in HONNOLD & REITz, supra note 86, at 109-
10.
594. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (Law Co-op 1976).
595. See, e.g., supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
596. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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without even trying to resolve, the problem of a merger clause leveraged
with the parol evidence rule to exclude parol express warranties.59 As
indicated above, the parol evidence and merger issues have been consid-
ered in some other states under unfair and deceptive trade practices
statutes.
2. Remedies for Breach of Express and Implied Warranties
One of the strongest messages conveyed by the very existence of
these special statutes-as augmented by the motor vehicle and mobile
home lemon laws-is that the Article 2 remedy provisions do not work
* well in the consumer context. The special statutes illustrate strong con-
cern about (1) permitting warrantors to limit remedies and exclude con-
sequential damages; (2) the flabbiness of the Article 2 rules governing the
consequences of not remedying defects;, (3) policing of express warranty
obligations; and (4) availability of attorney fees.
a. The ban on remedy limitations and exclusions of
consequential damages
The approach to remedy problems in the total ban states is simple
and generic: With only a very few exceptions, the warrantor may not
limit remedies for breach of implied, and sometimes also of express, war-
ranties.5 98 In at least five of the states, the prohibitions apply to both
manufacturers and retailers, and the statutes in several others can be so
construed.599
The most commonly used provisions in current warranties that
should be invalid under these bans are the ubiquitous clauses which limit
remedies to repair or replacement and exclude consequential damages.
No doubt the drafters of that day also had in mind provisions like those
classics which limited the repair obligation to those parts of the war-
ranted product (for example, automobile or furnace) that were returned
to the factory at the expense of the consumer.'
597. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992). Only West Virginia chose to follow the NA-
TIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 3.302(1) (1970) on this point. See supra text accompanying note
43.
598. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
599. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
600. Probably the most well-known example is the warranty in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which provided in part:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle.., to be fre from defects
in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under this
warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which
shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser
or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur,
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Given the potentially broad sweep of the statutes, it is surprising
that there is relatively little caselaw dealing with remedy limitations.
There are certainly enough cases to show the possibilities, such as the
invalidity of a variety of clauses ranging from "as is" to "50-50" warran-
ties in which the buyer is to pay half the cost of repairs and attempts to
confine consumers to claims against distant component suppliers."° '
Moreover, the case law does not hint at any pervasive problems caused
by the bans.
Although exclusions or limitations of consequential damages seem
doomed in both the total ban and the Song-Beverly states,602 the case law
contains virtually no reference to the issue. This absence of litigation
probably can be explained by the fact that such exclusions routinely are
circumvented in consumer cases, even in non-total ban states, when de-
fects have been serious enough to warrant application of the Article 2
"dynamic duo" of failure of essential purpose and revocation of accept-
ance."°3 All of this would appear to support a provision that banned
such clauses in consumer transactions.
b. Contending with the failure of failure of essential purpose
The Song-Beverly elevation of repair, replacement, or restitution to
statutory obligation presents a sharp contrast to the total ban approach.
In essence, it assumes the existence of the repair or replacement clause
and enhances Article 2 remedies for its breach. Its improvement over the
Article 2 pattern has been to collapse into a single test the two rather
generic and unformatted tests of failure of essential purpose of a limited
remedy (usually of repair or replacement) and revocation of accept-
ance.' This has evolved through the full warranty lemon-aid provisions
of Magnuson-Moss to even more specific form in the current motor vehi-
cle lemon laws. Thus, although some other features of Song-Beverly
be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination shall
disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being expressly
in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabili-
ties on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to assume for
it any other liability in connection with the sale of its vehicles.
Id. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
601. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
602. Under the damages provisions in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794 (West 1985), there is a cross
reference to the appropriate damage sections of UCC Article 2 other than § 2-719 in which
appears the authorization to limit remedies to repair and replacement and limit consequential
damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(b) (West 1985).
603. Many of the consumer cases simply ignore the issue of whether there should be an
analysis of unconscionability of the exclusion. See supra note 42.
604. As already indicated, a third inquiry under § 2-719, whether an exclusion of conse-
quential damages is unconscionable, generally has been ignored in consumer cases.
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have been followed in only a few jurisdictions, these appear in virtually
every jurisdiction in the specific context of motor vehicle and motor
home lemon laws.
In view of the flush of success of the lemon laws, it is tempting to
conclude that their approach to remedies could be applied across the
board to consumer products. A word of caution, however, seems in or-
der. The lemon law remedies implemented in the motor vehicle and mo-
bile home statutes were designed to deal with expensive and complex
products that consumers reasonably expect may require some repair even
when brand new," 5 and which usually can be and are repaired locally
and quicdy. The case may be different for products that are both less
complex and less expensive. Ordinarily it is expected that simpler goods
are ready to go and will not need adjustments. Moreover, most simple
goods are in a price range in which repairs often are not economically
efficient, and the warrantor does not maintain local servicing facilities.
In those cases, the warrantor's promise of repair is hollow when it is
conditioned on the consumer not only incurring the expense of shipping
but also paying a "handling" fee, which in some instances approaches or
exceeds the price of the item. Giving the warrantor a "reasonable
number of attempts" for such a product with such fees would, as a prac-
tical matter, be only a marginal improvement over the current Article 2.
The ban on remedy limitations seems more appropriate.
Song-Beverly attempts to cope with these kinds of problems by
means of provisions designed to police the repair process. The manufac-
turer is required to have sufficient and reasonably close repair facilities
and, ordinarily, to complete repairs within thirty days. If the manufac-
turer does not maintain such facilities, the statute enlists the services of
those in the distributive chain and even independent repairers, whom the
manufacturer is then obliged to indemnify. In addition, the manufac-
turer is obliged to provide adequate literature and parts.60 6
These Song-Beverly features were simplified greatly in the imitator
states, leaving only vestiges of requirements that manufacturers maintain
605. As Professor Whitford has said,
Such a high percentage of new cars require some repair early in their life [sic] that it
is totally unrealistic to say that the manufacturers promise their products will not
contain defects. Certainly the manufacturers themselves view the express warranty
as a promise to repair defects rather than a promise that there will be no defects. If
the express new car warranty is viewed as a promise to repair or replace defective
parts, then it can be said that there is no breach of promise, and certainly no material
breach, until the dealer demonstrates his inability or unwillingness to repair a defect.
William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About
Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83, 157-58.
606. See supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
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or provide sufficient repair facilities. An even more abbreviated and di-
luted requirement appears in some of the total ban states. 6 7 Of all the
special statutory provisions considered, this approach has been enacted
by the fewest statutes. Moreover, the subject matter seems the most dis-
tant from general sales law and perhaps the least appropriate for inclu-
sion in a revised Article 2. Indeed, there is clearly room, even without
express provisions like those in Song-Beverly, for application of little
FTC acts to some of these problems.6
8
California also apparently stands alone regarding statutory efforts to
cope with the problems of shifting to consumers the costs of shipping and
repairing (in the form of variously labeled fees). This may well be one of
the most significant areas unexplored by other state legislatures. Indeed,
it is surprising that questions regarding such practices have not been liti-
gated more under the special statutes.' It is hard to distinguish such
charges from the kind of cost-sharing warranty that has been found to
violate a remedy limitation ban.610 Such charges might also be con-
sidered inconsistent with prohibitions against disclaimers of
merchantability, although no cases have taken that approach.
607. For example, the prohibition against limitation of remedies for breach of express war-
ranties applies unless the manufacturer provides "reasonable and expeditious means of per-
forming warranty obligations." See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1(3) (1992). One
disadvantage of this approach is that litigation may be necessary to determine the adequacy of
the facilities in order to learn whether a remedy limitation is effective.
608. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel Guste v. Fedders Corp., 543 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (M.D. La.
1982) (affirming that Louisiana was not preempted from prosecuting state law claim for unfair
and deceptive trade practices by fact that FiC already had prosecuted manufacturer). For an
analysis that it is both unfair and deceptive for a warrantor not to provide adequate facilities
for service and repair, see BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, MOBILE HOME SALES AND
SERVICE: FINAL STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 421-46 (Aug. 1980).
The Federal Trade Commission Guide for Advertising of Warranties and Guarantees provides
that goods should be advertised as warranted only if the seller or manufacturer "promptly and
fully performs its obligations under the warranty or guarantee." 16 C.F.R. § 239.5 (1992).
609. There has been some significant litigation on this issue under the New York motor
vehicle lemon law. In State by Abrams v. Ford Motor Co., 74 N.Y.2d 495, 503, 548 N.E.2d
906, 911, 549 N.Y.S.2d 368, 373 (1989), the New York Court of Appeals approved (a) a per-
manent injunction enjoining Ford from requiring its customers to pay the first $100 of repairs
under its extended powertrain warranty during the 18,000-mile or two-year period of the New
York lemon statute, and (b) an order for restitution pursuant to a New York statute authoriz-
ing that remedy where a person has engaged in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or has other-
wise demonstrated persistent fraud or illegality in carrying on a business. The charge was
found to be in violation of the New York lemon law requirement that if the vehicle "does not
conform to all express warranties for the earlier of its first two years or 18,000 miles, '[t]he
manufacturer... shall correct said nonconformity... at no charge to the consumer.'" Id. at
500, 548 N.E.2d at 909, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (quoting N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(b)(1)
(McKinney 1992)). Although the provision is technically not a ban against disclaimers or
limitations on remedies, it is at the very least analogous.
610. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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3. Attorney Fees and Sanctions
A common feature of most of the special statutes is provision for
attorney fees. Now that this is a feature of federal law under Magnuson-
Moss, the need for specific provisions in a revised Article 2 is clearly less
compelling than it was before that Act. An Article 2 vthout such a
provision, however, remains an inaccurate statement of the law. There
is, moreover, room for consideration of drafting a different standard.
These statutes, as well at the little FTC acts, provide several different
models. Some of the statutes also provide for sanctions; that is, some
penalty not measured by actual damages. This approach clearly would
be an exception to the general expectations measure of damages set out in
Article 2 and underscored in Section 1-106. However, there is already
precedent for this kind of exception in Section 9-507(1). One problem
regarding sanctions may be noted. In a few states, a sanction is available
theoretically for drafting a form with a prohibited disclaimer or limita-
tion. The lack of cases on this point probably indicates that those provi-
sions have been vitiated by the Magnuson-Moss disclosure regulations
that permit a warrantor to bury state law rights under meaningless boil-
erplate. As a matter of public policy, such conduct should surely be
within the realm of unfair and deceptive practices. Many undoubtedly
would regard it more suitably addressed there than in Article 2. It is,
however, an issue that demands more response than it has received.
4. Bringing Distant Warrantors Under the Law
It is remarkable that Article 2 does not on its face even apply to
transactions between a consumer and a distant warrantor that is not the
consumer's "seller." The special statutes demonstrate several tested
ways to deal with this monumental shortcoming. These include applying
disclaimer and limitation bans to manufacturers as well as retailers, re-
quiring distant warrantors to indemnify immediate sellers, and confer-
ring standing on consumers to obtain remedies directly from the distant
warrantor. There are many details to work out, but these statutes and
the lemon laws are testament that the task can be done and that the
results will not clog the wheels of commerce. Moreover, it should not be
thought that the task is beyond the contemplation of those who drafted
Article 2. Section 121 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, drafted by Karl
Lleweylln, conferred a direct right of action against the party ultimately
responsible for breach of warranty.61
611. UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT § 121 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1) (1944) provided:
DIRECT ACTION AGAINST PRIOR SELLER. Damages from breach of a warranty sus-
tained by the buyer or by any beneficiary to whom the warranty extends under Sec-
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D. Amending the Disclosure Regulations of Magnuson-Moss
One last sad parting word need be said about the disclosure regula-
tions of Magnuson-Moss. As indicated in numerous places in this Arti-
cle, the Federal Trade Commission has authorized warrantors to write
warranties at the level of the lowest common denominator of consumer
rights and use them even in states whose legislatures have provided for
greater rights. This is permitted so long as the warranty concludes with
this printed epitaph: "This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and
you may also have other rights which vary from state to state." Since the
effectiveness of remedies rests in large measure on knowledge of rights,612
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this regulation has vitiated to an
unknown extent many of these special state laws.
This long-standing interpretation is not mandated by the Act. In-
deed, one subsection provides expressly that "[n]othing in this [Act] shall
invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of any consumer under State
Law." '613 Moreover, in 1977, the Commission rejected the contention
that the purpose of the Act "was to preserve uniformity of warranties-
i.e., to ensure that nationwide manufacturer-warrantors would not have
to comply with a multiplicity of State laws on the subject," and insisted
that Congress had rejected the idea of uniformity of warranties either as
"the major purpose" or a "predominant goal" of the Act.614 The regula-
tions should be changed so that consumers will not have to read state
statutes to learn that their warranties are not as limited as they say.
I have heard it said that it is easier to get all the individual state
legislatures to amend the UCC in order to effect change than it is to get
tion 43 may be recovered in a direct action against the seller or any person subject to
impleader under Section 120. An action against one warrantor does not of itself bar
action against another.
Id. The commentary further explained:
Section 121 on direct action follows the established line of cases which . . .have
worked out avoidance of hardship and expense by allowing immediate suit against a
party more remotely, or ultimately, responsible.... Without depriving the plaintiff of
a local remedy, at his choice (with Section 120 and its policy on voucher both avail-
able to protect the local seller) Section 121 makes possible a simplification and cheap-
ening of the remedy, recognizing at the same time the practice of manufactures [sic]
to protect their distributors by taking over the defense of such an action.
Id. § 43 cmt., at 154.
612. Failure to provide a meaningful compensatory damages remedy in consumer cases
"may be attributed, for the most part, to two principal factors, the lack of knowledge by the
consumer of his legal rights and the prohibitive cost of litigation." David A. Rice, Remedies,
Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV.
559, 567 (1968).
613. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(l) (1988).
614. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (1977).
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(and trust) Congress to act in areas of private law. One would hope the
same would not be true of the FTC, but this particular provision (which
a colleague once described beautifully as "one of history's more timid
exercises of authority")6"' has survived for almost two decades. At the
very least, it ought to be possible to induce the Commission to act if the
Revised Article 2 raised the lowest common denominator.
615. 2 RICHARD M. SMITH & DONALD F. CLIFFORD, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE:
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE FORMS ANNOTATED 150 (Supp. 1977).
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